Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 225th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, November 24, 1954 1

top secret

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Assistant Secretary Rose for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (Item 1); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Under Secretary of the Navy; the Under Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Gen. Pate for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President (Item 1); Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President (Item 1); the Naval Aide to the President (Item 2); the White House Staff Secretary; [Page 788] Mr. R.C. Sprague, Consultant to the NSC (Item 2); the NSC Representative on Internal Security (Item 2). The following Members and Advisers of the NSC Planning Board were present for Item 1: Mr. Bowie, State; Gen. Bonesteel, Defense; Gen. Porter, FOA; Mr. Elliott, ODM; Gen. Gerhart, JCS; Mr. Amory, CIA; Mr. Reid, Budget; Mr. Snapp, AEC. The Secretariat consisted of the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2;2 Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 17, 18, 19 and 22, 1954;3 Memo for Gen. Cutler from Director, ODM, dated November 19, 1954;4 NSC 5422/2;5 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Summary of Existing Basic National Security Policy”, dated October 11, 1954;6 NSC Action No. 1251;7 NIE 11–4–548)

Mr. Cutler outlined in a briefing note (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting9) a proposed procedure for Council discussion of the reference problem in terms of a series of topics. With respect to the first of these, “A Statement of the Nature and Scope of the Soviet Threat and Probable Soviet Intentions During the Next Few Years”, Mr. Cutler suggested a postponement of the discussion, with which suggestion the Council concurred. On the second topic, “The Emphasis and Manner of Carrying Out the Existing Policy”, Mr. Cutler stated that this, in his opinion, constituted the principal issue before the Council. The Departments of State and Defense, he indicated, differed perceptibly in their views on this topic. He then called on the Secretary of State for an expression of his views on this topic.

Secretary Dulles spoke first on the negative side, saying that he thought that the area of policy where we had been most lacking in achievement was primarily in the economic field. We were currently [Page 789] in pretty good shape from the point of view of our political and military situation. We did obviously lack a dynamic policy in the economic field, and our foreign economic policy was so uncertain that many of our friends in the free world are in doubt whether they ought to tie their economies in with us or, as an alternative, make an accommodation with the Soviet bloc.

A second serious lack, said Secretary Dulles, was represented by our failure to create an organization for the effective conduct of subversive and counter-subversive operations against the enemy. When we shift to the non-military struggle with our Communist enemies it is clear that the Communists, who have long been practiced in revolutionary techniques, have achieved successes in both subversion and counter-subversion far exceeding our own. Secretary Dulles said he noticed that CIA was equally concerned with this problem, and advocated support of the position taken by the Director of Central Intelligence on a more effective organization for this area of activity.

In other respects than these, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that our basic policy on the whole was pretty good, even (speaking sarcastically) if it hasn’t got us into war, and he was not sure (again sarcastically) that not getting into war was a bad thing. Certainly our policy could not be described as “craven”. We could have got into a war in Indochina, but we had not done so for reasons which were well known. In the case of the British plane shot down by the Chinese Communists in the area of Hainan Island, we again indicated that we were not fearful, and we shot down Chinese Communist aircraft. Certainly we were not timid with respect to over-flights of Soviet territory by U.S. planes. We were about to conclude a defensive treaty with Formosa which would be a “major challenge” to Communist China. In fact, at a recent meeting in Peiping the Chinese Communists said that they would consider such a treaty virtually an act of war. In Europe the United States had been largely instrumental in achieving the decision by our allies to proceed with the rearmament of Germany despite the Soviet Union. Despite all this, said Secretary Dulles, it would be difficult to argue that our policies are not strong, firm, and indicative of a willingness to take risks. But our policy was none the less one which fell short of actually provoking war.

