Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 1

340/9–1354

Memorandum by the Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations (King) ¹

confidential

New York , September 9, 1954.

A Positive U.S. Economic Program in ECOSOC—Is It Possible?

1. Introduction

It has been said that we have come to have nothing but a negative attitude in ECOSOC,^* and consequently the United States fails to exercise leadership and the USSR is enabled to seize the initiative. An examination of the economic items on the agenda of the 18th ECOSOC Session² and our position thereon leaves little doubt but that the United States was against most of the important proposals.

Leaving aside USSR proposals with respect to trade,^‡ which are dealt with later,^‡ and social and miscellaneous items,^§ the U.S. position was flatly negative on four out of the five principal economic items on the agenda, viz., item 3(a)(i), Question of establishing a special fund for grants-in-aid and for low-interest, long-term loans (SUNFED); item 3(a)(ii), Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the question of creating an international finance cooperation (IFC); item 10, that part of the Report of the Commission on Human Rights Tenth Session recommending the establishment of a Commission to survey the status of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination with respect to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources;^║ item 29(b), Constitution of a Commission on International Commodity Trade (PAC). An exception was the U.S. position on item 8(b), French proposals to centralize U.N. control of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance at the expense of the specialized agencies. Even here the U.S. position lagged behind that of the majority.

Our attitude on these matters cannot be accounted for simply by a failure to be positive. Neither can it be accounted for simply by a failure to seize the initiative in the cold war. As four of the five economic items listed above involved U.S. financial aid, it is necessary to first consider their monetary implications. Thereafter, political implications need to be examined in order to ascertain whether it is possible for the U.S. to be other than negative in ECOSOC.

2. Important Economic Items at the 18th ECOSOC Session

SUNFED would consist of an international fund (the greatest contribution coming from the United States) administered by the United Nations to assist the economic development of underdeveloped countries. The initial sum of 250 million dollars suggested by the Committee of Experts is recognized as only the minimum amount needed to permit the fund to be organized. The resources required for such a grandiose task would be limitless. With present world tensions and taxation of the American people for armaments, there is little likelihood that the Congress would make an appropriation to even permit SUNFED to get started. Such a fund involves a commitment of long duration, and once started, failure of the United States to continue to contribute thereto could only engender bitter disappointment in the underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, there has been no change in the world situation such as envisaged by President Eisenhower in his December 1953 address to the last General Assembly:³ sufficient progress in international supervised world-wide disarmament which might permit the U.S. to devote a portion of the savings from such disarmament to an international fund to assist development of the under-developed countries. Neither does the situation seem to permit of an immediate concomitant diversion of savings from defense expenditures to SUNFED as suggested at the 18th ECOSOC Sessions.^¶

IFC would be, in effect, an international Reconstruction Finance Corporation. It would be organized as an affiliate of the International Bank and seek to promote private investment in underdeveloped countries, through loans without government guarantee and through equity investments. The International Bank, at the request of ECOSOC, has submitted two reports on IFC (1953 and 1954) which in substance conclude that the initial capital must be provided by governments and, as the U.S. has not agreed to subscribe, sufficient financial support is not likely to be forthcoming to justify IFC’s creation.^** Present U.S. policy is to provide public funds for the making of unguaranteed loans abroad through the Export-Import Bank. IFC would cause the U.S. government to enter into partnership with private ventures abroad under U.N. auspices. Lack of capital is not a deterrent to American private foreign investment. It is due, in the main, to an unfavorable climate for foreign investment in capital importing countries.

The Human Rights Commission at its tenth session recommended the establishment of a Commission to survey the right of peoples and nations to self-determination with respect to “permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources”.^‡‡ The Commission was given the broadest terms of reference, with no obligation to consider compensation for the taking of vested interests in natural resources, international agreements, or international law. The context out of which this resolution arose indicates that the Commission would investigate specific concessions in underdeveloped countries. The establishment of such a Commission would not be a passive act such as the 1952 General Assembly resolution on exploitation of natural wealth and resources (G.A. Resolution 626 VII). The proposed Commission would constitute a continuing inquiry into the rights of private capital abroad, and thereby neutralize the U.S. sponsored resolution to promote private foreign investment adopted by ECOSOC at its 17th Session (ECOSOC Resolution 512B).

