Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 217th Meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday, October 14, 1954¹

top secret

October 14, 1954

Present at the 217th Council meeting were the Acting Secretary of State, presiding; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Assistant Secretary Anderson for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 4); Assistant Secretary of Defense Hensel (Item 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of agenda item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

2. Procedures for Periodic NSC Review of Military Assistance Program (Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “Foreign Military Assistance”, dated August 30, 1954;² NSC 5434;³ NSC Actions Nos. 1029–c and 1210⁴)

After briefing the Council on the background of the problem and describing briefly the proposed review mechanism, Mr. Cutler summarized or read the key paragraphs in the Planning Board’s report.⁵ He then turned back and identified and explained the several splits in point of view, noting that Governor Stassen had already withdrawn the FOA position that the chairmanship of the proposed special committee should go to FOA.

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler’s opening remarks, Secretary Humphrey inquired whether the proposed special committee at the Assistant Secretary level was expected to present the Council with recommendations and decisions, or merely to submit an informational report. Mr. Cutler explained that the special committee was merely to present a photograph of the existing situation at the time with regard to foreign military assistance programs. It would be the function of the Planning Board to make recommendations to the Council on the basis of the special committee’s report. Mr. Cutler also emphasized that the special committee would have no duties involving the supervision of the day-to-day operations with respect to the various military assistance programs, which operations would be conducted, as in the past, by the Department of Defense.

Secretary Humphrey said that in this case he could not understand why the Department of State, FOA, and ODM contended that the special committee should study allocations, priorities and requirements as between foreign programs and domestic military programs. The special committee should confine itself strictly to the field of foreign military assistance programs.

Acting Secretary Talbott said that this was emphatically the view of the Department of Defense. Admiral Radford added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no particular objection to the arrangements proposed in the present report, but it was his own personal view that if the National Security Council thought it desirable to have a semi-annual review of all of our military assistance programs, the Defense Department was in the best position to present such a review. After all, continued Admiral Radford, the Defense Department administered these foreign assistance programs as nearly as possible in accordance with the broad guidance of National Security Council policies. The difficulties which had arisen were not the result of ineffective administration by the Defense Department, but were rather a reflection of the fact that our national security policies don’t always work out as we wished them to. For all these reasons Admiral Radford personally doubted the value of the proposed new mechanism. There were just too many details for such a special committee to get involved with.

Mr. Cutler replied that it would not be the purpose of the proposed special committee to get into the details of administering the foreign military assistance programs. If it were, he would agree with Admiral Radford’s views. Mr. Cutler again proceeded to explain the function of the special committee as conceived by the NSC Planning Board.

Governor Stassen insisted that the issues which were implicit in a review of foreign military assistance comprised the whole range of United States security policies—foreign and domestic aspects as well as military aspects. Hence, the broad membership of the proposed high-level committee would make a valuable contribution. After all, he continued, this problem raised issues not only between various executive departments, but also within individual departments. Moreover, there were occasions when there was a direct conflict between the requirements for the U.S. military establishment and the requirements for assistance to friendly foreign nations. There must be a forum in which such a conflict could be explored in order to provide the President with the basis for a solution.

Both Secretary Humphrey and Admiral Radford indicated their firm belief that there would be no great difficulty in getting such issues before the President for his decision. Secretary Humphrey added that this task should not be assigned to any special committee, but should instead be decided by the National Security Council itself. Any other solution was tantamount to interfering with the prerogatives and responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

Governor Stassen cited the recent case of the alleged shortage of 105 mm. Howitzers, to illustrate the need for a special committee. Acting Secretary Talbott, however, insisted that there was no need to create any special committee in order to solve the problem cited by Governor Stassen. Secretary Humphrey reiterated his firm conviction that if it were created, the new special committee must not in any circumstances be permitted to interfere with the responsibilities of the Department of Defense for the day-to-day implementation of the foreign military assistance programs. Any balancing of foreign and domestic requirements for military end items and the like should only be exercised by the National Security Council. It was a waste of time to assign this function to any special committee. If the Defense Department proved incompetent in executing its responsibilities, the thing to do was to get a new team to run the Defense Department efficiently.

Dr. Flemming said he would like to remind the Council of the basic objective behind the new proposal. This was, in effect, to get a significant staff job accomplished in order to assist the Planning Board and the National Security Council to carry out their responsibilities. While he had not personally discussed this paper with anyone, Dr. Flemming said he very much doubted the need for any special committee as a means of getting a staff job done. If the Planning Board was unable to do this job with its own resources, it might be well to seek the assistance of some individual, such as Mr. Robert Sprague, to look into the problem. Mr. Cutler replied that of course the Planning Board could call individually on such experts as Mr. Hensel in Defense, Mr. Nolting in State, and Mr. Ohly in FOA, in order to review foreign military assistance and prepare recommendations for the Council. He had believed, however, that rather than resorting to the assistance of individuals, these experts should be formed into a committee as likely to provide a more orderly, effective, and dignified procedure.

Secretary Humphrey said that he had no objection to the creation of a special committee to make a report of the existing situation, as long as this committee did not interfere with the functions of the Defense Department. Dr. Flemming, however, counseled putting the responsibility directly on the Planning Board, with the expectation that the Planning Board would decide how best to accomplish the task.

Mr. Cutler then called attention to the possibility noted in paragraph 3, that an “Interdepartmental Mutual Security Committee” might be set up. He asked the Director of the Budget if such a committee was actually going to be created. Mr. Hughes replied in the negative, and went on to state his agreement with the general position taken by Dr. Flemming. Secretary Hoover said that the State Department felt that it was absolutely essential, from the point of view of our foreign policy, to have a semi-annual review of all the commitments made by the United States to provide military assistance to friendly powers. It was also essential to note the changes which occurred from time to time in these commitments. Accordingly, the Department of State was convinced of the great need for the creation of such a special committee as was called for by the present report. On the other hand, said Secretary Hoover, the State Department was not contemplating that the committee would in any way interfere with the normal duties of the Department of Defense.

