611.94/8–2251
Memorandum by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)1
Subject: Joint Chiefs of Staff Comments Regarding the Administrative Agreement between the United States and Japan Implementing Provisions of the Bilateral Security Treaty
The memorandum of August 8 to the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff2 forwarded in Mr. Lovett’s letter of August 22, 1951,3 contains such important statements regarding the whole philosophy of the peace settlement with Japan and is at such great variance with what I believe are the fundamental principles of the Peace Treaty and present thinking regarding post-war policy toward Japan that I believe definite action should be taken at once in order to get a decision from the highest quarters regarding the matter.
While it might be possible with some minor changes to agree to the Joint Chiefs of Staff redraft of the Administrative Agreement forwarded in its memorandum of August 8, the covering memorandum cannot, in my opinion, be ignored.
Paragraph 2 states that the details necessary for the formulation of specific facilities and areas to be retained by United States forces and specific facilities and services to be furnished by Japan at its expense cannot be finalized until at least October 1, 1951. Nevertheless in paragraph 5 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, they strongly recommend that the Administrative Agreement be signed and come into force concurrently with the Japanese Peace Treaty and with the Bilateral United States–Japan Security Treaty. I do not believe any Japanese Government, except under duress, will sign such an agreement which leaves for future reference what to the Japanese must be one of the most important aspects of the agreement, namely, a definite indication of what facilities will be returned to Japan after the Treaty goes into effect and what Japan will be required to furnish either in money or in goods and services. It also should be borne in mind that if the Department of State concurs in this arrangement, it will be extremely difficult for us to have any real influence in what facilities are returned to Japan and may indefinitely delay the Department of State’s regaining control of properties it has already purchased for its own use in Japan.
Paragraph 3 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of August 8 is, however, the most significant and most objectionable. This refers [Page 1286] to a new paragraph on jurisdictional matters which has been inserted in the Administrative Agreement which provide, among other things, that there should be no Japanese criminal jurisdiction over United States armed forces and civilian employees and dependents. The paragraph goes on to state that this is necessary to preserve the morale of the members of the security forces in Japan.
“… where the standards and system of justice are not familiar and do not accord with those recognized in the United States as inherent to its citizens, …”
This statement by the Joint Chiefs exhibits complete ignorance of Japanese history as well as lack of confidence in the achievements of the Occupation undertaken in great part by the representatives of the Defense Department. In 1899 Japan became the first Asiatic land to free itself of extraterritoriality. This was because the Occidental powers at that time recognized Japan as an equal and fullfledged member of the family of nations which had reorganized its political institutions in conformity with Western patterns and that its legal system was up to Occidental standards of justice and humaneness. To act now on the assumption that the Japanese had retrogressed to the situation prevailing prior to 1899 in spite of the complete renovation of Japan’s legal system during the Occupation and its reorganization by the Occupation to bring it more into accord with American standards and procedures, would not only be a grave insult to the Japanese but also to the untiring efforts of all those from General MacArthur on down who have worked to make it possible for Japan to be treated as a sovereign and equal member of the world community.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff go on to say in this connection that they
“feel that the position of Japan, as a conquered nation and as an oriental nation is not analogous to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations with which agreements have been negotiated on jurisdiction questions.4 … An agreement with Japan along the lines of the NATO agreement is not only inappropriate, but it would be unacceptable from the military point of view. Under the conditions which will exist in Japan, it is necessary that the United States have in time of peace those jurisdictional rights which it requires in war.”
The bald statement that Japan is considered a defeated and oriental nation and that this justifies treatment inferior to that accorded NATO nations is one which is at complete variance with the underlying spirit of the Peace Treaty as presently drafted and as put before Congress and the people of the United States as well as the rest of the world in [Page 1287] the many public statements and speeches of Mr. Dulles, to say nothing of the proposed speech by the President which will be given at the opening of the San Francisco Conference. If such statements are allowed to pass unchallenged and if the military forces of the United States are permitted through the State Department’s acquiescence to operate in a post-treaty Japan under the philosophy inherent in the above quoted excerpts, I am confident that it will be impossible for the United States to carry on successfully its diplomatic policy toward Japan to say nothing of the rest of the Far East. As one who has been designated to serve in a responsible position in Japan in the post-treaty period, I can only say that should this Joint Chiefs of Staff philosophy be accepted, directly or indirectly as the philosophy underlying United States Government policy toward Japan, I should have to consider seriously requesting a different assignment.
The same philosophy is evident in paragraph 4 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum where it recommends the revision of Chapter IV of the Administrative Agreement to eliminate the phrase “after consultation with the Japanese Government” with respect to the appointment of a Supreme Commander over United States and Japanese forces in the event of hostilities or imminent threat thereof. The memorandum states
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned lest the Japanese Government, by reason of a difference of opinion with the United States Government, delay or even attempt to veto any such appointment in the eventuality of a situation which the United States might consider as warranting the establishment of a unified command.”
It is difficult to understand why the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the appointment of a Supreme Commander over Japanese as well as United States troops would be of any value if this were not concurred in by the Japanese Government and why the Joint Chiefs consider the Japanese armed forces would willingly submit to the authority of a Supreme Commander appointed over the protests of their own government. If the United States policy is such that in time of crisis the Japanese Government will not willingly and at once agree to action desired by the United States, certainly no words in an Administrative Agreement or otherwise will have any effect, and the philosophy underlying the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum is one which, if carried out in practice, would, in my opinion, make certain, if nothing else did, that the Japanese Government would not in time of crisis willingly cooperate with the United States.
If the United States–Japan Security Treaty is to have any reality, it can only be based after a Peace Treaty on willing and voluntary cooperation. After the Peace Treaty goes into effect Japan will be a sovereign nation and will expect to be treated as such. The position of [Page 1288] the State Department and its representatives in Japan will be an impossible one if, from the beginning, it is not made crystal clear to the Defense Department that in time of peace the State Department will be supreme in policy matters and that its present policy of treating Japan as a sovereign equal must be respected. The time to make this clear is at the beginning of the post-treaty relationship and we should not depend upon a compromise of wording which may take us over an initial hurdle but in the long run lead us gradually into a position which will be untenable.
It is therefore recommended that no attempt be made in the first instance to make a detailed comment on the revised Administrative Agreement forwarded with the Joint Chiefs memorandum, but rather that the matter be discussed on a high plane with the Defense Department in an effort to make clear the unacceptability of the general philosophy exhibited in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum. If this is not done and if instead an attempt is made by means of drafting changes to bring the Administrative Agreement into line with the Department’s thinking, I am afraid we will become involved in a long drawn-out discussion and in the end probably agree to words which mean one thing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and another thing to the Department with the result that there will be constant disputes and bickering in the field when the agreement is put into effect.
- Memorandum distributed also to Mr. Dulles.↩
- See the enclosure, p. 1282.↩
- Supra.↩
- A handwritten marginal note appears next to the first sentence of this quotation: “This sentence has been officially deleted by the JCS in a new version received 9/22/51. R[obert] J G M[cClurkin].” JCS records show that removal of this passage was completed in all copies by September 26.↩