PAC was established by the Council at its 17th Session with the main task of seeking to maintain a just and equitable relationship between the prices of primary commodities and the prices of manufactured goods in international trade (ECOSOC Resolution 512A). Its organization was postponed until the 18th Session when it was rechristened the Commission on International Commodity Trade, to consist of eighteen experts appointed by eighteen members of the U.N. elected by the Council.^‡‡ This Commission amounts to a sort of junior ECOSOC to consider almost any problem connected with international commodity trade. Recent U.S. policy has generally been against international control of commodity prices. Our limited participation in such schemes has been confined to those dealing with a single commodity. Congressional antipathy toward PAC has been direct and specific.^§§ Arrangements to control the international price of primary commodities usually require financing, e.g., buffer stocks, compensation schemes, etc.^║║ Thus, notwithstanding the real problem of instability in prices of primary commodities confronting the underdeveloped countries, the U.S. attitude is entwined with financial considerations, both of the use of public funds and of artificially increased costs to the American consumer.

3. Financial Implications of Principal Economic Items at 18th ECOSOC Session

In the light of the above, the saw that ECOSOC always has its hand in Uncle Sam’s pocket seems a truism. To have voted in favor of SUNFED, or IFC, would have committed U.S. public funds. To have voted in favor of PAC might have impliedly done so. To have supported the Commission on the right of self-determination over natural wealth and resources would have run counter to the protection and encouragement of American private investment abroad. In the present situation, both international and congressional, it is difficult to see how the U.S. position on any of these four items could have been other than just what it was—negative.

The one item that was, at least at the beginning of the session, noticeably different was the U.N. Expanded Technical Assistance Program (UNETAP). Even here it cannot be said that on the particular phase of this subject under consideration, the administration of the program (agenda item 8(b)), the U.S. had the initiative. In January of this year the French had taken the lead on centralization in the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC).^¶¶ At the 17th Session of ECOSOC the Council requested TAC to suggest proposals on the matter for consideration at the 18th Session.^* At that time a majority of governments, although not the U.S., strongly supported the French proposals for tightening up organization, centralizing financial control and improving flexibility of appropriation of funds.^‡ The U.S. delegate to ECOSOC accordingly recommended that a U.S. position be developed, strongly directed at the top, to arrive at one of the following alternatives: (1) a U.S. plan which would effect closer centralized control and improve flexibility of appropriations and distribution to specialized agencies or, (2) approve the French plan with or without modifications.^‡ The U.S. position developed for the 18th ECOSOC Session was still considerably behind the original French proposals. The underdeveloped countries desired to reduce even further the authority of the specialized agencies and to eliminate any guaranteed percentage of funds to the agencies. Due to the efforts of the U.S. Delegation these extremes were avoided.

What was different was that before that time the U.S. had definitely committed itself to aiding underdeveloped countries through technical assistance administered by the United Nations. While unilateral aid (Point Four) was being continued, part of U.S. public funds for this purpose was being appropriated by Congress direct for use by the United Nations. The U.S. has not been negative in ECOSOC on this subject only because it was committed to supplying funds to the underdeveloped countries through the U.N.

Because of their interest in certain of the specialized agencies, (Labor in the International Labor Organization (ILO), Health and Welfare in the World Health Organization (WHO), Agriculture in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)), some of the Washington Departments objected to the centralization of control of U.N. technical assistance activities. Agriculture’s opposition to centralization was ineffective in the Executive Branch, but the same opposition appeared in Congress when appropriations for the Expanded Technical Assistance Program were being considered. A move developed in the House to give FAO a separate allocation of funds without regard to the U.N. ^§ One result was a Senate Appropriations Committee Report^║ requiring a study by the Committee of the relationship of the U.S. Government to the whole multilateral technical assistance program. This is to include the effect the U.N. technical assistance program is having upon the functioning of the specialized agencies. This investigation should decisively determine whether the U.S. can continue to be positive on at least one important item in ECOSOC.

