Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 1

940.53/12–1053

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] December 9, 1953.

• Subject:
• Proposed meeting between the Secretary, Secretary Weeks, Secretary Wilson and Doctor Flemming¹ concerning the U.S. reservation from the NATO shipping pool in wartime.

Discussion

Ambassador Hughes² has reported that the U.S. position that a block of U.S. merchant type shipping will not be available to the NATO pool in wartime has raised serious concern in NATO. This concern arises because it appears that the U.S. is abrogating unilaterally an undertaking to which it had earlier agreed and which was approved at Ministerial level. The U.S. stand threatens not only to break up the shipping pool but has raised a general doubt regarding U.S. preparedness to adhere to its NATO undertakings.³ Hughes believes this matter may be raised at the forthcoming Ministerial meeting.

[Here follows discussion of the background and history of the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping.]

From our standpoint this problem has been most unfortunate for our NATO relationships. It has been particularly unfortunate because in our view it is not necessary to make a reservation from the pool in order to assure U.S. military objectives. …

The reasons Defense have given for not believing its objectives can be met under PBOS are summarized in Tab B with our comments. Although never stated, we believe Defense is not so afraid to be dependent on an international pool of shipping—as it is aware the U.S. will control its contribution—so much as it does not wish to be entirely dependent on a U.S. civilian government agency for its requirements.

Recommendations

(1) In view of earlier U.S. commitments in NATO, it is desirable for this Government to be able to reaffirm in NATO that all its normal cargo-type merchant vessels will be in the NATO pool in time of war.

(2) If U.S. inter-agency agreement along lines of recommendation No. 1 is impossible at this time, we recommend another policy review to determine whether it is really essential to make any U.S. reservation and that the Delegation be authorized to indicate that this review is taking place at the forthcoming Ministerial meeting.

(3) The presently agreed inter-agency working level position that the U.S. is examining the numbers and character of ships it intends to withhold and will report this information to PBOS, does not suffice in view of the anxieties expressed in the Permanent Representatives.

[Tab B]

⁴

secret

[Undated.]

Likely Principal Defense Points Concerning Their Need to Have Exclusive Jurisdiction of a Bloc of Normal Cargo-Type Vessels in Time of War. Comments Regarding These Points Follow

I. U.S. Emergency War Plans Necessitate Assurances that a Percentage of the Military Shipping Requirements be Carried in Vessels Controlled by the Military.

Although Defense reasoning here is not entirely clear, it seems in part to be based on a need for “speed” at the outset of an emergency and an assumption that civilian agencies will be “slow” in meeting military needs. There is also a feeling that the DSA (the NATO planned Defense Shipping Authority) cannot become an effective machinery until several months after the outbreak of a war. Actually these fears are groundless. Under the PBOS plan there is an interim plan (assumed to be 90 days) when National Shipping Authorities are to act in the name of the DSA. During this period the U.S. National Shipping Authority could allocate the entire U.S. merchant fleet to the Department of Defense if it desired. When the DSA machinery is set up, all allocations made by national authorities become in effect DSA allocations.

II. Defense Does not Believe it Desirable to be Dependent on an “International Body” for its Shipping Requirements.

… [The executive functions of the DSA rest in two Executive Boards—one chaired by London—the other by Washington.]⁵

III. Defense Points to US Non-NATO Military Commitments as Grounds for Requiring Exclusive Jurisdiction over a Bloc of Shipping Tonnage.

This argument is also without much substance. If U.S. non-NATO military commitments must be fulfilled and the NATO alliance has not been invoked, then the DSA will not come into existence and there is no problem from a Defense standpoint.

There is only one condition under which the DSA would come into being—and that is if there is a global war of World War II dimensions. Although PBOS is a NATO body, it has planned “on a global basis.” Its plans provide for the admittance to the DSA of all friendly belligerents. It is assumed the British Commonwealth countries will be members. In fact it is unlikely that there will be any appreciable friendly shipping outside the pool. The DSA is set up to meet both the military and civilian wartime requirements on a world-wide basis.

IV. Defense Will Stress the Need for Large Blocs of Shipping to Meet Specialized Military Objectives (Such as the North African Invasion in World War II).

The PBOS plans to allow “bloc allocations” as opposed to singlevoyage allocations whenever military exigencies require it.

1. Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
2. John C. Hughes, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council.
3. A detailed description of the NATO reaction to the U.S. position is contained in the report of the U.S. Delegation to the Fifth Meeting of the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping, held in London, Oct. 6–9, 1953. (940.53/11–3053)
4. Tab A, a paper describing the background and history of the PBOS, was not found with the source text.
5. Brackets in the source text.