Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Truman Library, Truman papers (PSF Subject File)

The Indian Chargé (Kirpalani) to the Consultant to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Washington, August 23, 1951.

Dear Mr. Ambassador: I am desired to convey to you the following reply on behalf of the Government of India to your Government invitation to participate in a Conference to conclude a Treaty of Peace with Japan to be convened on September 4, 1951, in San Francisco.

Begins: “The Government of India have the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the reply of the Government of the United States of America to the representations which they had made on the Japanese Peace Treaty in their communication dated July 30, 1951.² They fully appreciate the consideration given to their views by the United States Government and wish to assure them that the present reply is conceived in a spirit of frankness and sincere friendship for Government and people of the United States of America.³

2. Throughout the negotiations that have taken place between the two Governments on the subject of the Treaty the Government of India have laid emphasis upon two fundamental objectives:

(I) The terms of the Treaty should concede to Japan a position of honour, equality and contentment among the community of free nations;⁴

(II) They should be so framed as to enable all countries specially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the Treaty sooner or later.⁵

The Government of India have after most careful thought come to the conclusion that the Treaty does not in material respects satisfy either of these two criteria.⁶

3. Condition (I)

(a) It is only natural to expect that Japan should desire the restoration in full of her sovereignty over territory of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her own people and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country. The Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands fully satisfy this description. Nevertheless the Treaty proposes that until United States Government seek and obtain trusteeship over these Islands they should continue to be subject to the legislative and administrative control of the United States. It is apparent to the Government of India that such an arrangement cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people and must carry the seed of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East.⁷

(b) The Government of India recognise that as a sovereign nation Japan should have the right to make arrangements for her defence as provided in Article 5 of the Treaty. If in exercise of this right Japan should decide to enter into defensive agreements with a friendly power no one could reasonably object to this. But the right should be exercised by the Government of Japan when Japan has become truly sovereign.⁸ A provision in the Treaty which suggests that the present occupation force may stay on in Japan as part of such a defensive agreement is bound to give rise to the impression that the agreement does not represent a decision taken by Japan in the full enjoyment of her freedom as a sovereign nation.⁹ The effect of this not only on the people of Japan but upon large sections of people in Asia is bound to be most unfortunate.¹⁰

4. Condition (II)

As already stated the Government of India attach the greatest importance to the Treaty providing that the Island of Formosa should be returned to China. The time and manner of such return might be the subject of separate negotiations but to leave the future of the Island undetermined, in spite of past international agreements, in a document which attempts to regulate the relations of Japan with all Governments that were engaged in the last war against her does not appear to the Government of India to be either just or expedient. Mutatis mutandis the same argument applies to the Kurile Islands and to South Sakhaline.¹¹

5. For foregoing reasons, the Government of India have decided, with regret,¹² that they cannot be parties to the Treaty, It is their sincere¹³ hope that lasting peace will prevail in the Far East and, to that end, they will continue to cooperate with the United States Government and other Governments in such manner as may be open to them, consistently with the principles on which their foreign policy is based. As a first step, it is their intention, as soon as this may be practicable, to put an end to the state of war between them and Japan, and to establish full diplomatic relations with that country.

6. It has already been announced that the Conference convened at San Francisco to consider the draft Peace Treaty with Japan will not be open to negotiations, though attending Governments will be free to state their views on the Treaty. The Government of India feel that the statement of their views on the Treaty contained in this reply should be adequate to clarify their own position to the Conference.¹⁴ It is their intention, if the United States Government have no objection, to communicate this reply to their own Parliament which is now in session on August 27. Once the document has been published, it will be available for the information of the Conference, and the Government of India will be glad if the Government of the United States, which will act as host to the Conference, will have this reply circulated to its members. As, for reasons already stated, the Government of India will be unable to sign the Treaty, they think that it is not necessary for them to send representatives to it.” Ends.

The Government of India would be glad to know if the United States Government have any objection to their informing our Parliament of this reply on Monday, August 27, 1951.

With assurances of my highest esteem,

M. K Kirpalani

1. The source text is attached to two covering notes. One is an undated memorandum from W. J. McWilliams, Director of the Executive Secretariat, to William J. Hopkins, Executive Clerk in the White House Office. It reads:

   “On August 28, 1951 the President sent to Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, the following memorandum:

   ‘I have been waiting for you to send me your copy of the message from Mr. Nehru, together with a copy of the proposed reply as it was first sent to me.

   ‘If you will do that I will make the necessary interlineations and send it back to you.’

   “Mr. Rusk was in San Francisco when the President’s memorandum was received, and it was forwarded to him there since only Mr. Rusk was familiar with the matter. Mr. Rusk’s instructions have been received and the papers referred to by the President, obtained from Mr. Rusk’s and Mr. Dulles’ files, are forwarded as requested.”

   The top covering note is a copy of a memorandum from the President to Mr. Rusk dated September 14, which reads:

   “Attached is a marked up copy of the message from Mr. Nehru to the United States and also the marked up copy of our reply.

   I have tried to put in exactly the same comments as were on the original and I think I have succeeded in doing that, even including the bad spelling.”

   The following is typed at the bottom of the page: “President added in longhand—‘It is a pleasure to fix up this souvenir for you. I’m one of your admirers.’”

   Apparently the text printed here, which bears numerous marginalia in the President’s handwriting, is that on which Mr. Truman based his “souvenir” for Mr. Rusk.

   Also attached is a draft, not printed, by Mr. Dulles of the U.S. reply, marked “4th draft” and dated August 24. This document bears extensive marginalia by the President embodying his suggested revisions. For text of the U.S. note dated August 25, see Department of State Bulletin, September 3, 1951, p. 387.

   According to the Bulletin, the texts of both notes were released to the press on August 25. However, the Department’s original press release (No. 765) containing the two notes is marked for release at 10:30 p. m. EST on the 26th, a time which had been agreed between the two governments. In a memorandum of his telephone conversation held on August 30 with Mr. Kirpalani regarding alleged U.S. Government advance leakage of the texts, Mr. William L. S. Witman of the Office of South Asian Affairs stated in part that he had told Mr. Kirpalani that the release date was plainly marked on the press release, and that the release was also stamped “Caution—Future Release” in large letters. He further reported telling Mr. Kirpalani that in consequence the only leak which could have occurred was through the wire services. (Lot 54 D 423)

2. Three question marks in the President’s handwriting appear at the end of this sentence. All marginal notes referred to in the following footnotes are also by the President.
3. A marginal note after the semicolon reads: “Oh yeh!”
4. For provenance of the Indian aide-mémoire and of the U.S. reply dated August 9, see footnote 5, p. 1263.
5. A note in the margins at the end of this sentence reads: “Only right statement—so far.”
6. The following note appears in the margins at the end of this sentence: “Evidently the ‘Govt’ of India has consulted Uncle Joe and Mousie Dung of China!”
7. A question mark appears in the margin at the end of this sentence.
8. Another question mark is written in the margin at the end of this sentence.
9. The President wrote after this sentence as follows: “Let Stalin come in and decide it—shall we?”
10. A question mark appears in the margin at the end of this sentence.
11. The margins bear the following note after this sentence: “Is that a fair statement? I doubt it”.
12. A question mark is written above the words “with regret”.
13. The handwritten words “I wonder!” appear above the word “sincere”.
14. The following note is interpolated after this sentence: “It is! Stalin speaks.”