The insistence of the specialized agencies for a free hand with technical assistance funds provided through the U.N. is understandable. FAO, for example, now receives almost as much money through the U.N. as it does from its regular budget—regular budget for 1954 $6,040,000, ETAP budget $5,688,500.^¶ The ratio of UN ETAP budget to regular budget for other specialized agencies is: WHO—53.1 per cent, ILO—34.2 per cent, UNESCO—30.6 per cent.^** What is directly involved is whether U.S. funds for technical assistance will continue to be provided through the U.N. ^‡‡

A similar decision would appear necessary with respect to other financing of the economic development of the underdeveloped countries and of dealing with international primary commodity prices if we are to have anything resembling an affirmative policy in ECOSOC. There must, it would seem, be a prompt basic decision as to what part, if any, of U.S. foreign, non-military aid is to be expended through the United Nations. All that is attempted here is to pose the question without presuming to suggest an answer. Nevertheless, it seems questionable whether the U.S. can effectively take the lead in the economic sphere in the U.N. unless it is willing to pay for whatever advantages, if any, that a truly affirmative policy might entail.

4. “Underdeveloped” vs. “Developed”

One tends to take for granted that important international affairs revolve basically around the communist vs. non-communist conflict. Such is not the case in ECOSOC where other fundamental cleavages align the members of the Council. Here the division is between the “developed” and the “underdeveloped” countries and the words strangely enough have common usage. The line is rigid between the have and the have-not, the progressive and the backward, the rich and the poor. Of the present eighteen members of the Council only six fall into the developed category (U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, Australia and Norway) while ten consider themselves underdeveloped (India, Pakistan, Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela, Cuba, China, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Egypt). The remaining two, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, the Machiavellian self-styled protectors of the underprivileged, almost invariably side with the underdeveloped countries. The underdeveloped bloc is thus in a position to rely on a majority in a straight underdeveloped vs. developed vote, even with occasional desertions to the developed side. It is therefore impossible to consider an affirmative U.S. policy in ECOSOC without constantly bearing this division of the Council in mind. With the precedents for maintaining the present geographical and political balance in the Council, the situation may be expected to continue unchanged.

It now seems to be dogma in ECOSOC that international economic progress, and even international political stability, depends upon the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. Every resolution adopted by the Economic Committee at the 18th Session paid allegiance to this thesis,^‡‡ e.g., “Acceleration of the economic development of the underdeveloped countries, particularly in the fields of industry, agriculture and commerce, is of major importance for the achievement of a more prosperous and stable world economy” (Consideration of the World Economic Situation); recognizing the need “to promote the economic development of the underdeveloped countries” (Full Employment); “Recognizing the contribution which a continuing expansion of international trade can make to … economic development of underdeveloped countries” (Removal of Obstacles to International Trade). From this one could conclude that a stable world economy, full employment, and international trade all have as a collective sine qua non the economic development of the underdeveloped countries.

There is no seeming disposition on the part of any of the underdeveloped countries to rely on private capital. This, they assert is inadequate,^§§ and while giving lip service to stimulating its flow most of them in practice do little to attract it. Many of the newly sovereign underdeveloped countries consider foreign private capital as a form of colonialism, while many of the long independent underdeveloped countries consider it a means of exploitation.

The situation in the Council smacks of a naked bid for redistribution of national wealth by the poorer countries of the world. There is always in the background the implication that unless the richer nations, particularly the United States, can provide adequate material assistance the underdeveloped countries must resort to communism and totalitarian means in an effort to lift themselves by their own economic boot straps.^║║ The underdeveloped countries in the Council are not therefore adverse to exploiting the cold war for their own benefit.

It is not realistic to consider ECOSOC agenda items on important economic matters separately. What the majority of the members of ECOSOC, the underdeveloped countries, are interested in is economic development primarily financed by the United States through the U.N. We must decide whether or not it is in our best interests to give it. If we want to give such aid, we can decide how and go into ECOSOC with a definite plan of our own making. If we don’t, we can expect to continue negative. But we make few friends by failing to make up our mind.

For better or for worse, the underdeveloped countries are in a hurry for material growth.^¶¶ This impatience to catch up, to become equal with the developed countries is reflected in ECOSOC. In discussing the 18th Session of the Council,^* its President (Cooke⁴—Argentina) emphasized the remarks of Secretary-General Hammarskjold⁵ that the economic gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries has tended to widen. The only way, Ambassador Cooke said, to overcome this growing state of unbalance is to speed up economic development of the underdeveloped countries. This correctly portrays the feeling in the Council. It was particularly evident in the debates on SUNFED.^‡

5. USSR Proposal on Trade

On the surface the underdeveloped vs. developed struggle predominates. Underneath there is a strong current of the cold war which sometimes emerges with considerable turbulence. But at the 18th Session the Soviets “new course” was in full operation. They failed to obtain consideration at the 17th Session of an agenda item entitled “Removal of obstacles to international trade and means of developing international economic relations”. It was considered at the 18th Session as item 2(c), a sub-item under “World Economic Situation”.