In one respect only was the United States now facing a general deterioration of its position in the world—namely, the forthcoming achievement of atomic plenty and a nuclear balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR. But how, asked Secretary Dulles, were we to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving such a nuclear balance of power without going to war with the USSR? Certainly no actions on the periphery of the Soviet Union would stop the [Page 790] growth of the atomic capabilities of the Soviet Union. If achievement of this capability were to be stopped, it must be stopped in Russia itself, and this meant action against Russia. This did not mean, of course, that we could not do a great deal along the periphery of the Communist empire to prevent the subversion of free nations.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles’ statement, Mr. Cutler called on Secretary Wilson, who said that he looked at the situation very much as Secretary Dulles did. The problem as he saw it, said Secretary Wilson, was to maintain our strength and our world leadership. Accordingly, we should never lose sight of the fact that our free society is a very powerful factor in the world situation. We must be willing to fight for the values of our free society. He said that he was accustomed and liked to analyze problems, both inductively and deductively, and he could demonstrate this position by reference to perhaps ten specific cases. Most of the problems which we now confront in the world derive from three things: First, the aftermath of World War II; second, from the collapse of colonialism which, after all, the United States had itself in a way begun; and third, while naturally we don’t believe in Communism ourselves, it is not so much Communism that we are fighting as it is Soviet imperialist Communism. As proof of this Secretary Wilson cited our attitude toward Yugoslavia, and further indicated that we would not worry so much about Communist China were it not for that country’s alliance with the USSR. It was, in short, the international crusade of Communism that so concerned us. For these reasons Secretary Wilson thought it would be a good thing to base our overall national security policy on the case-by-case study to which he had referred at the outset of his remarks.

Continuing, Secretary Wilson pointed out that another serious problem was posed by the changing techniques of modern warfare, together with the weapons available to us. Some people were anxious to shift to these new weapons too radically. Others appeared to wish to fight the next world war as we had fought World War II. It was necessary to make a wise choice between these two extremes. And, furthermore, we must have patience in our effort to defer another world war for long enough to permit the seeds of decay which were inherent in Communism to have their effect.

Called on by Mr. Cutler, Dr. Flemming said that he would not differ from the position taken by Secretary Dulles, but that he would change the emphasis by putting Secretary Dulles’ last position, with regard to the achievement of nuclear balance of power, in the first place. He said he would also agree with the Defense position as to the desirability of reaching a basic policy position by reference to a case-by-case study. The test should be in each case [Page 791] whether or not a proposed course of action resulted in the weakening of the power of the Soviet Union. Mr. Cutler commented that he had rarely seen a stronger position than that taken by Dr. Flemming in his written report. Dr. Flemming, however, explained and qualified this position.

The President, speaking with conviction, said that it was absolutely essential, if possible, to clarify the basis of the Council’s present discussion. It was certainly not necessary to restate the history of United States policy. He also expressed a strong agreement with Secretary Wilson’s proposal for proceeding on a case-by-case basis. But in many respects, despite the plea for a more dynamic U.S. policy, our policies were not dynamic, but negative. An example was our policy with respect to trade between the free world and Communist China. In any event, the critics of our current policy certainly ought to refer to specific forthcoming problems and decide what they will do when the problem actually must be faced. He agreed, he said, with Secretary Wilson as to the desirability of a dynamic U.S. policy, but he wished this policy to be responsive to specific cases and situations.

Mr. Cutler suggested that perhaps Admiral Radford would be able to suggest such specific actions and cases. Admiral Radford replied that he would try to do so, but at first wished to go back to the problem of specifics. He then referred to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had been expressed more than once in the recent past, on the general subject of the U.S. position upon the attainment of nuclear balance by the USSR. When this occurred, warned Admiral Radford, the Chiefs of Staff had pointed out that the relative power position of the U.S. would have so changed that the U.S. could no longer count on the Russians being afraid of starting general war. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had pointed out that they could no longer guarantee a successful outcome for the U.S. in such a war, and had felt that they must bring these facts to the attention of the President and the National Security Council. Admiral Radford went on to say that assuming that the objectives of Soviet Communism were unchanged, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that some time or other the Soviet Union will elect to force the issue. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs had concluded that the United States has only a limited period of time with which to reach an accommodation with the Communists.

Turning to the subject of specific courses of action, Admiral Radford explained that the Chiefs had felt that they could not suggest specific courses of action because such courses of action could not, in the nature of things, be exclusively military. They would also include diplomatic, political, economic, and propaganda actions. All the Chiefs could do was to guarantee that if such courses of action [Page 792] did result either in a limited or a full-scale war, the outcome for the United States, prior to Soviet achievement of atomic plenty, would be successful. All agree, said Admiral Radford, that Soviet policy since 1945 has operated at the risk of but not deliberately provoking general war, with the objective of dividing and subverting the free world. On the whole this Soviet policy had been very successful, as Indochina had already illustrated. We are now indeed witnessing the result of what might be described as lack of courage of our allies. What we can hope to retrieve in Indochina, if anything, is very debatable. Moreover, we are going to face—and perhaps within the next six months—still another situation where the Communists are certain to generate further difficulties between us and our French allies. For the situation in North Africa, confronting us with a very grave dilemma, will involve the possibility of either losing our whole position in the Middle East by offending the Arabs, or else risking the rupture of our NATO position by offending the French.

