PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “NSC 153–162, Sept–Dec, 1953”
Memorandum by W. Barton Leach of the Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)1
Some question has been raised as to the interpretation of certain paragraphs of NSC 162/22 dealing with our capabilities in Western Europe, the function of our forces there, and future developments as to U.S. forces in that area. The questions arise in paragraphs 15 and 34.
The first interpretation is this: Neither the forces we now have nor any forces we are likely to put there, together with NATO forces, can be expected to defend successfully the land areas of the NATO allies if the Soviet Union makes an all-out invasion of Western Europe. The function of U.S. forces in Western Europe is the same as that of the U.S. forces in Berlin—a political function, assuring both friend and enemy that any attack on that area automatically produces a war to the death with the U.S. Our present deployment in Europe is excessive and should be reduced, since the forces necessary to provide requisite assurance to friend and enemy are less than those now deployed. U.S. ability to sustain the Free World is strengthened by withdrawing forces from exposed salients on the periphery and retaining them in positions from which flexibility of use can be assured. It is the job of the State Department to make palatable to NATO the withdrawal of some U.S. forces now in Europe, even though it is recognized that at the present time such withdrawal would be very unpalatable indeed.
The second interpretation is this: The mission of U.S. forces in Europe is to assist in giving to Europe the capability of defending [Page 599] the land area of the NATO allies. U.S. forces in Europe are not now capable of performing that mission. Therefore U.S. forces not only should not be withdrawn from Europe, but should be strengthened. Western Europe is a critical area which the U.S. must defend. Any reference to withdrawal of peripheral forces does not include U.S. contributions to NATO in Western Europe.
This conflict of interpretation exists. It is desirable that it should be resolved if effective planning is to take place in the Department of Defense. There is a real possibility that forces and strategy will be determined by compromising the concept—i.e. “agreeing” upon forces that are half-way between those that are necessary under the first interpretation and those that are necessary under the second.