Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala

212. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[place not declassified], June 20, 1954, 0555Z.

4093. Re: DIR 5706.²

1. Ref msg forwarded to Somerset as directed, however, owing to possible delay in reply and fact information requested is largely available at LINCOLN, the following is hereby provided.

2. Ref para 1: As to targets, LINCOLN does not contemplate employment of tactics requiring instrument controlled or guided bombing, on contrary, from outset of air support plan only low level skip or dive bombing with attendant pinpoint accuracy considered feasible to fulfill all foreseeable requirements. LINCOLN has at no time supported or even considered favorably field (including JMBLUG) requests for bombing national palace, racetrack or other non military targets. Only military garrisons and storage tanks are presently considered primary essential targets and of these only Hank is desired for immediate action in event ultimatum to commander is ineffective.

3. Ref para 2:

A. When air support plan drawn up every emphasis was placed upon selection of combat experienced ODYOKE service trained pilots. In other words, only best and most combat proven pilots were to be selected of the 32 or more candidates interviewed by Brodfrost.

B. Lead pilot, [name not declassified], CMDR, USNR; flew with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], became an ace during [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; joined us, became an ace with 12 kills in Pacific, wing CMDR on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; considered one of the finest tactical naval air planners. All verified from naval records.

C. [name not declassified] selected [name not declassified] as his wingman. His qualifications are: LT (SG) USN active reserve, combat experience with navy in Pacific WW 2; completed advanced naval pilots course on night target pinpointing day before reporting to SYNCARP. Highly recommended by [name not declassified].

D. [name not declassified] USAF, flew 50 missions over Japan from Iwo Jima. Has over 1560 hours in F 47 and over 5,000 hrs in total. Checked out by Brodfrost who rated him tops.

E. Re bombsights, ODUNIT provided combat ready A/C.

F. Flak only reported light to accurate over Adam 20 and possibly 40 mm. Minor damage sustained one A/C. See following SHERWOOD cables for specific details: 286 (IN 19798), 291 (IN 19939), and 295 (IN 20028).³ Sufficient flak encountered over Adam to warrant consideration as hazardous to dangerous but not serious thus far.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 6, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
2. See footnote 2, Document 211.
3. None printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 93, Folder 17; Box 12, Folder 3; and Box 93, Folder 14, respectively)