Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/8–2451

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (Burrows)

confidential

[Washington,] August 24, 1951.

Memorandum of Meeting on Japanese Peace Conference

Participants:	Ambassadors (in most cases) or other diplomatic representatives of Latin American nations in Washington except Costa Rica and Guatemala which were not represented.
	S—Mr. Dulles
	OSA—Ambassador Warren1
	ARA—Mr. Mann
	AR—Mr. Burrows
	AR—Mr. Monsma
	FE—Mr. Barbour

Following a few introductory remarks by Mr. Mann during which he thanked the Ambassadors for attending this meeting which had been suggested by the Department for the purpose of discussing the procedure to be followed at the Japanese Peace Conference in San Francisco the meeting was turned over to Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Dulles addressed the group first in terms of the background of the treaty, the philosophy behind it, the hopes for its achievements, and the preparation which has gone into it. He described the treaty as one not of revenge but of Christian expression. He spoke of the necessity of winning a peace as well as a war, of past failures of the world to recognize this fact and of his belief that the peace now being arranged with Japan will be the kind of peace which will permit Japan to play her part as an independent nation in a free world. He admitted that it was not a perfect peace—that would be impossible—but said that it is a good peace and probably the best peace ever imposed on the vanquished by the victor. He said that the peace contains compromises but not compromises with principle.

Mr. Dulles then described how in the planning and preparation of this treaty there has been constant discussion and negotiation over at least the past year, how he himself has travelled east and west to discuss details and to work out agreement with the governments of those countries most directly concerned in the war against Japan. In all of this we have endeavored to keep in mind the interests of all the belligerents, particularly the Latin American nations who although perhaps not as directly interested as some of the other powers (except possibly for Mexico which as everyone knows had a fighting contingent in the Japanese theater) were actively involved in the war as co-belligerents and played their part in the final victory. He said he felt positive that the kind of peace which has evolved from these protracted negotiations is the kind of peace which will appeal to the Latin American nations and to their sense of democratic fairplay. Certainly the Latin American representatives have been kept in mind throughout; we have known from the beginning that we would need their support and the treaty has been drafted with that consideration in mind. Mr. Dulles, in this part of his presentation, made specific reference to the opportunity that the Latin American nations have had in the last couple of months to suggest revisions in the treaty and the changes that were made in Article 14, for example, to more closely meet their particular problem in dealing with potential Japanese claims.²

With such detailed and careful negotiation having actually preceded the Peace Conference as it has, Mr. Dulles continued, and with everyone’s views having been given careful consideration, much of what might normally be expected to be done at the Peace Conference has already been accomplished. The negotiating has been carefully carried out and over an adequate period [of] time. Now, we are satisfied, it is time to end the negotiations and to sign the treaty. It is never healthy for a country to be occupied by foreign troops, no matter how enlightened the occupation. We think it is high time to end the occupation and let Japan once again assume her part as one of the free nations of the world. That can only be accomplished by signing the peace treaty and that is what we are planning to do.

Now that we have been advised that Russia plans to attend the Peace Conference, we can expect that there will be efforts to delay the signing by all kinds of dilatory tactics, Mr. Dulles said. We must be prepared for this and must plan the procedure to be followed with all possible care so that the Soviet will not be successful in those efforts. Nothing as yet has been worked out officially or in detail with anyone else, but Mr. Dulles said that we have given the matter a great deal of thought and that our views are somewhat as he then proceeded to outline. He said first that since there have already been twelve months of discussion we believe that further lengthy debate must be avoided at the Conference and that very complete rules of procedure must be adopted and adhered to throughout in order to avoid complete confusion. He said that our thoughts have been to permit an absolute maximum of something like an hour for each delegation which wishes to express its views of the treaty, that no changes in the treaty will be accepted, and that signature of the treaty will follow with or without those countries which may refuse to sign. We would hope that these expressions of view would be in general statements of approbation of the treaty with perhaps in some cases statements of position on some particular point. We would like to think of the Conference as an extended signing ceremony and not a forum. Perhaps two days would be sufficient for these statements, at the end of which time the Conference itself could decide whether the signing should take place immediately or whether some additional time should be permitted for future discussion. A day or so at the beginning of the Conference will perhaps be necessary for discussion and adoption of the rules of procedure, and if the Soviets can be kept from successfully pursuing dilatory tactics it should be possible to finish up completely in four or five days, Mr. Dulles said. It is very important that every effort be exerted to accomplish this, and it was for the purpose of discussing this necessity and the best method to pursue it that he (Mr. Dulles) had wanted to meet with our Latin American allies and give them a chance to think about tactics in advance of the Conference.