In sum, said Admiral Radford, the Joint Chiefs feel that if we continue to pursue a policy of simply reacting to Communist initiatives, instead of a policy of forestalling Communist action, we cannot hope for anything but a showdown with Soviet Communists by 1959 or 1960.

The President, again speaking with considerable forcefulness, said that he was completely unable as yet to perceive a fundamental difference in the approach to basic national security policy among the departments, despite whatever the words spelled out. On the other hand, if our present security policy was as completely futile as Admiral Radford was saying, there would obviously be no need for the Soviet Union to go to war with us; they would achieve their objectives readily enough without resort to war. Where, however, asked the President, were the real differences between the departments and agencies?

Mr. Cutler suggested that perhaps the real difference lay in what the Secretary of State had said in his report—namely, that the United States should not take actions against the Communists which were provocative of war. If we did get into war, we should try to limit such a war. Contrary to this position, Admiral Radford seemed to be calling on the United States to take greater risks of getting into war without, however, actually trying to provoke such a war.

Speaking with impatience, the President said yes, but asked where and how we got more dynamic. He still insisted that everyone really seemed to be in fundamental agreement on our basic policy.

[Page 793]

Secretary Wilson said it was clear to him that while the United States was certainly very strong militarily, such military strength alone did not provide the answer to our problems. Even if our military power had been twice as great as it actually had been over the last two years, things would not have happened any differently in this period. For the future, the great issue was how to spend our money in the right places in defense of our national security. If we spend too little money we will invite aggression; if we spend too much money we will get into a war. This always happened when a military establishment got too big. There was a point of optimum security, insisted Secretary Wilson, which was neither too little nor too great, and it was this level which we must find. How we work out the varying difficult situations which we have inherited from the past and for which we were not responsible, was something which required careful study. The business of the Defense Department, said Secretary Wilson, was of course primarily military, and for that reason their suggestions might have the appearance of differing strongly from the suggestions of other departments. But they felt that a high-level interdepartmental group should take this problem in hand and work out the right courses of action, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended. We should list our problems and have such a group go over them one at a time and suggest the solution.

At the end of his statement, Secretary Wilson urged the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to speak their minds if they were moved to say anything on this subject.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that there seemed to be general agreement on the intelligence background of this problem, and that he agreed specifically with Admiral Radford’s predictions as to the Soviets being relatively stronger in five years. In the interim they would continue to carry on the cold war, and what do we do in response? He added that he had forwarded suggestions to Director Hughes regarding improved means of mobilizing our assets in the cold-war struggle. We have all the elements we require, but there is need for a more effective organization to capitalize on them.

The President interrupted Mr. Dulles to express his hearty agreement, and the latter went on to point out that we were receiving no help from our allies in this field.…

The President again expressed agreement with Mr. Dulles, but insisted that what he proposed was already covered by existing and agreed U.S. policy, and no policy change was required. Mr. Dulles said that all that was needed was a “more aggressive tone”.

Governor Stassen expressed the view that the Council was now moving in the direction of establishing priorities in our national security policies. First priority had formerly been accorded to the defense [Page 794] of Western Europe. This had largely been achieved, and first priority now must be accorded the preventing of the destruction of the United States itself through nuclear attack. Other pressing needs were for acceleration of the build-up of capital resources in underdeveloped areas of the free world, and development of an effective organization to counter Communist subversion of free countries. All the above, said Governor Stassen, were covered in existing policy papers, but not in terms of clear priorities. Moreover, organization for carrying out these policies needed to be revised. Finally, it was essential that we “sell” the European states on the proposition that the impregnability of the United States was essential for their own survival.

Secretary Wilson said that there was nothing basically the matter with our national security policies, and he personally was not “too discouraged” as to actual results. The losses we had sustained were not as great as you might think at first. The U.S. did not need more aggressive security policies, but rather more intelligent execution of those already on the books—better courses of action.

The President replied that the latter task was precisely what this body (the NSC) was here to accomplish. He once again repeated his inability to detect basic policy differences among the Council members, and added that what “we’ve really been talking was not policy but operations.”

