700.5 MSP/4–1752
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs (Perkins) to the Under
Secretary of State (Bruce)1
secret
Washington, April 17, 1952.
We have just learned confidentially that Senator Green proposes to introduce
the following amendment for insertion in this year’s Mutual Security
Act.
[Page 499]
“The Congress believes it is essential that the Mutual Security Act be
administered so as to make it clear at all times that the American
people wish to assist dependent peoples the world over to establish
their own free political and economic institutions.”
According to our information which comes from a member of the staff of the
Foreign Relations Committee, no Senator can be expected to oppose this
amendment. In addition, strong representations by the Department to the
Committee, especially after the President’s recent speech,2 would be both
difficult and embarrassing. Consequently, it seems to us that our only
course of action would be an informal and personal approach to Senator
Green.
Although the wording of the proposed amendment is fairly restrained, I think
you will agree that its introduction at this time, and subsequent passage,
would be sure to cause great concern among our Allies with overseas
dependencies, particularly coming on top of the President’s recent speech. I
strongly urge that an effort be made to talk the Senator out of it and I
hope, that you would be willing to take this on.
The task is made more difficult by the fact that the confidential manner in
which we obtained the text of the proposed amendment makes it impossible for
us to reveal our knowledge of its existence. We therefore have to find
another “peg” on which to hang the discussion. It seems to us that the peg
may be provided by the Secretary’s telephone conversation with Senator Green
on March 25.3 I attach a copy and you
will note in the second paragraph that they discussed the colonial question.
It seems to me that you could approach the matter by indicating that the
Secretary asked you to follow up on this conversation. You could perhaps
begin by explaining our position on the Tunisian question along the lines of
the Secretary’s press conference yesterday. With this as a starter, you
might be able to smoke the Senator out in revealing his plans so that a
direct discussion of his proposed amendment would follow.
Unfortunately, we have a very tight deadline if there is any hope of getting
the Senator to withdraw. According to our confidential source we must act
before tomorrow (Friday) evening. Otherwise it is believed we will be too
late.
I am also enclosing for your information a copy of a memorandum prepared by
Messrs. Knight and Nunley which I think has some good and interesting
suggestions.4
[Page 500]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum Prepared by Ridgway Knight of the Office
of Western European Affairs and William Nunley of the Office of
European Regional Affairs5
secret
[Washington, April 9, 1952.]
I. General Policy
Considerations
In considering any proposal for the expression of a point of view by the
United States on the “colonial question”, it is important first to
recognize that the people of the United States have a natural sympathy
for the aspirations of dependent peoples for freedom, independence and
economic well-being. This sympathy has been demonstrated time and again
by the actions of the United States Government, both in dealing with
territories under its control and in the exercise of its influence in
behalf of other dependent peoples (Indonesia, India, Libya, etc.). As a
basic principle of its foreign policy, the United States believes that
the peoples of all territories now dependent should eventually attain
self-government, either by establishing the territory as an independent
state or, where acceptable to the peoples concerned, by political
integration with the mother country under conditions of freedom and
equality.
At the same time, in the application of this fundamental policy to
particular situations, the United States is required to take into
account certain additional considerations, as follows:
- 1.
- The United States cannot, by action or implication,
automatically endorse “just any” independence movement, without
regard
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to its
competence, political coloration or probable consequences. In
some instances, these movements are inspired and dominated by
the forces of Communist imperialism, which has long aimed at
separating dependent peoples from the colonial powers as a first
step in subjugating the former and breaking down the strength of
the latter. In such cases, the movement is not toward
“independence” at all, but in fact toward a powerful and
merciless tyranny. In other instances, the movement may be
genuine but may be undertaken by a people so pitifully
ill-prepared for self-government that immediate success would
result in increased economic weakness, social retrogression, and
political stability,6 thereby paving the way for an
eventual seizure of power by Communism or some other dangerous
form of government. The long-term interests of both the United
States and the colonial peoples require that colonial freedom be
established on solid political, economic and social foundations.
Otherwise, the dependent peoples risk exchanging a temporary
political subordination for a crushing despotism which might
take generations to break.
- 2.