Mr. Dulles then gave the Ambassadors an opportunity to ask questions or to introduce subjects for discussion. The Ambassador of El Salvador³ spoke first and said that he believed there were three important points to consider in advance of the Conference. These points were, in his mind: (1) how to dispose of the question as to invitations to participate in the proceedings, (2) how to handle suggested amendments and (3) the question of translations. The Ambassador also expressed his opinion to the effect that it would be very difficult to conclude the Conference by September 8 and that it may be necessary to consider the possibility of the Conference extending beyond that date with all the complications of hotel reservations, etc. that would ensue. Mr. Dulles’ answer to these considerations were: (1) we hope that since the United States is the host country the Conference will decide that the list of invitations prepared by the United States is the definitive list and that no other countries can be added (Mr. Dulles made clear that he was thinking of Russia of course and a suggestion that the Peiping government of China be invited); (2) our position is that no amendments of substance may be made; (3) Mr. Dulles said that he feels sure that there will be no trouble on the translations and that that question can be worked out very well with an efficient Secretariat which we expect to have. With reference to this last matter Mr. Dulles mentioned the part he had played in insisting that Spanish be added as one of the official languages if French was going to be so considered. In connection with the question of translations the Chilean Ambassador⁴ spoke up and recounted his experience when the Charter of the United Nations was drafted at San Francisco and when he himself had to work together with Mr. Alfaro⁵ of Panama practically the last forty-eight hours uninterruptedly in order to get the Spanish version in acceptable form. The Ambassador of El Salvador, referring again to amendments, suggested that even if no amendments of substance were accepted there might still be a very difficult problem in connection with the presentation of numerous amendments of form. He suggested that to combat this it might be possible to arrange in the rules of procedure that the only amendments of any kind which would be accepted would be those advanced by countries which intended to sign the treaty.

The Ambassador of Colombia⁶ then asked Mr. Dulles’ opinion as to why Russia had accepted the invitation to attend the Conference. Mr. Dulles said that as usual in questions involving Soviet behavior one could only guess and that such guesses could be interesting but were not often productive. He said that the Soviets might want to take advantage of another public platform to talk about issues between the Soviet and democratic world, they might want to endeavor to bring in discussion of the Korean armistice or any number of other issues of that nature. The Colombian Ambassador then asked as to whether reservations to the Treaty would be accepted. Mr. Dulles said that we doubted the effectiveness of reservations to a treaty of this kind and said that although a statement of some kind might be effective we think that reservations might make the signature of the treaty meaningless. With regard to interpretations, Mr. Dulles said that the addition of such statements would be acceptable and could be of considerable importance.

The Ambassador of Uruguay⁷ on behalf of all those present presented his compliments to Mr. Dulles and spoke very highly of the work that he has done in preparation for this very important treaty. He called for and spoke of the importance of moral support in peace as in war.

Mr. Dulles concluded the meeting by speaking of the important contribution that all of the Latin American nations had made to the winning of the war against Japan and said that in many cases support other than military support was of extreme importance in the winning of a war. In this connection he said that Latin America’s contribution in terms of material, economic and moral support, in addition to that military support furnished by Mexico, had been of great satisfaction and importance to the allies in the war against Japan.⁸

1. Fletcher Warren, Director of the Office of South American Affairs; Thomas C. Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs: Charles R. Burrows, Deputy Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs: George N. Monsma. Officer in Chargé of International Organization Affairs in the Office of Regional American Affairs: Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
2. Extensive documentation on problems encountered by certain American Republics in connection with the Japanese Peace Treaty is contained in file 694.001 for 1951.
3. Héctor David Castro.
4. Félix Nieto del Río.
5. Ricardo J. Alfaro, in 1945 Panamanian Foreign Minister.
6. Cipriano Restrepo-Jaramillo.
7. José A. Mora.

8. In a memorandum of September 24 to the Secretary summarizing information regarding the Peace Conference which was to be presented by Mr. Acheson to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Allison stated in part:

   “Perhaps the single most decisive factor was careful preparation which had gone into the formulation of the Rules of Procedure and the effort which was made at San Francisco to explain these Rules to the friendly nations present. Prior to reaching San Francisco the Rules had been discussed in detail with the United Kingdom Government which offered valuable suggestions and became their joint sponsor and had been made available to the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Philippines, Netherlands and New Zealand. In every case the purpose of the Rules was carefully explained and in many cases valuable suggestions were received from the countries concerned. On the day before the formal opening of the Conference in San Francisco, meetings were held with the friendly members of the Far Eastern Commission countries plus Ceylon and Indonesia and later with representatives of the Latin American states at which time careful explanations were made concerning the purpose and operation of the Rules. It is believed that these meetings, in addition to the fact that every nation was aware that it had already had an opportunity to express its views on the Peace Treaty draft, played a large part in influencing the great majority of the states present to vote in favor of the U.S.-U.K. proposals. The ineptness of the Soviet bloc representation, particularly that from Poland, also played a part in making crystal clear to all those present that the only purpose of the Soviet group was destructive and that they had nothing really constructive to offer.” (694.001/9–2451)