Mr. Cutler said that Admiral Radford had taken the position earlier that unless the U.S. undertook more positive measures against the Communist enemy, it would be isolated in the world by 1960 and wide open to Soviet attack. That much was clear. The Secretary of State’s views did not reflect so pessimistic an outlook. Mr. Cutler asked Secretary Dulles if this wasn’t the essential policy difference between himself and Admiral Radford.

The President again said that if we were in so precarious a position in 1960 as Defense believed, it wouldn’t be necessary for the Russians to resort to nuclear attack in order to take over the United States.

Secretary Dulles denied that Mr. Cutler had accurately stated the difference of view between himself and Admiral Radford. The only way in which the views of the Joint Chiefs involved a difference with his own was that the Chiefs’ paper favored the U.S. taking greater risks for bigger goals. His guess was, continued Secretary Dulles, that what the military was really advocating was that we should tell the Soviets that they must restore freedom to Czechoslovakia by a certain date “or else”. Was this correct? In any event, the U.S. had already taken many risks and, except for the set-back in Indochina, with pretty good results. As Secretary [Page 795] Wilson had earlier pointed out, the failure in Indochina stemmed from decisions and policies taken long ago by the French and over which we had no control and which we could not change. Thus we come back to the question of what we can do now to prevent the Soviets from achieving nuclear balance with the United States. We can’t stop this by action in Indochina, nor indeed in China itself. The Joint Chiefs’ views don’t suggest any way of stopping it.

Mr. Cutler said that he could not answer the Secretary of State, but that perhaps Admiral Radford could.

Admiral Radford replied that he could do so only in a negative way. He explained that General Guillaume had been talking with him during his recent visit. Regarding Indochina, Guillaume had argued that it was essential for France to withdraw her troops from the area as fast as possible in order to send them to French North Africa where the situation was becoming critical. French forces in Indochina would be reduced to 125,000 by the end of January 1955. Guillaume explained that many of his country men had virtually abandoned hope of a successful outcome in South Vietnam. The Vietminh had turned out to be real Communists, and there was little chance of effective counteraction.

From this point General Guillaume led into the next great conflict between Communism and the free world, which would occur in North Africa. The French, he said, were determined to hold this area, and the only way to do so was to put in sufficient military force.

Admiral Radford explained that such a French policy in North Africa would be bound to cause tension between France and the United States. Guillaume replied that he realized this, but hoped that the French would be able to explain to us why such a repressive policy was necessary. In short, the French reasoned that if French Africa were lost to the Arabs, it would in short order thereafter be lost to the Western world.

So, concluded Admiral Radford, going back to the position of the Chiefs of Staff on the present paper, Guillaume’s conversations seemed to him (Radford) to show clearly that the Communists are engaging in another divisive action against the free world allies, and it will present the U.S. with a serious dilemma.

Secretary Dulles then inquired of Admiral Radford how the military people would solve the problem of North Africa. Admiral Radford said they would advocate outright support of the Arabs against the French. Secretary Dulles then asked with asperity if Admiral Radford were not making a political rather than a military decision. This was the responsibility of the State Department, not the military.

[Page 796]

The President predicted that the French were about to repeat in North Africa the serious mistakes they had made in Indochina. Military force alone would not hold these colonies.

Mr. Cutler intervened to say that this turn in the discussion led rather naturally into Topic III, “Validity of Our Collective Security System to which Major Allies throughout the World Make Equitable Contributions”. He called on Secretary Dulles, who said that he had nothing to say on this topic. Mr. Cutler then asked Admiral Radford to enlarge on the point made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the danger in the U.S. deferring to the most cautious of its allies.

Admiral Radford cited the events in Indochina last spring as a concrete illustration of the military’s contention. We had in this instance in effect given Britain and France a veto on U.S. actions. North Africa will probably be a case of the same sort. This would play into the hands of the Commies, who desire either to destroy NATO by splitting France from the U.S., or else to destroy our whole position in the Middle East by splitting the Arabs from the U.S.

Mr. Cutler reminded Admiral Radford of the contents of our North African policy, but the latter expressed strong doubt that the French would solve their problem in North Africa by giving a larger degree of freedom to the Arabs.

