940.5260/8–1054: Instruction
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1
990. Subject: Implementation of NSC 15/3. The Department notes the types of questions that have arisen in your discussions with the British authorities over the implementation of NSC 15/3. Deptel 210 to Bonn of July 22, copies to London 458,2 it is hoped will clarify U.S. views. However, in order that the Embassy may be more specifically informed of the Department’s position there are cross-referenced below replies to the itemized questions contained in Embassy’s Despatch No. 4220.3
1. Department’s Telegram 6964 of June 184 was not meant to preclude eventual operation of reciprocal services between Paris and Moscow. NSC 15/3 states that reciprocal arrangements should be sought “when it has been clearly determined, on an individual basis, that a fully realizable balance of advantage would result from such services to the United States or the non-curtain country concerned after careful evaluation and weighing of the civil aviation, economic, political and military security considerations involved.” Such a balance of advantage may at some time exist, but no views to this effect have yet been expressed.
It was determined, however, when NSC 15/3 was adopted that a balance of advantage to the West did exist in the aviation arrangements then in effect between Czechoslovakia and certain non-curtain states. Therefore these were left undisturbed at that time. Since the reasons for the interim suspension of CSA operations to Western Europe have now been eliminated, the Department sees no adequate reason for not reverting to the status quo ante and resuming permission for the overflights. Deptel 3092 of December 10, 19535 outlined support for this position.
2. It has been established that some special air service to Warsaw by a Western state is extremely important. The most favorable arrangement yet found possible is the RAF courier service. As the Embassy is aware, even this operation has been precariously close to summary suspension, and the Department has been reluctant to suggest disturbing this delicate situation lest a more unsatisfactory situation would result. It is likewise apparent that enforcement of the NSC 15/3 policy is far more difficult in the Scandinavian countries [Page 439] and the satellite operations in this area cannot in all instances be tied to the principles of NSC 15/3.
3. Sabena and KLM services to Prague provide a reliable communication across the curtain and are considered to produce benefits. It was partially because of the existence of alternative services that Pan American was permitted to suspend its services to Prague.
4. The Department and the Department of Defense are conducting a review of U.S. policy with regard to civil operation of turbine-powered aircraft. Under current policy, the United States would certainly disfavor use of these aircraft across the curtain, but a final answer to the Embassy’s question must await completion of the policy review.
5. NSC 15/3 states that each situation arising under this policy should be treated “on an individual basis.” Therefore, the Department does not believe it is possible to set standard conditions that would be acceptable in all instances. However, the United States as a general principle is in favor of Western airline penetration of the curtain countries if this can be accomplished without reciprocity. If reciprocity is involved, then the balance of advantage must be assessed. The Department therefore cannot advise the Embassy on the desirability of discouraging negotiations by Western airlines for air rights in curtain countries until the terms of the negotiations are known.
Since the Embassy indicates that such questions as these have been raised, the Department would be interested in knowing what comments have been made and in particular what the British views currently are.