211. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida1
Washington, June 20, 1954, 0155Z.
05705. Refs: A. LINC 4071; B. LINC 4078; C. DIR 05706; D. DIR 05707; E. GUAT 906.2[Page 356]
- Refs C and D give reasons why we unwilling authorize bombing on 20 June on basis all info now available to us as well as considerations urged refs A, B, and E.
- Ref B suggests you now inclined place main reliance not on inducing defection WSBURNT army but upon its intimidation or actual defeat through air to ground action supported by shock forces. If so you presumably have in mind attacks on number of military installations. This still seems to us more likely to consolidate army’s loyalty to regime and we still believe defection of army is best chance.
- In ref E, JMBLUG clearly has in mind different kind of target selected with view to intimidation and creation sense of crisis, but we are unclear as stated ref D what specific targets would meet this specification and avoid other objections.
- In view of widely differing views on appropriate and effective targets request your recommendations this point after receipt reply to ref D.
- Apologize direct dispatch refs C and D to field. Believe necessary in view extreme urgency final decision.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Sherwood for Somerset. Drafted by Bissell and cleared by Wisner.↩
- Reference A is not printed. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 2) References B, D, and E are printed as Documents 209, 213, and 208, respectively. Reference C, telegram 5706 from the CIA to the Station in Guatemala, June 20, requested additional information, in light of various proposals to bomb targets in Guatemala, “for realistic assessment abilities of SYNCARP pilots. Specifically ascertain extent their bombing experience and date most recent actual experience.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 6, Folder 2)↩