S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, “U.S. Civil Aviation Policy—U.S.S.R. and Satellites”

Memorandum Prepared by the Aviation Policy Staff, Office of Transport and Communications Policy1

top secret

Current Implementation of NSC 15/32—“United States Civil Aviation Policy Toward the U.S.S.R. and its Satellites

The policies established in NSC 15/3 have been, on the whole, effectively implemented. Soviet and Satellite civil aviation has been contained to the extent considered necessary to provide the desired “balance of advantage.” Although the Polish airline, LOT, is permitted to operate to Brussels, Paris, Copenhagen and Stockholm; we obtain an advantage through the British courier air service to Warsaw. The Russian airline, Aeroflot, serves Helsinki at which location containment would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. However, several of the Western Powers also have agreements to operate into Helsinki; and, in fact, Pan American World Airways includes it as a regularly scheduled stop.

The Czech airline, CSA, has provided an essentially different problem in the implementation of NSC 15/3. Before the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, this airline had extensive services throughout Europe; and in turn, the Czechs maintained a liberal policy in granting operating rights for airlines of the Western [Page 406] Powers. Therefore, at the time of the containment decision, Praha had become the hub of Western airline penetration of the Iron Curtain and the operating rights of CSA throughout Europe were firmly established. As a result, the curtailment of CSA operations proceeded at a slow pace with every attention being given to maintaining western air connections to Praha. Restrictions on operators and passengers into Praha nevertheless made the service uneconomical; and Pan American World Airways, the United States certificated carrier, finally received in the fall of 1950 government approval to suspend service on this route. As a result of a foreign policy decision in 1951 to exert pressure on the Czechoslovak Government in various ways because of its action against American interests steps were taken in cooperation with Western European states to curb CSA operations through denial of permission for flights over the territory of the German Federal Republic. As a result CSA now operates only to Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki. Recently resumption of operating rights to Brussels and Paris by a circuitous route through Copenhagen have been strenuously sought by the Czech Government but so far they have been successfully denied. Although, as one of their reprisals to our pressure measures, the Czechs have evicted from Praha the Pan Am sales office, the last vestige of United States airline activity, they have strangely, and to our advantage, permitted Western European airlines to continue their Praha operations.

Yugoslavia was exempted from the provisions of the containment policy by Presidential approval on August 16, 1949. No efforts have been made to restrict the operation of its national airline, JAT, which connects Belgrade with Munich, Salzburg, Frankfort, Athens, and Paris. The Swiss and Greek airlines have landing rights in Belgrade and it is not believed any great difficulty would be encountered if an American airline were to apply for this service. In fact, a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement exists between Yugoslavia and the United States and close coordination is maintained between the respective aviation authorities. On the other hand, the Yugoslav Government exercises some control over the services to Tirana of the Russian airline, Aeroflot, by requiring a technical stop at Belgrade.

With regard to the implementation of the policy in the Near East, South Asia and Africa, it has been determined that reciprocal landing rights would not offer a balance of advantage to the non-Communist countries; and civil air operations into these areas by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites have been successfully blocked.

Implementation of the policy objectives with respect to the availability of facilities and services and of aircraft and spare parts has likewise been effective. Cooperation of the Western Powers has [Page 407] been obtained and it is believed that there is a minimum leakage of aviation materials through to the Iron Curtain countries. This situation has been considerably strengthened by United States shortages in these materials and by increased United States vigilance over their end-use, which have, in part, been brought about by the Korean emergency and domestic mobilization.

The policies of NSC 15/3 appear to have been implemented satisfactorily and the balance of advantage remains in favor of the Western Powers. Because of the criteria by which the necessity for action is to be assessed, the objectives have a desirable flexibility and unless unforeseen circumstances recommend amendment, the paper does not require revision.

  1. Drafted by Henry T. Snowden, Assistant Chief of the Aviation Policy Staff. A covering memorandum by Robert E. Asher, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to Bromley K. Smith, alternate senior member of the NSC for the Department of State, concerning the Aviation Policy Staff memorandum, reads in part: “It is my understanding that it has been discussed with EUR and is satisfactory to that bureau.”
  2. NSC 15/3 was approved by the President on Jan. 6, 1950.