S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, “Review of Basic Natl
Sec Policy, Sept–Nov, 1954”
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)1
top secret
Washington, November 22, 1954.
- Subject:
- Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2 and NSC
5422/2)2
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided the following comments regarding
desirable changes in United States basic security policy. These comments are
as follows:
- “1. At this time, when ‘Existing Basic National Security
Policy’ is under review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel it their
duty specifically to draw attention to the evolution of a
situation which, militarily, could involve progressively more
serious risks to national security than those we now face. The
struggle between the Communist and non-Communist world is now in
a critical era and within a period of relatively few years will
probably reach a decisive state.
- “2. There is no acceptable evidence of abandonment or major
modification of the Communist objective of achieving ultimate
world domination, using armed force, if necessary. There is no
abatement of Communist efforts to infiltrate, subvert and
control non-Communist Governments. Communist machinery for
exerting this effort continues to be augmented and strengthened.
Communist armed strength and war-making potential, including
capability for thermonuclear attack, continue to
increase.
- “3. This combination of objective and capabilities together
comprise a threat to the non-Communist world in general and to
our national security in particular. The growth of this threat,
with the enormously increased potentiality for destruction,
deriving from capability in the thermonuclear field, and growing
fear, in certain non-Communist nations of involvement in atomic
war, with a definite trend toward neutralism, are some of the
major forces in the situation now evolving.
- “4. The non-Communist world, if it takes positive and timely
dynamic countermeasures, presently
has ample resources to meet this situation, and with high chance
of maintaining world peace without sacrifice of either vital
security interests or fundamental moral principles, or in the
event of war being forced upon it, of winning that war beyond
any reasonable doubt. On the other hand, failure on the part of
the free world and particularly of the United States to take
such timely and dynamic action could, within a relatively short
span of years, result in the United States finding itself
isolated from the rest of the free world and thus placed in such
jeopardy as to reduce its freedom of action to two
alternatives—that of accommodation
[Page 786]
to Soviet designs or contesting such
designs under conditions not favorable to our success.
- “5. Paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2
states ‘… the broad aim of U.S. security policies must be to
create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty,
conditions under which the United States and the free world
coalition are prepared to meet the Soviet-Communist threat with
resolution and to negotiate for its alleviation under proper
safeguards.’ When adopted, it was considered that NSC 162/2 provided a basic policy
which held promise of achieving this broad aim, despite the lack
of concrete definition of the ‘conditions’ to be created.
However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, in the interim
since the adoption of NSC 162/2,
the Soviet-Communist threat has not been reduced, while the time
available for the establishment of more secure conditions has
appreciably diminished. It is deemed pertinent to the review of
current policy to determine whether this lack of progress should
be attributed to the policy itself or to the efficacy of steps
taken in implementation thereof.
- “6. The United States rejects the concept of preventive war or
acts intended to provoke war. Thus, a definite limit is
established beyond which our policy and courses of action to
implement that policy should not go. However, there remains a
wide latitude between a category of somewhat passive measures
which are reactive or counteractive to Soviet acts or threats of
aggression and a category of more positive measures to be
undertaken ‘even at the risk of but without deliberately
provoking war.’ A study of NSC
162/2 discloses that it provides verbal accommodations for
either of these categories of security measures. Meaningful
evaluation of basic security policy, however, includes
recognition of the interpretations given to such policy
statements in their actual application. In this sense it is
clear that steps taken under NSC
162/2 have not resulted in a reduction of the Soviet-Communist
threat. On the contrary, NSC
162/2 as basic security policy has been attended by continued
emphasis on reactive-type security measures and continued growth
of the threat to the free world. Accordingly, it is believed
necessary to remove from NSC
162/2 its present preponderant commitment to a policy of
reaction, with the purpose of providing a basic U.S. security
policy of unmistakably positive quality.
- “7. While NSC 162/2 has
sufficient flexibility to have served as adequate guidance to
meet Soviet aggressions occurring during its existence, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that in the formulation of subsidiary
policies pertaining to particular countries or regions, there
have been deviations from the guidelines provided in NSC 162/2 and that, in the
application of these policies, the United States has not focused
upon the achievement of the broad objective of our basic
security policy. It is considered that the timely achievement of
the broad objective of U.S. security policy cannot be brought
about if the United States is required to defer to the counsel
of the most cautious among our Allies or if it is unwilling to
undertake certain risks inherent in the adoption of dynamic and
positive security measures. In summary, it is the view of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that the objective stated in paragraph 45
of NSC 162/2 remains valid but
it is imperative that our basic security
[Page 787]
policy, when revised, reflect throughout
the greater urgency of the present situation, define concretely
the conditions which it is the aim of our security policy to
create, and direct the formulation of courses of action designed
to achieve the basic objective. In the final analysis, the
criterion as to each course of action to be adopted should be
determined by what best serves the interests of the United
States.
- “8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing
views be presented to the National Security Council. A statement
of the specific methods of implementing paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2 and paragraphs 12 and 13
of NSC 5422/2 should be charged
to some existing or ad hoc agency of the
NSC, so constituted as to
membership as to insure that all major political, military,
economic, and financial considerations will be accorded their
due consideration.”
The Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force agree with these comments as
do I. I am transmitting them to you as the views of the Department of
Defense for the consideration of the National Security Council.