With respect to North Africa, Secretary Dulles reiterated feelingly that it was basically a political problem and therefore the business of the State Department. Moreover, he questioned in any case whether Admiral Radford’s solution was correct. It was a most serious problem which it was State’s business to think through. To tell the French today that the U.S. would give full support to the Arab position on North Africa would undoubtedly result in French refusal to ratify the London and Paris accords. This in turn would end all hope of German rearmament, on which he understood the Chiefs of Staff to place great store. Once again, he insisted, this was the business of the State Department, not the Defense Department.

Admiral Radford said in effect that he was not intent on invading the prerogatives of the State Department, and had only reluctantly picked out North Africa in response to Mr. Cutler’s “admonition” to cite an illustration of the U.S. tendency to defer to the most timid of its allies.

After further discussion of the situation in North Africa, Secretary Wilson brought the conversation back to Indochina. He said that while of course he was very disappointed in the results, he did not feel quite as Admiral Radford did as to our “faint-hearted allies”. The British and Canadians were not timid. They simply didn’t [Page 797] think it was “smart” to team up with the French in an Indochina war because French policies in this area had been wrong for many years back. The results of past errors made the situation hopeless. The French should have been able to defeat the Vietminh in strict military terms, but there was no “cause” to which the French could rally the native population.

Mr. Cutler then suggested that the Council turn to Topic IV, “General Character of U.S. Economic and Military Assistance”. After summarizing the written suggestions of Governor Stassen and Mr. Streibert (U.S.I.A.) on the subject, Mr. Cutler asked Governor Stassen if he wished to add anything. The latter replied that Mr. Cutler had stated his position very well. The number of divisions which the nations of the free world had on the ground was now less important as a result of the introduction of the nuclear element. Empahsis must therefore be shifted to capital development in these countries. Also we must get our more prosperous allies to assist us to assist the underdeveloped areas of the free world. In conclusion, Governor Stassen said he also accepted the point made by the U.S.I.A.: economic development alone would not do the job of saving these areas from Communism.

Mr. Streibert said that he had nothing to add to his written suggestions.

Admiral Radford explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to defer for a time any positive recommendations on the topic. But he very much doubted if we had yet reached the point where we could run the serious risk of cutting down significantly on the military buildup of the free world nations. Citing Turkey and Portugal’s requests for additional military assistance, he indicated that he thought the U.S. too far committed to most of its military aid programs to be able to withdraw gracefully before completion of the programs.

Governor Stassen admitted that there were exceptions, and that Turkey might well be one. But was the 20-division program for Korea wise? Should it not be scaled down. The same solution might well result from General Collins’ recommendations on South Vietnam. The economic implications of these large, modernized, military establishments were tremendous, and it was necessary to establish a sound balance between economic and military requirements.

Admiral Radford replied that he was well aware of the heavy cost to the U.S. of supporting these extensive military assistance programs. It would perhaps be possible to reduce the current level of the South Korean armed forces because if war again broke out there, it would not be conducted as had the earlier one. However, the South Koreans objected strongly to the redeployment of U.S. divisions. [Page 798] By and large, concluded Admiral Radford, he could not see how we could reduce the force goals of our allies around the world at this time.

Governor Stassen stated that balance is what must be achieved in these assistance programs.

Mr. Cutler then turned to Topic V, “The Mobilization Base”, and asked Dr. Flemming if he had any further views. The latter replied that on the second of his two written suggestions, he merely wanted to reemphasize. The first suggestion was scheduled for discussion by the Council next week and he would withhold comment at this time.

Mr. Hughes inquired with respect to the first point (steps to provide adequate capacity for production of new-type weapons at the rate that would be required immediately following M–Day) whether substantial progress had not already been made. Dr. Flemming did not believe the progress could be called really substantial.

Secretary Wilson commented that when he first came to Washington, it had been clear to him that no one had thought through how you maintained a mobilization base after the orders for materials ran out. This and other areas of the mobilization base needed further study, and Secretary Wilson was sure we could greatly improve our present position.

Mr. Cutler then turned to Topic VI, “Fiscal Policy”, and described the suggestions of Burns 10 as “refreshing for their specificity”. The President interrupted to say that here again we should take account of the meaning of the words and not the words themselves. We are all already in agreement with Arthur’s first point. Dr. Burns said that he had nothing more to add.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that Topic VII (“Additional Counter-Subversive Activity”) had already been covered in earlier discussion.

On Topic VIII (“New Objective”), Mr. Cutler read to the Council a synthesis of the President’s speech in New York, October 20, 1954,11 recast in the form of a basic policy formulation. The only comment was from the President, who said that if his favorite authors were quoted in an NSC policy statement, a credit line should be included (laughter).