As expected, the USSR used the item as a basis for attacking non-communist control of strategic materials destined to the Soviet bloc and the repression of East-West trade. But they attempted more than propaganda. They proposed a resolution,^‡ the most important part of which instructed the Secretary-General of the U.N. to convene an international conference of government experts of States both members and non-members of the U.N. for the purpose of formulating recommendations for developing international trade. In introducing this resolution the USSR delegate said that non-communist trade controls (“discriminatory measures”), had had no effect on the USSR because of her vast resources, but, on the contrary, had acted against the interests of the countries applying them. This theme was echoed by the Czechoslovak delegate, who added that economic realities were persuading the capitalist countries to put an end to the cold war so far as trade was concerned, an obvious reference to the recent revision of the CG/CO.COM. lists.

The Soviet position throughout was mild. In the Economic Committee they sought to find common ground with a U.K. resolution which in the main merely requested the Secretary-General to include in his next World Economic Report an analysis of factors which limit expansion of international trade. While the committee rejected the USSR resolution and adopted the U.K. resolution the Soviets were able in plenary, on the plea of the need for unanimity in the Council, to have the U.K. resolution interpreted to mean that when the Council considers the subject further at its 20th Session the question of convening an international conference of governmental experts is not excluded.

The USSR was successful in further extending ECE resolution 5(IX), adopted unanimously at its Ninth Session, which proposed the organization of trade conferences within the framework of the United Nations between, on the one hand, countries participating in ECE, and on the other, countries participating in ECAFE and ECIA. Again, by an appeal for unanimity and vigorous lobbying, the Soviets succeeded in having ECOSOC adopt a joint Belgian-French-Czechoslovak resolution^§ requiring the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the practical conditions whereby Resolution 5(IX) might be effective, such report to be submitted to the three regional economic commissions for comment at their next sessions, and the whole matter to be considered by the Council at its 20th Session. Apparently being satisfied with EGE’s action on East-West trade, the USSR by this resolution seems to have set the stage for a consideration of trade with China through the medium of ECOSOC consideration of interregional trade.

ECOSOC at its 20th Session (summer of 1955) will thus have squarely before it not only the usual East-West trade situation but concrete proposals to call a world-wide conference to do something about such trade, and probably the matter of trade with Communist China as well.

Prior to the 18th Session the Department suggested that in view of agenda item 2(c) CG/CO.COM. countries might well arrive at a common position on the East-West trade aspects of the item in Paris. So far as we know the matter was not considered by that group. As the subject will presumably arise in the General Assembly this fall when ECOSOC’s report is considered, in all of the regional commissions, and in ECOSOC next summer, it would still not seem amiss to try and reach at least a broad general understanding on a common position through CG/CO.COM.

About the only way an affirmative U.S. East-West trade position in ECOSOC can be achieved is through coordinated support of CG/CO.COM. countries that are members of ECOSOC, presently the U.K., France, Belgium, Norway and Turkey.

6. Political Factors in ECOSOC

For the most part, while ostensibly discussing economic matters the Council was also in fact engaged in a political debate wherein diligent effort was made to submerge the communist-non-communist conflict. It is this last factor and the striving of the USSR delegation for “unanimity” in the Council that deserves particular consideration.

In the field of East-West trade the USSR tactics at the 18th ECOSOC Session were but a refurbished continuation of the effort to split the non-communist countries on policies that require, if they are to survive, concerted action. Foreign trade is, of course, a political weapon to the USSR and its vassal states.^║ On the propaganda side the line has heretofore been that trade with the Soviet bloc was equivalent to peace and prosperity. They have recently extended this concept to include its contributing to the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. Recent trade agreements with Argentina and India are a step in this direction. On the concrete side the Soviet line has been to portray an alluring picture of vast prospects of East-West trade, beyond all factual probability in view of Soviet policies.