- The interests of the United States demand friendly relations
with mother countries as well as dependent peoples. Some of the
mother countries, in fact, such as France and the United Kingdom
are important allies in the world struggle against Soviet
imperialism. Our security requirements will not permit us to be
indifferent to any development which threatens the legitimate
interests of these countries and which might gravely weaken
their capacity to act as full partners in our collective
security system. There would be little value in a policy
designed to create strong and democratic friends 50 years hence
at the cost of sacrificing the strength and stability of the
nations upon which our security depends at this moment. Our aim
must be to avoid a choice between these alternatives and to
pursue policies through which the true interests of both mother
countries and dependent peoples may best be realized.
- 3.
- Even without regard to the aims of United States policy, there
is always a delicate question as to when, how and to what extent
United States influence can be used effectively in particular
circumstances. In disputes between a mother country and a
dependent territory, intervention by a third party may often
serve no purpose other than to create suspicion on both sides,
and sometimes produce a result quite the reverse of what was
intended. Moreover, the use of United States influence places on
us a definite responsibility for results—sometimes a
responsibility for “picking up the check” if our proposals do
not in fact work out satisfactorily. Finally
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we must remember that the United
States cannot, in any case, hope by a policy of intervention to
outbid the Soviet Union for the affections of the extremist
elements in the colonial territories, since the responsible can
never outbid the unscrupulous.
II. Probable Political Effects of
Expression on Colonial Problem in MSP Legislation.
The suggestion that the United States might use the language of the
MSP legislation to express sympathy
for the aspirations of dependent peoples has the following
disadvantages:
- A.
- In general, the Department of State believes it desirable to
confine statements of policy in legislation to subject matter
which is directly related to the purposes of the legislation.
Any other course tends to produce suspicions of United States
motives and aims. In particular, a seemingly non-relevent
provision tends to supply fuel for anti-American propaganda
attacks embodying the theme that the United States is using its
aid program not merely as a measure for helping to build the
collective strength of the free world, but largely as a device
for pressing America’s special interests in all aspects of
international relations.
- B.
- A legislative expression of sympathy for the aspirations of
colonial peoples would achieve little in a positive nature,
since the responsible elements in dependent territories will
judge the United States by its actions rather than by general
expressions. Statements of this kind tend to be ignored by
people to whom they are addressed, and to be used only by
“trouble makers”.
- C.
- A statement of the kind suggested would almost certainly be
subject to a great deal of misinterpretation among the dependent
peoples, partly unintentional and partly deliberate. For
example, in some areas irresponsible leaders might use such a
statement to convince their followers that the United States
will support even the most fanatical demands against the
colonial powers. Similarly, it might be interpreted as a sign of
weakness and division among the Western powers and thereby
stiffen local leaders against acceptance of compromise solutions
to current disputes. Even Communist elements, masquerading as
legitimate nationalists, could use the statement to advantage,
just as the Communists tried, in the 1948 Italian elections, to
persuade many ignorant voters that the United States did not
care whether they voted Communist or not.
- D.
- The effects within the governing countries would be equally
detrimental to American interests. In countries such as the
United Kingdom, France, Belgium, etc., a probable popular
interpretation of such a statement of policy would be that the
United States is intervening in what most of the national
population believes is a
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matter of purely national concern. Anti-American
propagandists in these countries would go much further and would
declare (as they have already done on occasion) that the real
aim of the United States is to use its aid program as a device
for “stealing” the colonies for itself. An argument of this kind
makes a real impression in circumstances where it seems evident
that the colonial territories concerned are actually incapable
of self-government at this time. In either case, the effect is
to arouse resentment against the United States among peoples
whose friendship and cooperation is vital to American security.
Several of our NATO allies are
colonial powers, and they have acknowledged their
responsibilities under the UN
Charter, both within the UN and
elsewhere. Sometimes we have not agreed with them in their
handling of issues arising in the dependent territories, nor
with their judgments as to the capability of certain dependent
peoples for self-government. However, steps by the United States
which might be interpreted as infringing upon the sovereignty of
these nations might well cause a serious rift between the
countries of the North Atlantic alliance and could conceivably
result in the withdrawal of certain countries from active
participation in the mutual defense program. As a minimum, it
would make the task of the existing governments in these
countries far more difficult, by permitting the political
opposition to play on chauvinist sentiments and to accuse the
government of being subservient to American pressure.