Mr. Cutler pointed out that Topic IX (“East-West Trade”) would be considered at next week’s Council meeting. Governor Stassen, however, asked to say a word now. He felt it was obvious that the [Page 799] U.S. could not “sit still” on this problem of East-West trade, particularly as respected Communist China. We cannot long maintain our demands for a virtual embargo. The longer we remain sitting, the worse it will be for our interests. We will lose our friends and at the same time fail to make any kind of deal with our enemies. The restrictions on free world trade with Communist China would eventually have to come down to the level of the restrictions against such trade with the European Soviet bloc.

Secretary Dulles said that he had considerable hesitation about relaxing restrictions on trade with Communist China at this moment.

Mr. Cutler then inquired whether he could assume that the Council desired the NSC Planning Board to produce a revised basic national security policy reflecting the views expressed at the meeting.

Governor Stassen inquired whether there was not room in our policy for greater emphasis on ways and means of dividing the Soviet bloc.

The President summarized his view that our national security policies were now well-stated. What he wanted, in addition, was advance identification on problems that were coming up. Perhaps a study by government people or by foundations like that at 68th and Park (Council on Foreign Relations) could anticipate such problems and list possible solutions to them. In any case, said the President, he was tired of abstractions; they got him down.

Governor Stassen said that the Council should focus its undivided attention on three prime points:

1.
To see to it that the USSR never got in a position to knock out the U.S.
2.
To see to it that the Soviets could seize no further free world territory without an act of overt aggression.
3.
To study how to put strains on the Soviet bloc in order to cause dissension and to divide the bloc.

Secretary Wilson asked about the JCS recommendation for a high-level interdepartmental group to recommend courses of action to carry out the objectives of our revised basic security policy. The President said he would consider this recommendation and talk it over later with Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson. Secretary Dulles said that he supposed that it was the specific function of the NSC Planning Board to recommend courses of action. Secretary Wilson said that this case was a little different. The group recommended by the JCS conceived the problem as more operational than policy-forming, and of the group itself as an “action committee”.

[Page 800]

The National Security Council: 12

a.
Discussed the subject on the basis of the suggestions thereon of the Secretary of State (reference memorandum dated November 17), the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (reference memorandum dated November 22), the Director, Foreign Operations Administration (reference memorandum dated November 19), the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization (reference memorandum for General Cutler, dated November 19), the Director, U.S. Information Agency (reference memorandum dated November 22), the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (reference memorandum dated November 22), and the Director of Central Intelligence (reference memorandum dated November 19); as orally summarized by topic at the meeting by Mr. Cutler.
b.
Directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare for early Council consideration a restatement of basic national security policy in the light of the above-mentioned suggestions and discussion.
c.
Discussed the desirability of a study, by governmental and private organizations, of specific measures which might be taken during the next few years before the achievement of mutual nuclear plenty to increase the determination and cohesion of the free world and to weaken and if possible divide the Soviet bloc, at the risk of but without being provocative of war.

Note: The action in c above subsequently submitted to the President for consideration.

2. Continental Defense (Progress Reports, dated November 16, 1954, by the Department of the Treasury, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the ICISIIC, on NSC 540813)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council in detail with respect to the subject, generally along the lines indicated in his “Briefing Note” dated November 20, 1954 (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).14

Mr. Cutler indicated, with respect to the ODM Progress Report, that the Planning Board was of the firm view that a clear and commonly understood civil attack warning program should be established at the earliest possible date. Dr. Flemming agreed with this point, stating that he thought, as a result of recent conferences which he had held with Governor Peterson and General Chidlaw, that the desired objective could soon be achieved. Dr. Flemming mentioned that such a program must be tied in with the National Indications Center. Mr. Allen Dulles stated that a directive would [Page 801] soon go out which would have the effect of activating the National Indications Center with headquarters in the Pentagon.

Dr. Flemming stated, with respect to Mr. Cutler’s briefing on the status of emergency relocation, that he wouldn’t want the impression left with the Council that there was not now in existence an approved operating procedure for giving warning to the emergency relocation forces of the Executive Branch. He said there was in fact an operating procedure in existence, but it was of such a nature that it ought to be changed.

