Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “NSC 153–162, Sept–Dec. 1953”

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the President¹

top secret

[Washington,] December 3, 1953.

1. Paragraph 39b of NSC 162/2² (Basic National Security Policy) provides, in part, that “in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.” In approving NSC 162/2, the Council noted that action should be promptly taken “to conform existing arrangements regarding atomic weapons to subparagraph 39b.” (Action 944c)³ In discussing this matter, the Special Committee, composed of State, Defense, and AEC brought to light the existence of differences of opinion between State and Defense as to the meaning of paragraph 39b. Accordingly, the two Departments were requested to prepare memoranda for the President regarding their views.

2. The Department of State had understood that the purpose of paragraph 39b was primarily to permit the military to make plans on the basis of the availability of nuclear weapons. It also agrees that, as a corollary, custody of atomic weapons should in large part be transferred from the AEC to the Department of Defense.

3. The Department of State, however, does not construe paragraph 39b to be a present decision that atomic weapons will, in fact, be used in the event of any hostilities. In its opinion, the decision to use atomic weapons will necessarily involve the gravest political and foreign policy aspects. For example, in cases of limited hostilities, it will be essential to consider whether the use of atomic weapons will widen the hostilities, lose the support of Allies, or increase the danger of strategic use of atomic weapons by the enemy.

4. In our opinion, the President should decide these issues from case to case in the light of the actual circumstances. Undoubtedly it will be possible to isolate certain cases where the use of such weapons would be virtually automatic. Obviously, in the event of an atomic Pearl Harbor there would be no question of our use of atomic weapons in retaliation. With the development of tactical atomic weapons it may also be possible to identify in advance certain kinds of tactical use which would be authorized in reacting to aggression.

5. The State Department position, however, is that these issues have not been decided by paragraph 39b. They can and should be further explored to establish suitable procedures which will take account of the political issues in deciding upon use of atomic weapons in a particular case.

WBS

1. Drafted by Bowie and Arneson.
2. Dated Oct. 30, p. 577.
3. For NSC Action No. 944–c, see footnote 5, p. 575.