The true significance of the “new course” economic policy in so far as it affects international trade is yet to be seen. It depends on whether the Soviet bloc seriously intends to appreciably increase its imports of consumer goods and can actually deliver in quantity its new exports such as manganese, chrome, oil and machinery. But at the moment the USSR seems to have the cold war initiative on international trade. We need concerted action stemming from CG/CO.COM, if we are to help this situation in the U.N.

While the Soviet fist was well incased in velvet throughout the session, the tepidness of the cold war in ECOSOC became striking after the Indo-China settlement on July 20th. The Soviets immediately adopted the thesis that agreement with the USSR had been demonstrated and, while not openly said, that this had been accomplished without the United States. From July 20th forward it was almost considered impolite for an animadversion to involve the USSR. The Council’s temper has aptly been described by its president (Cooke—Argentina): “I believe that the desire for peace, which seems to be the concern of the hour, has been largely responsible for the calmness of the Council’s discussions. It seems that we should have some justification for the belief that there is nothing to prevent the peaceful co-existence of nations with different political ideologies.”^¶

Soviet diplomacy was skillful in playing upon the recent tendency of the U.K., and France, in particular, to pursue policies independent of the United States. An outstanding example of this was the success of the USSR in having the French and Belgian delegations (both of whom spoke for the new Soviet concept that Council actions should be unanimous) co-sponsor with Czechoslovakia the resolution on interregional trade which originated in ECE. If successfully pursued, the unanimity concept in ECOSOC can be expected to have one of two results—(a) isolate the United States by confronting us with resolutions we cannot support because of principle, or (b) force the United States to support resolutions regardless of principle because we cannot eternally be negative.

Another noteworthy facet of the unanimity concept was the affirmative vote of the USSR on SUNFED, which they have heretofore opposed. This obvious bid for the support of the underdeveloped countries bears close watching. The USSR finally felt obliged to contribute to the U.N. Expanded Program of Technical Assistance presumably because the program benefited the United States. It is not inconceivable for them to make a contribution to SUNFED and thereby attempt to steal the whole idea. The wind seems blowing in the direction of Soviet plans to actively participate in the industrialization of the underdeveloped countries.

The USSR participation in the U.N. technical assistance program is of course, fraught with serious political consequences, particularly in regard to furnishing of experts.^** What affirmative position we have been able to achieve in ECOSOC by contributing to the U.N. program of technical assistance might well be lost because of USSR participation therein. Congress almost refused to vote funds for the program this year because it believed communist experts participated therein. The extension of communist influence through U.N. technical assistance might well force the U.S. to provide any technical assistance only unilaterally regardless of our position in the U.N. Should this occur the Soviets would have the clear opportunity of dominating the U.N. Technical Assistance program by supplying experts and by increased contributions.

7. Conclusions

From the foregoing it might not be difficult for the U.S. to concur with what an erudite journal^‡‡ has said about ECOSOC: “This council’s activity is as vast and sterile as the salt sea.” But as long as the U.S. is a member of the U.N. we cannot, no matter how tempting, accept that periodical’s further conclusion that the U.N.’s economic and social work is done, in practice, by its technical agencies and departments and “it is difficult to see what part of that work would suffer if the Council were to vanish overnight.”

So long as we are obliged, by reason of our U.N. membership to sit in ECOSOC, we have no alternative but to make the best of it. Part of this would seem to be to try and be affirmative so long as we do not participate just to be participating and eschew the sacrificing of principle. Then, it would seem, we would be obliged to be negative. The following conclusions are therefore temerariously submitted:

1. There are certain important economic items on which the U.S. cannot be affirmative because of principle, e.g., the weakening of the security of private capital investment abroad. The same seems true of matters where there is definite and strong Congressional opposition.

2. Due to the nature of the subject and U.S. policy, it is difficult if not impossible to be other than negative in East-West trade matters. But a common policy for ECOSOC should be concerted by CG./CO.COM. for its members who are likewise members of the Council.

