900.521/3–652
Memorandum by Robert A. Thayer of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy (Klemmer) 1
- Subject:
- Technical Assistance Programs in Civil Aviation
The situation with respect to U.S. technical assistance to foreign countries in the field of aviation is one which should give rise to serious concern on the part of the U.S. Government, in my opinion. In general, the U.S. does not appear to be engaging in a sufficiently vigorous bilateral technical assistance program. This deficiency appears to be particularly acute in the NEA area. In raising this subject, I would like to set forth certain assumptions upon which this memorandum is based. These assumptions are: (1) No suggestion is being made to the effect that a higher priority should be given to aviation technical assistance in relation to non-aviation projects than is currently the case. (2) It is not intended to imply that the U.S. Government should compete with UN agencies in offering technical assistance, or that pressure should be placed upon foreign governments to induce them to request U.S. rather than ICAO assistance.
Technical assistance to foreign governments designed to raise the standard of their civil air power in all its aspects (air transport, ground facilities, techniques and administration) has in most cases important political and strategic implications to the U.S. which are not necessarily applicable to technical assistance in other fields such as agriculture and health. Because of this fact the motivation behind the interest of the U.S. in aviation technical assistance should differ to a considerable degree from that which leads us to promote programs designed generally to raise the standard of living and social conditions in foreign countries.
Technical assistance in aviation serves the following purposes: (a) It increases the defense potential of the recipient nation by improving its air power potential, (b) It improves facilities which the U.S. and her allies may require during an all-out emergency, (c) It promotes [Page 390] the sale of U.S. manufactured aeronautical equipment and matériel, thus developing long term markets for an industry essential to national defense, (d) It promotes the adoption of U.S. techniques, which in turn serves to assist in furthering (b) and (c) above. (e) It provides the U.S. Government with intelligence opportunities with respect to an activity of great military importance.
The above list is not intended to be exhaustive and deliberately omits mention of the benefits in terms of economic development which accrue from well-developed air transport in an area such as the Near and Middle East. The omission of mention of this factor is deliberate in view of assumption No. (1) above.
If the above listed benefits accruing to the U.S. from aviation technical assistance are accepted as being valid, it would appear that technical assistance programs now under way or planned are inadequate both in number and in character. With the exception of Greece, the only U.S. aviation technical assistance now being rendered in the NEA area is of a “spot” character. We have no missions in the field nor do we have any requests for assistance of a comprehensive nature. This situation has been brought about as I see it for three major reasons. (1) The failure of the U.S. to be aggressive in “selling” its technical assistance capabilities to foreign governments. (2) Our timidity in encouraging a foreign government to seek American assistance once that government or ICAO has entered into discussions regarding the possibilities of ICAO assistance. (3) The preference shown on the part of some governments for assistance from an international body as opposed to bilateral programs which, it is feared, may have strings attached.
There is probably little that can be done with respect to the desire of foreign governments to seek international rather than bilateral assistance. Only time and experience can prove that the U.S. Government does not use its offers of assistance as a means of exploitation.
With respect to our failure to make known to foreign governments our capabilities in the field of technical assistance, the ground which has been lost could perhaps be recovered in part at least by an aggressive informational campaign. The question of the relationship of ICAO to the U.S. in the field of technical assistance is a difficult one, however it is my impression that we are in many cases failing to achieve our legitimate objectives by following an unrealistic policy of undue deference to ICAO. A reexamination of our policy appears called for.
In the first place, the desire to avoid duplicating efforts in a given country appears to be so sound as to be beyond question. As a consequence, the U.S. has not sought to mount a bilateral program where ICAO is already on the job. Unfortunately, however, [Page 391] ICAO has not always reciprocated in this policy. Both in Greece and in Turkey ICAO representatives have aggressively and actively sought to inject ICAO into the picture in spite of the difficulties which this will, and already has, caused the U.S. Secondly, the U.S. has been so timid that we have avoided even suggesting to a foreign government that a better program might be arranged bilaterally with the U.S. than would be the case through ICAO where practical difficulties exist within the ICAO organization limiting the effectiveness of the program. This timidity on our part appears to indicate that we are more concerned with the form than we are with the substance in that greater weight is given to the question of what agency should do the job than to the best method by which the job can properly and effectively be accomplished. This is not intended to imply that in all cases a bilateral program by the U.S. offers the best technical assistance. On the other hand, we should not fail to recognize that in most cases the U.S. can provide a better program with better technical backstopping than can ICAO. When representatives of ICAO make visits to foreign countries for the purpose of promoting ICAO technical assistance and when U.S. representatives in those countries fail to inform the governments concerned of what the U.S. could do, it is only natural that a large number of requests will be filed with ICAO. Once such a request is filed the U.S. withdraws from the picture even though there may be a clearly defensible justification for a bilateral program by the U.S. in terms of our own interests as well as those of the country concerned.
Recommendations:
The following steps are proposed to remedy the present situation.
- (1)
- The U.S. Government should make available to all friendly governments
which are believed to be interested in technical assistance:
- (a)
- A statement of what the U.S. has accomplished in the past in foreign countries and (b) a statement of the technical assistance facilities and programs which the U.S. is in a position to offer. This information should be prepared by the CAA and after receiving the necessary clearance should be published in pamphlet form and given wide distribution through every available channel.
- (2)
- TCA and MSA country directors should be given a policy directive with respect to ICAO–US relations which will make it clear that while the U.S. does not propose to undercut or to sabotage ICAO efforts, an aggressive policy of promoting U.S. aviation technical assistance should be followed within the limits of approved country programs.
- (3)
- The active cooperation of U.S. air carriers operating abroad should be enlisted in support of U.S. aviation technical assistance both public and private.
- Drafted by Thayer.↩