After Mr. Cutler briefed the Council with respect to the Planning Board’s consideration of the highlights of the Progress Reports submitted by ODM, FCDA, AEC, Treasury, and IICICIS, he called upon Mr. Sprague, the Council’s Consultant on Continental Defense. Mr. Sprague thereupon read to the Council his report on the subject dated November 24, 1954 (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting;15 copies were not distributed at the Council meeting). Mr. Sprague then read a two-page supplementary memorandum which he suggested the Council might consider in reference to a one-page chart which he had prepared for the purpose of pointing up some personal views which he had formulated following his thirteen months study of the subject. (Copy of the above-mentioned memorandum and chart filed in the minutes of the meeting;16 copies of the memorandum were not distributed at the meeting; copies of the chart were distributed and recalled at the end of the meeting.)

The President, upon the completion of Mr. Sprague’s presentation, indicated that, as usual, he was very grateful for the excellent services which Mr. Sprague had performed in this highly important field. The President made particular reference to the above-mentioned chart, stating that it was one of the most useful types of information that could possibly be put before the NSC.

The National Security Council: 17

a.
Noted and discussed the reference Progress Reports and the Progress Report by the Department of Defense on the subject distributed at the meeting.
b.
Adopted the following recommendations by the NSC Planning Board:
(1)
Early establishment of a basic program to insure the existence of a clear, effective, and commonly understood means for communicating timely warnings of impending attacks, as well as appropriate guidance as to the steps to be taken on receipt [Page 802] of such warnings by (a) the President and his immediate entourage, (b) personnel of the essential wartime functions of the Executive Branch, and (c) the general civil population.
(2)
Consideration of additional statutory authority to insure that State and local civil defense agencies adopt plans and programs consistent with the guidance furnished them pursuant to (1) above.
(3)
Press for legislation (similar to that recommended to the 83rd Congress) to provide payment of rewards as an inducement for defectors and informants to supply information leading to the recovery or acquisition of nuclear weapons or fissionable material illegally introduced or attempted to be introduced into the United States.
(4)
Provide that the next Progress Reports on Continental Defense cover the period through April 15, 1955, to be submitted to the NSC Staff by May 20, 1955.
c.
Noted the Report by Mr. Sprague, Consultant to the NSC, with reference to the above-mentioned Progress Reports and the report by the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee presented at the 222nd meeting of the Council (NSC Action No. 1260).18
d.
Agreed that Recommendations Nos. 1 through 7 in the report by Mr. Sprague should be referred to the Secretary of Defense for consideration.
e.
Agreed that Recommendation No. 8 in the report by Mr. Sprague should be referred to the organizational machinery to insure a continuous evaluation of net capabilities, as determined by the President pursuant to NSC Action No. 1260–b.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted as follows for implementation:

b–(1):
Director, ODM, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, in consultation with the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other appropriate agencies.
b–(2):
Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
b–(3):
The Attorney General.
b–(4):
Departments and agencies responsible for reporting on the various elements of continental defense.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the Secretary of Defense.

(Note: The summary of the discussion on Item 2 above was written by Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security.)

S. Everett Gleason
  1. Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Nov. 26.
  2. Dated Oct. 30, 1953, p. 577.
  3. The memoranda under reference pertain to the papers prepared by the Directors of Foreign Operations, of Central Intelligence, and of the U.S. Information Agency, and those prepared by the Department of State and by the Secretary of Defense between Nov. 9 and 22, pp. 770 ff.
  4. For text of this paper, with attachment, see p. 781.
  5. Dated Aug. 7, p. 715.
  6. For text of this memorandum, with enclosure, see p. 738.
  7. Regarding NSC Action No. 1251, see footnote 3, ibid .
  8. Extracts from NIE–11–4–54, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1954”, are scheduled for publication in volume viii .
  9. Briefing note not found. For information on minutes of NSC meetings, see footnote 1, p. 394.
  10. Reference is to Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Burns’ “suggestions” under reference have not been found; but see footnote 1, p. 784.
  11. Reference is to the President’s address at the American Jewish Tercentenary Dinner, New York City, Oct. 20, 1954, printed in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 920–928.
  12. Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1272. (S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)
  13. The progress reports under reference are in S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5408 Series. NSC 5408, Feb. 11, is printed on p. 609.
  14. Briefing note not found.
  15. Report not found.
  16. Memorandum not found.
  17. Paragraphs a–e constitute NSC Action No. 1273. (S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)
  18. For documentation on the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee, see pp. 845 ff.