Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Third Secretary of the Mission in Japan (Finn)

secret

[Tokyo,] June 28, 1951.

Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty and Bilateral Agreement

Participants:	Ambassador W. J. Sebald
	Minister John M. Allison
	Vice Minister Sadao Iguchi
	Mr. R.B. Finn

1. Regarding Japan’s sale of its shares in the Bank for International Settlements, discussed in the meeting on June 25, Mr. Allison said that he had put the matter up to Mr. Dulles, who also felt that the proceeds from such a sale should revert to Japan and not be treated as a Japanese asset in a neutral country. Mr. Fraleigh, a legal expert from the Department of State now in Japan, was of the tentative opinion that the BIS Charter explicitly provided that proceeds from the sale of BIS shares should revert to the selling nation. There appears to be no question that Japan will get the money from the sale of its BIS shares.

2. Regarding the proposed US–UK statement on Chinese participation in the Japanese peace treaty, Mr. Dulles had informed Mr. Allison that no public statement would be issued for the time being. Mr. Allison added that it was apparently not certain that such a statement would be made.

3. Mr. Allison said that the memorandum on Japan’s shipbuilding handed him by Mr. Iguchi on June 25¹ was most useful and asked whether there was some expert on this problem in the Japanese Government with whom he might discuss the matter further. Mr. Iguchi suggested either Mr. Kiyama or Mr. Okada of the Ministry of Transportation and said he would check this and let Mr. Finn know so that a conference on shipbuilding could be arranged.

4. Mr. Allison handed Mr. Iguchi two copies of various articles of the latest draft peace treaty (Articles 4, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, and 26), stating that these articles contained many of the major changes made in the treaty draft which the Japanese had been given in February. Mr. Allison briefly described each of the 8 articles handed Mr. Iguchi and said he would be glad to answer any questions the Japanese might have on these articles.

5. Mr. Allison also handed to Mr. Iguchi the revised text of the proposed bilateral agreement² and requested that it be brought to Mr. Yoshida’s attention as soon as possible in order that the views of the Japanese Government might be known in Washington. Mr. Allison pointed out that the present draft was almost the same as that handed the Japanese in February with the exception of three changes:

(a) The title of the proposed agreement had been changed in conformity with Japanese suggestions.³

(b) Paragraph three of the Preamble had been altered in accordance with the change made in the treaty itself by deletion of the phrase “with one or more of the Allied Powers”.

(c) The second sentence of numbered paragraph one had been changed to avoid any implication that US forces stationed in Japan might be authorized to interfere in the internal affairs of the Japanese Government. The previous wording might have presented an opportunity to opponents of the treaty and the bilateral agreement to attack both agreements at the time of Japanese ratification, and US Defense Department officials also felt that the earlier wording was undesirable because similar agreements with other nations contained no reference to responsibility or authority to intervene in the internal affairs of the state concerned. (Cf. Deptel 1810, June 25, 1951).⁴

6. Mr. Iguchi asked about the proposed site for signing the treaty. Mr. Allison said that there was no definite decision on this but that the leading suggestions were Tokyo and San Francisco. He said that Pakistan officials had suggested Tokyo and that Indian officials had no strong feeling on this score. He also felt that France and Britain would go along with Tokyo. When asked, Mr. Iguchi said he thought Tokyo would be best but that there might be opposition to Tokyo on the part of other countries. He said he had not discussed this matter with friends or colleagues. Mr. Sebald said that Japanese friends of his approved the idea of holding the signing ceremony in Tokyo and he thought some place such as Memorial Hall might be suitable. Mr. Allison commented that an invitation⁵ had been received from the mayor of San Francisco⁶ but that the mayor appeared to have in mind the conventional type of peace conference involving a long time and a lot of important people. The ceremony for the Japanese peace treaty would be a short one and would probably involve representatives from most of the nations who had been at war with Japan. He added that nothing was fixed in regard to the site and kind of ceremony contemplated.

6. [sic] Mr. Iguchi raised the question of the opening of the Japanese Overseas Agency at Taipei. Mr. Sebald said that if there was going to be no joint US–UK statement on Chinese participation in the peace treaty, it might be well to go ahead with the opening of the Taipei office; he noted that the Chinese in Tokyo were pressing the issue and there were no longer any good reasons for delay, especially if as planned the Japanese were to open a number of other overseas agencies in the near future. It was agreed to hold action on this matter temporarily and to consult Mr. Dulles.

Richard B. Finn

1. Not found in Department of State files.
2. Not printed; it had been transmitted to Tokyo in the Department’s telegram 1810, June 25, not printed. (694.001/6–2551)
3. The title at this time was “Security Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan”.

4. In telegram 1810, cited in footnote 2 above, the text of paragraph 1 reads as follows: “Jap grants, and the US accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this agreement, to station US land, air and sea forces in and about Jap. Such disposition wld be designed to contribute to the security of Jap against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Jap Govt to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Jap, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.”

   One other change differentiated this draft from that of February 9. The word “effective” had been inserted between “the” and “means” in the second sentence of the Preamble. For information on the draft of February 9, see Annex II to the letter of February 10 from Mr. Dulles to Secretary Acheson, p. 875.

5. Not printed.
6. Elmer E. Robinson.