Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 171st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 19, 1953¹

[Extracts]

top secret
eyes only

November 19, 1953

Present at the 171st meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present at the meeting were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency (for Item 1); The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

. . . . . . .

3. Interim Defense Mobilization Planning Assumptions (NSC 172)²

In introducing this report, Mr. Cutler outlined the reasons why Mr. Flemming had desired the National Security Council to endorse the assumptions, and the considerable difficulties which the Planning Board had encountered in framing them. Specifically, he pointed out that it had been impossible to agree in the Planning Board on the wording of the third assumption, dealing with the probable length of a future global war. He also pointed out the Planning Board’s view that if the Council adopted these assumptions as a basis for detailed ODM mobilization plans, such detailed plans would themselves be subject to subsequent review. Lastly, Mr. Cutler pointed out the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that final action on the present report should not be taken at this meeting. On the other hand, if no action were taken, Mr. Flemming would have to fall back on prior sets of assumptions which presumably had even less validity than those now set forth.

Mr. Flemming then expressed appreciation for the contribution made by the Planning Board in its formulation of these assumptions. He also indicated awareness of the difficulty of fixing now on long-term assumptions, and agreed that the assumptions set forth in the present report should be considered as interim in character. Nevertheless, since some kind of guidance was now essential for the ODM, he expressed the hope that the Council would adopt the present assumptions as guidance to the ODM in the formulation of its plans and programs.

Secretary Wilson pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were at the moment engaged in a reappraisal of U.S. military strategy. Accordingly, the mobilization assumptions could hardly be valid until this reappraisal was completed. For that reason he wished to go on record as supporting the suggestion of the JCS that the Council postpone action on the present report.

While Secretary Humphrey expressed agreement with Secretary Wilson, Mr. Flemming, although quite prepared to revise these assumptions when the Joint Chiefs had completed their new strategic plan, insisted that in the meantime he must have reasonable assumptions which would enable him to get his programs in shape to take before the Congress when it met in January.

The President suggested that greater progress might be made if the Council addressed itself to the specific assumptions in the report and particularly those which appeared to involve a disagreement.

Mr. Cutler reiterated that the chief disagreement related to paragraph 3, which assumed that if global war broke out it would last four years or a period up to four years.

The President agreed that it was of course very difficult to make even an educated guess as to how long such a war would last, and that it was also desirable to look at this question again after the Joint Chiefs had completed their job. Meanwhile, however, he could perceive no particular objection to the assumption that such a global war would last “up to four years”.

Secretary Humphrey replied that the trouble lay in the length of time, since the longer we assume the war will last the more we will be inclined to spend in order to prepare for its prosecution.

The President took issue on this point with Secretary Humphrey, and said that it was quite possible that the most expensive war to prepare for was the one which would last only a few months, because in that case you would have to have everything in readiness in advance of the war to assure its successful prosecution. He certainly didn’t want Arthur Flemming to spend $300 million on stockpiling some material or other if $50 million would do the job.

Mr. Flemming illustrated the President’s generalization by reference to the stockpiling program, and also pointed out that prior acts of assumptions with regard to the length and character of a global war involving the United States had never taken account adequately of the massive damage which this country might suffer from an enemy atomic attack. For this reason if for no other, it was desirable to have the Council act on the present assumptions rather than to compel him by default to fall back on earlier and more unrealistic assumptions.

While the President took no issue on this point, he did indicate his hope that the Council, in dealing with the problem of the character and duration of the war, would take into consideration the blow which our own atomic capability could deliver against the enemy. As he had pointed out before, said the President, our estimates of the enemy’s capabilities always tend to overlook what the United States was capable of doing to the enemy. From this point the President launched into a discussion of the stake of the civilian in the economy of the United States in the event of another global war. He expressed himself as convinced that American civilians would undergo a regime of austerity unprecedented in their history. He was certain, for example, that in order to solve our manpower problems it would be necessary to conscript women. That was a subject about which many people had views, but very few were willing to express them publicly, owing to the political repercussions.

With respect to paragraphs, Secretary Dulles offered the opinion that as drafted the language suggested that it was possible to make a scientific estimate with regard to the length of the war. Of course, no such scientific estimate was possible, and Secretary Dulles thought the difficulty could be overcome if paragraph 3 were introduced by a statement indicating that you were merely suggesting four years of war as a means of planning for stockpiles. Indeed, continued Secretary Dulles, he was not at all sure that a future war, in which we were ranged against both the USSR and Communist China, would not last for even ten years. It could end up with such complete political disintegration of the world as to make a stable peace impossible.

Secretary Humphrey expressed the view that paragraph 3 did not actually constitute an attempt to estimate how long a future global war would last. It was, rather, an estimate as to how long a war we should be prepared to plan. Could anyone, he asked, guess what we would be in a position to do at the conclusion of two years of global war in the future? In short, a two-year period was probably the utmost that you could realistically plan for, and it was his recommendation that Mr. Flemming formulate his programs on a two-year basis.

