92. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency1

311. Re: DIR 36511.2

In full discussion with Mylkes re possible sources White Paper info, Calligeris named in order: Somoza, Somoza’s son, Delgado, Captain Raul Sierra, and Seekford. He devoted considerable time to speculation that Somozas could be witting or unwitting sources, but could give no motives for such action on their part. When directly questioned why he had named Seekford, C replied Somoza Jr. had once told him Seekford security risk. C then added he himself had fullest confidence in Seekford. C extremely reluctant to consider Delgado or Sierra as sources, despite his own admission that both knew virtually all his plans, including most sensitive items of White Paper.
Calligeris obliquely declined to divulge Sierra’s true name to Mylkes. (Note Sierra action re KUCLUB TNG site reported SCRANTON 002 (IN 14032). Note also Seekford request POC on Sierra in alias per [telegram indicator not declassified] 0858.
Calligeris indicated to Mylkes his dislike of Lugton’s requests for bio data on personnel in his intelligence nets.
When Mylkes pointed out that Delgado and Sierra were also on staff for two previous attempts which were compromised at crucial junctures, Calligeris failed to respond directly. He replied that group must also consider both Somozas and Seekford as definitely possible sources of White Paper.
Above would perhaps not ordinarily raise doubts Calligeris loyalty or motivation and might be interpreted as pride or reticence. However, in present situation, fullest objectivity, candor and straight talk are required of all concerned. Above Calligeris replies either fail to meet such standards or suggest inability of Calligeris to face situation realistically.
In addition, there are the objective considerations that:
Calligeris himself has not been engaged in three compromised attempts.
KUBARK has invested heavily, financially and otherwise, in Calligeris.
KUBARK needs fullest information on events leading to present situation.
In the light of all the foregoing, LINCOLN considers it imperative that HQS give most serious consideration to LCFLUTTER for Calligeris and [name not declassified] soonest. LINCOLN believes it virtually unfeasible to take the basic decisions scheduled for 1 Feb 54 without the evidence obtainable though LCFLUTTER on the integrity of [name not declassified] and Calligeris.
LINCOLN is well aware of significance of LCFLUTTER at this point. [name not declassified] and Calligeris may refuse, thus terminating their participation in operation, since to keep them on after such refusal would eliminate any chance of control. LINCOLN considers this risk much less weighty than the danger of making KUBARK decisions on less than maximum available evidence.
In order minimize possibility affronting [name not declassified] and Calligeris pride, LINCOLN recommends following approach:
Discuss with [name not declassified] first, as individual less involved operational details.
Explain to [name not declassified] need to apply every precaution prior to new start, precautions beginning at top.
Explain to [name not declassified] that many PBPRIME commercial firms use LCFLUTTER.
Explain to [name not declassified] LCFLUTTER had been used on all key American personnel and it therefore consistent for him and Calligeris to do so.
If [name not declassified] persuaded, have him persuade Calligeris.
If LCFLUTTER approved, Mylkes will attempt obtain acquiescence [name not declassified] and Calligeris.
Recommend LCFLUTTER team be dispatched LINCOLN immediately. Operator should be most competent, and, if possible, speak Spanish. Upon receipt ETA, LINCOLN will provide contact instructions.
FYI: Although request in early December, no security clearances have been received on either [initial not declassified] or C to date.
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 4. Secret; Operational Immediate; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT.
  2. Document 90.