3. Given the division of ECOSOC between developed and underdeveloped countries, the United States can achieve a really affirmative economic policy in ECOSOC only if it is willing to contribute financially, under U.N. auspices, to the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. Unless this is done the U.S. attitude in the U.N. on economic issues can be expected, for all practical purposes, to be negative.⁶

1. Transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 211, from New York, dated Sept. 13, 1954, not printed.
2. Cf. New York meeting of Preston Hotchkis, U.S. Representative in ECOSOC, on June 16, 1954 with representatives of the oil industry and of business, industry and labor; New York meeting of NAT B. King and Richard F. Pedersen, USUN, on June 18, 1954, with representatives of non-governmental organizations accredited to the U.N.; U.S. Delegation Report on 18th ECOSOC session at Geneva, pp. 1, 2. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. The 18th session of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was held in Geneva, June 29–Aug. 7, 1954.
3. See Part 5. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Agenda item 2(c), Removal of Obstacles to International Trade and means of developing international economic relations. The USSR also injected the question of trade into the subject of full employment (agenda item 2(b)) and the Report of the Economic Commission for Europe (agenda item 5). [Footnote in the source text.]
5. This memorandum is confined to economic matters only. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. This item, while coming from the Commission on Human Rights, is entirely in the economic field. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. For text of President Eisenhower’s address before the U.N. General Assembly concerning “Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,” Dec. 8, 1953, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 813–822.
4. Yugoslav draft resolution, Document E/L.620. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Document E/2616. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Document 2573, p. 77. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Argentine Draft Resolution (E/AC.24/L.79/Rev.4). [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Hearing before Special Senate Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials, and Fuel Economics, May 26, 1954, Part 5, pp. 1–53. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. Commodity Trade and Economic Development, Document E/2519, passim. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. E/TAC/32; Document E/2558. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. ECOSOC Resolution 521(XVII). [Footnote in the source text.]
12. Ibid. [Footnote in the source text.]
13. USUN tel. 576, April 3, 1954. [Footnote in the source text.]
14. Full background of Congressional action on Fiscal year 1955 appropriations for UNETAP is contained in a UNI memorandum dated August 20, 1954, from Mrs. [Virginia C.] Westfall [of the Office of International Administration] to Mr. [Joseph S.] Henderson[, Acting Director, Office of International Administration]. [Footnote in the source text.]
15. Calendar No. 2343, Report No. 2268. [Footnote in the source text.]
16. Document A/2661, p. 2. [Footnote in the source text.]
17. Ibid. [Footnote in the source text.]
18. In the meantime present legislation prohibits the U.S. from even pledging funds to the U.N. until Congress actually appropriates the money therefor. [Footnote in the source text.]
19. Document E/2643. [Footnote in the source text.]
20. Cf . Council Discussion on SUNFED. [Footnote in the source text.]
21. “The ‘Brown Man’s Burden’ Analyzed”, New York Times Magazine, September 5, 1954, pp. 7, 30. [Footnote in the source text.]
22. Ibid. [Footnote in the source text.]
23. “Appraisal of Work by Economic and Social Council”, United Nations Review, Vol. No. I, No. 3, pp. 61, 62. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Juan Isaac Cooke.
5. Dag Hammarskjold.
6. Summary Record of the 18th ECOSOC Session. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Document E/L.614. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Document E/L.644. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. See Soviet Strategy in East-West Trade. OIR/DRS paper, undated. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. Op. Cit., note 25. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to footnote *, p. 99.]
11. See USUN Dispatch No. 27, July 9, 1954 [not printed (398.00 TA/7–954)], Department airgram CA–1385, August 25[, 1954] to Paris, concerning sending of Russian engineering experts to India by UNESCO [not printed (398.43 UNESCO/8–2554)]; “Soviet to Give Aid to Poorer Lands”, New York Times, August 29, 1954, p. 10. [Footnote in the source text.]
12. The Economist, July 10, 1954, p. 107. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. In a letter to Secretary Dulles, dated Nov. 22, 1954, the U.S. representative in the Economic and Social Council, Preston Hotchkis, stated that if the United States desired to preserve its prestige among the underdeveloped nations of the free world, it should try to channel the deliberations of U.N. organs into more constructive areas and assume the initiative in proposing sound and positive agenda items. He also recommended that Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Key’s office be designated to serve as the clearinghouse for suggestions pertaining to new agenda items from other government departments. In a letter dated Dec. 3, 1954, Assistant Secretary Key replied that the Department agreed that a more positive approach in ECOSOC was desirable, and that all officers of the government concerned with GA and ECOSOC affairs had the question of new agenda items constantly under review. (320/11–2254)