As a result of this discussion the Council agreed to strike out the last three sentences in paragraph 3 of the report, after which Mr. Cutler pointed out that the remaining big issue was whether the special committee, in making its report, should confine its scrutiny strictly to the programs for foreign military assistance or whether, in so doing, the committee should also have in mind the over-all relationship between domestic military requirements and foreign military requirements. State, FOA, and ODM favored the over-all look by the special committee; the other agencies and departments thought that the special committee should confine itself to a scrutiny of the foreign field alone.

Dr. Flemming commented that if you were going to have such a special committee (which he still believed to be unnecessary), the special committee should most certainly take the over-all look, though this did not mean that it should have any voice in the day-to-day operations of the Defense Department, as Secretary Humphrey and Admiral Radford seemed to fear.

Mr. Cutler then stated his opinion that the Council discussion revealed a clear split of views as between the narrow and the broad scope for the special committee’s review. After summing up the two different points of view, Mr. Cutler suggested two possible solutions. One was to put this split to the President with a request that he make the decision, which proposal, said Mr. Cutler, put a heavy burden on the President. Or, alternatively, the Council might agree to delete all references in the report to the special committee, with the clear and explicit understanding that the Planning Board was authorized to create some such committee to assist it in identifying and flagging issues respecting foreign military assistance programs, on the basis of which the Planning Board could prepare recommendations for Council consideration.

Secretary Humphrey read paragraph 4–a, which described the proposed functions of the special committee, and said that he was at a loss to understand how anybody could interpret this paragraph as anything but authority for the special committee to supervise the routine operations of the Defense Department in implementing foreign military assistance programs. Mr. Cutler again explained that this was certainly not the intention of the Planning Board, while Dr. Flemming added that if Secretary Humphrey’s interpretation of paragraph 4 was correct, he was just as opposed to it as Secretary Humphrey himself. He said he agreed, however, to accept the second of Mr. Cutler’s proposed compromises.

Acting Secretary Talbott said that he would like to comment briefly on the whole range of special consultants and civilian committees as they had been operating in the Defense Department. He had in mind in particular Mr. Robert Sprague’s report on continental defense.⁶ While admittedly Mr. Sprague’s conclusions had been very effectively presented, his report had actually contained absolutely nothing new and nothing of which the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not already acutely aware. Moreover, Mr. Sprague’s report had involved a “fabulous” waste of man hours in the Defense Department, in view of the fact that it made no contribution whatsoever. In short, the Joint Chiefs themselves were a much more effective group than any of these civilian committees or consultants. Agreeing with Secretary Talbott, Admiral Radford pointed out that of course the Joint Chiefs of Staff handled problems like these every day.

Governor Stassen commented that the President seemed to have a quite different view of the effectiveness of Mr. Sprague’s study of the continental defense problem, and that the President believed that the Sprague report had actually brought up a number of new needs in the area of continental defense. Furthermore, said Governor Stassen, he did not feel that any single executive department had a field of activity and responsibility that was exclusively its own business. The President was obliged to decide conflicts between departments and agencies, and it was the duty of the National Security Council to provide means of assisting him in reaching such decisions.

Mr. Cutler confined himself to observing that if the President of the United States desired to make use of civilian consultants he was very likely to request their services, despite the views of the National Security Council. He again suggested his compromise solution of removing the special committee and authorizing the Planning Board to make use of a committee of its own choosing to assist it in arriving at recommendations.

Secretary Hoover indicated that this compromise was satisfactory from the point of view of satisfying the State Department’s basic need for a semi-annual review of the whole foreign military assistance picture which would tie in the foreign policy, the military, and the economic aspects of the problem.

At the conclusion of the discussion Admiral Radford again expressed, as he had in the past, his great concern over the ramifications of our military assistance programs. They were too loaded and too big already, and yet we still continued to take on additional programs without any clear idea of where we were going.

The National Security Council:

Adopted the recommendations in NSC 5434, subject to the deletion of all reference to the creation of a Special Committee, with the understanding that the NSC Planning Board may utilize such a high-level committee to identify key issues. Specifically, the recommendations were adopted with the following amendments:

a. Paragraph 2–b: Delete the words “the members of the Special Committee referred to in para. 3, in addition to the usual limited distribution to”.

b. Paragraph 2–e: Delete the words “and the Special Committee referred to in para. 3”, and insert the word “and” in lieu of the comma between “the Council” and “the Planning Board”.

c. Delete paragraphs 3 and 4 and the footnotes related thereto, and renumber remaining paragraphs accordingly.

d. Paragraph 5: In the first sentence, delete the words “and the Special Committee’s report on key issues arising therefrom,”. Delete the last sentence.

Note:NSC 5434, as amended, approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5434/1.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 3–7: “U.S. Policy on French North Africa,” “U.S. Rubber Policy,” “Expansion of the Labor Service Organization in Germany,” “NSC 5401,” and “Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe.”]

1. This memorandum was drawn up by Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC Gleason on Oct. 15.
2. See footnote 1, p. 740.
3. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5434 Series)
4. NSC Action No. 1029–c is quoted in the memorandum by Cutler of Aug. 30, 1954, p. 740. NSC Action No. 1210 was taken at the 212th meeting of the NSC on Sept. 2, 1954, and simply noted Presidential approval of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Cutler memorandum of Aug. 30, 1954. A copy of NSC Action No. 1210 is in the S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the NSC, 1954”.
5. The “Planning Board report” under reference was NSC 5434 of Sept. 28, 1954.
6. For documentation on continental defense, see volume ii.