S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 172
Report to the National Security Council by the Executive
Secretary (Lay)1
top secret
NSC 172/1
Washington, November 20, 1953.
Note by the Executive Secretary to the
National Security Council ON Interim Defense Mobilization Planning
Assumptions
References:
- A.
- NSC 1722
- B.
- NSC Action No. 9633
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Acting
Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 171st Council meeting on November 19,
1953, amended and adopted, subject to review by the Council early in 1954,
the report contained in NSC 172, as interim
defense mobilization planning assumptions, to provide a basis for the
Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, in consultation as
appropriate with the Secretary of Defense and other departments and
agencies, to develop more specific guidance which will insure adequate and
uniform planning by all departments and agencies having mobilization
responsibilities, with the understanding that the plans so made are subject
to review and appropriate revision in the light of their cost, timing, and
feasibility. The report, as amended by NSC
Action No. 963, is enclosed herewith.
The President has this date approved, in accordance with the above Council
action, the interim defense mobilization assumptions enclosed herewith.
Accordingly, the enclosure is being referred to the Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization.
[Enclosure]
Report by the National Security Council
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Interim Defense Mobilization Planning
Assumptions
(Subject to review by the National Security Council early
in 1954)
In fulfilling their defense mobilization responsibilities, agencies will
plan on the following interim assumptions:
- 1.
- There will continue to be a long period of tension with
possible local aggressions not involving full scale U.S.
military action. Global war is possible at any time, but its
occurrence on Soviet initiative is considered to be unlikely in
FY 1954 and FY 1955 (the period covered by
current estimates). Estimates for the subsequent period are more
uncertain.
- 2.
- In the event of global war, the enemy will include the USSR,
the Soviet Satellites and Communist China.
- 3.
- While global war may last for an extended period up to four
years, planning for its duration should be based upon all
assumptions herein stated, with particular emphasis on paragraph
14.
- 4.
- Global war may be initiated without warning, or may be
preceded by local hostilities or other events requiring
stepped-up mobilization.
- 5.
- Global war will involve nuclear attack on and massive
destruction to selected major urban areas of the United States
wherein our principal Government centers and a large portion of
our productive capacity and population are located. Global war
will also involve substantial damage by nuclear attack on or
sabotage to military and key industrial facilities not located
in major urban areas. Large scale attacks and sabotage will take
place on selected important European and other free world
critical industrial areas, and on U.S. and allied overseas
bases. In evaluating the effect of the damage to the free world,
described in the three preceding sentences, appropriate weight
will be given to the damage which will be done by the free world
to the enemy and its resources.
- 6.
- Total wartime demand on the economy will be larger than can be
supported in terms of production (including transportation and
power) and manpower. Under full mobilization, manpower (the
total labor force) will be one of the seriously limiting
resources even assuming maximum utilization.*
- 7.
- During the war period, the United States will be a substantial
net supplier of military and non-military material to its
allies.* However, it will be a net importer from
certain areas, notably South America.
- 8.
- War will be fought by the United States as part of an alliance
which will be more highly integrated and at least initially more
extensive than that of World War II, and the industrial capacity
and manpower of our allies will be used to the maximum extent
possible.
- 9.
- War will involve initial denial of several areas of the free
world to the United States and its allies.
- 10.
- Shipping losses will be high in the first year of the war but
will diminish later in the war.
- 11.
- Before war or a period of increased tension begins, the U.S.
economy will be operating at high levels but with somewhat
greater unemployment than at present. Capacity and production
will be at higher levels than at present.
- 12.
- When increased tension threatens to create a scramble for
resources and serious inflationary pressures, production and
stabilization controls will be imposed.
- 13.
- Global war will result in the reduction of civilian living
standards below those in World War II, but because of the need
for post-attack restoration of minimum living standards, total
civilian requirements may be temporarily larger at times.
- 14.
- The capacity, adaptability and ingenuity of American industry
will enable it, after a period of recovery, partially to offset
the loss of capacity and sources of supply resulting from enemy
action. Because the initial shock of such action will paralyze
some sections of industry, other sections will be forced to
produce for recovery rather than for immediate war time needs,
and deliveries of weapons and military equipment and supplies
will be curtailed for a considerable period thereafter.
- 15.
- Barring basic change in the world situation, materials and
facilities deficiencies will decline so that by the end of
FY 1954 existing controls can
be dropped.
- 16.
- The present Universal Military Training and Service Act will
be continued for the period short of global war. Following the
initiation of global war, this Act will be drastically amended
in accordance with a plan being developed.†
