340/8–2553
Special Report of the United States Delegation to the Sixteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council, Geneva, June 30–August 5, 1953 1
[Here follow a letter of transmittal containing a brief table of contents and Section I, “Comments on Other Delegations at the Conference.”]
II. Objectives and Results
The United States Delegation did not come to this session of the Council with any “bold new program” to establish. The objective in both the social and economic fields was rather in the nature of a holding action: to avoid any large-scale financial commitments, direct or implied, to adjust and improve programs already underway.
This has generally been accomplished with only minor sacrifices of the United States position. With the exception of taking the forced labor and freedom of information items off the agenda, the actions of the Council have supported the United States position or have been, at least, satisfactory compromises. The number of actions taken by unanimous vote has been quite gratifying.
It might also be stated that one of the major accomplishments was the improvement of our relations with practically all of the nations represented. Every member of the Delegation, including the [Page 277] permanent staff in Geneva, worked for this objective, apparently with some success. As well as can be judged, the United States Delegation as a whole conducted itself with the efficiency and dignity so as to earn the respect of other delegations. The credit for this, in large measure is due the chairman of the Delegation, Mr. John C. Baker. Although he himself would object, it should be mentioned that his success in working with other delegations and his inspiring leadership resulted in a remarkably smooth working and cooperative Delegation throughout.
At the 16th Session, we played for time on the ground that a comprehensive review of U.S. foreign economic policy was under way and would take until at least next spring to complete.2 But will we be ready to move forward next spring, within the UN framework, with an imaginative, constructive line that will maintain our position of leadership and strengthen the confidence and security of our friends?
We profess great faith in the United Nations but we have reached the point where we must be better prepared to demonstrate that faith in concrete economic and social programs, which are not completely dwarfed by our bilateral programs, or we must temper our professions of faith. We need both a better understanding of our long-term objectives in the Economic and Social Council and of our overall objectives at each session.
The results on the more important items as summarized by the member of the Delegation responsible are as follows:
[Here follows discussion of several reports, of a review of 1954 programs, and of the issue of full employment.]
Item 3(a): Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development
This item was generally regarded by underdeveloped countries as the most important on our agenda. The detailed plan for a development fund (SUNFED) represented the culmination of several years’ effort by them to establish such a fund within the United Nations.
Despite our admittedly excellent record of financial assistance to underdeveloped countries, the United States, because of its refusal to cooperate in the establishment of a development fund within the United Nations, and because its support of such fund was essential to its creation, became the focus of resentment by the underdeveloped countries, which regarded the United States as the main obstacle to United Nations action in this field. In this connection, it should be noted that the representatives of many underdeveloped [Page 278] countries were prepared even to accept some reduction in the total amount of assistance available to them, provided that a part of this assistance moved through a United Nations fund.
From our point of view, the President’s speech of April 163 represented an important change in the position of the United States in this matter, particularly in the light of the interpretation which the Delegation was authorized to make to the Council, i.e., that the President meant an international fund designed to strengthen the United Nations. We recognized that the President’s promise was one that probably could not be acted upon in the near future, and that the underdeveloped countries were impatient to move ahead with the special development fund. Moreover, an integral part of our position continued to be opposition to any further action now, such as refinement of the SUNFED blueprint, looking to creation of a special fund. Nevertheless, it was hoped that the promise of a substantial development fund after genuine disarmament would be greeted as an important positive change on our part in the Council.
As it turned out, our new position was received without enthusiasm by both the developed and the underdeveloped countries. The former were unhappy at the prospect of losing the shelter of United States opposition to the demands of the underdeveloped countries, and the latter felt that the preconditions attached were such as almost to make certain that we would never have to make good on our offer in respect to the fund. This, together with our attempt to write into the SUNFED resolution a statement that it was premature to take any further steps at this time looking to a development fund, made our basic position unacceptable to the underdeveloped countries.
To avoid a Council split on this issue, the resolution as agreed simply transmits the SUNFED report to the Assembly, which is left to consider what other preparatory steps might usefully be taken. Our proposed Assembly declaration looking to an international fund after genuine disarmament is also included.
While our pledge regarding an international development fund and our call to others to join in such pledge did not bring spontaneous wide support in the Council, the importance of our pledge eventually was publicly acknowledged by many of the underdeveloped countries. Also, while we were unable to obtain majority support for our view that further action on SUNFED now was premature, we were able to avoid having the Council make positive recommendations for such action to the Assembly, and the matter is left to be dealt with there. We also made clear in the record that our view [Page 279] continued to be that no further preparatory action would be useful at this time.4
Item 8: Technical Assistance
The position of the United States at the Technical Assistance Committee was a difficult one because of the uncertainty of the United States financial support for the program. It was therefore felt that our delegation should not assume its usual leadership in the discussions. The results of the session were entirely in line with our own aim: the concept of and procedures for country planning were clarified, the role of the Resident Representatives was strongly supported, the allocation of funds for 1954 is within the scope of our instructions, and the financial procedures and future methods of allocation of funds are subject to study by a working party.
[Here follows discussion of Item 21, “Assistance to Libya,” and Item 33, “Question of Access to Headquarters.”]
- Prepared by Irving Salomon, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation, at the request of John C. Baker. The full report covered four major topics: (I) the attitudes and viewpoints of other delegations, with a special section on the Russian attitude, (II) U.S. objectives and results, (III) the size and composition of the U.S. Delegation, and (IV) the agenda and organization of work, with suggestions for future meetings.↩
- The Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, chaired by Clarence B. Randall, was established by President Eisenhower in early 1953 to conduct a thorough review of U.S. foreign economic policy. The Commission submitted its Report to the President and the Congress in January 1954. See the editorial note, p. 49.↩
- See footnote 3, p. 273.↩
- For a brief summary of the treatment of the SUNFED issue at the Eighth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly, which convened on Sept. 15, 1953, see circular airgram CA–1601, Sept. 3, 1954, p. 290.↩