Expressing agreement with Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Wilson stated that if we had on hand all the materials we needed to prosecute a war for a period of two years, we would be able to turn in a very good performance. If a longer period were envisaged, Secretary Wilson was afraid that we would now spend our money for the wrong things.

The President did not, however, agree with Secretaries Wilson and Humphrey. As it seemed to him, the problem boiled down to telling the Office of Defense Mobilization to rely to the greatest possible extent on measures that we could take after the war had started, as well as on measures and materials which would be needed prior to the outbreak of the war. For these reasons, he still believed that the phraseology “up to four years” was as reasonable as one could expect.

Mr. Cutler then called the Council’s attention to the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the statement in paragraph 4, which suggested that war could be initiated without warning. On the contrary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that if the Soviets deliberately initiated global war, they would have to undertake measures to prepare for this event which they could not disguise from us. Accordingly, we would have some kind of warning of their plans.

Mr. Allen Dulles, however, said that he had been unable to agree with the position taken by the Joint Chiefs if it ruled out the possibility of a Soviet sneak attack which would have no advance warning.

Mr. Cutler then outlined the comment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to paragraph 5, as to the character and destruction to be anticipated from a nuclear attack in a global war. The Joint Chiefs believed that the language in the present paragraph 5 made the worst possible case and was too pessimistic an assumption for planning purposes.

Mr. Flemming commented that at least the paragraph should make some reference to the damage which the United States would be able to inflict on the Soviet Union in order to present a reasonable case.

Secretary Wilson, however, stated that this strengthened his already-expressed view of the inadequacy of the present set of assumptions. He felt that a new group of individuals, like those originally called together for the Solarium project,³ should now be constituted “to give this thing a whole new look”.

The President, however, pointed out to Secretary Wilson that the authors of this paragraph had had all the advantages of the findings of the Bull Committee with respect to the very problem in paragraph 5.

Secretary Humphrey also thought that the present language was much too pessimistic and black-and-white. If one really believed the statement in paragraph 5, it would be his duty to advocate the immediate dispersion of our entire industrial plant.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that of course if it was taken out of context paragraph 5 did create an unduly alarming picture, but he insisted that pararaph 5 was expected to be read in the context of the other paragraphs in the paper, and particularly in relation to paragraph 14.

Governor Stassen supported Mr. Cutler’s position by pointing out that according to the basic estimate in NSC 162/2⁴ which the Council had recently approved, the Soviets were unlikely to initiate global war unless they estimated that they could do just about everything to the United States in an initial attack that had been set forth in this paragraph.

The National Security Council:⁵

Adopted, subject to review by the Council early in 1954, the report contained in NSC 172, as interim defense mobilization planning assumptions, to provide a basis for the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, in consultation as appropriate with the Secretary of Defense and other departments and agencies, to develop more specific guidance which will insure adequate and uniform planning by all departments and agencies having mobilization responsibilities, with the understanding that the plans so made are subject to review and appropriate revision in the light of their cost, timing, and feasibility; subject to the following changes:

a. Paragraph 1: In line 1, insert “a” before “long”.

b. Paragraph 1: In line 6, strike out the parenthetical word “prospects” and the footnote.

c. Paragraph 3: Strike out the material appearing in parentheses, and substitute therefor the following: “While global war may last for an extended period up to four years, planning for its duration should be based upon all the assumptions herein stated, with particular emphasis on paragraph 14.”

d. Paragraph 4: In the second line, delete “a”.

e. Paragraph 5: Add at the conclusion of the paragraph the following sentence: “In evaluating the effect of the damage to the free world, described in the three preceding sentences, appropriate weight will be given to the damage which will be done by the free world to the enemy and its resources.”

f. Page 2, footnote: In the second line, insert “the” before “military”.

Note: NSC 172, as amended, and approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 172/1, and referred to the Director, ODM.⁶

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Nov. 20.
2. NSC 172, Report to the National Security Council on Interim Defense Mobilization Planning Assumptions, Nov. 13, is not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 172 Series) NSC 172 was based upon two earlier draft papers on interim defense mobilization assumptions. The first, prepared by the NSC Planning Board Assistants on the basis of an Office of Defense Mobilization initial draft of Sept. 24 is dated Nov. 2. The second, dated Nov. 4, is a revision of the Nov. 2 draft by the NSC Planning Board. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, “Defense Mobilization Planning”) No record of the Sept. 24 draft has been found in Department of State files. NSC 172/1 is printed infra.
3. For information on Project Solarium which culminated in NSC 153/1 of June 10, 1953, see the memorandum by Cutler, May 9, p. 323 and subsequent documents. For text of NSC 153/1, see p. 378.
4. Dated Oct. 30, p. 577.
5. The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 963. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)
6. NSC 172/1 is printed infra.