Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 54D423

Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)

secret

[Washington,] June 27, 1951.

Memorandum re Ryukyus¹

1. The United States does not itself desire to acquire sovereignty, for the reason, among other things, that the United States seeks scrupulously to conform to its January 1, 1942 declaration that it seeks “no aggrandizement, territorial or other”.

2. If Japan renounces sovereignty in favor of no one, this would create a chaotic international situation, particularly if, as is possible, the United Nations does not approve the trusteeship agreement we shall propose. It might then be claimed

a) that sovereignty was vested in the inhabitants, who could hereafter assert, perhaps with United Nations backing, a right to oust the United States;

b) that the victors in the war over Japan, including the U.S.S.R., have an inchoate right to sovereignty of these islands renounced by Japan in favor of no one in particular;

c) that the United Nations is entitled to deal, in its own way, with the islands and their inhabitants;

d) that the United States has, by a subterfuge, actually acquired the sovereignty.

3. The present formula, whereby Japan agrees that, pending affirmative United Nations action on a United States proposal for trusteeship, “the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.”² fully complies with the provision of the September 7, 1950 Joint Memorandum that the treaty should “secure to the United States exclusive strategic control”.³ It is fully effective, at least so long as Japan is sovereign.

Exclusive strategic control is entirely compatible with residual sovereignty elsewhere, provided the sovereign grants it. We have exclusive strategic control over the former Japanese mandated Pacific islands and over the Panama Canal Zone, although in the former case sovereignty is vested in the United States, United Kingdom and France, and in the latter case in Panama.

The grant by Japan to the United States of continuing full powers over the islands might, however, be impaired if Japan itself renounces—in vacuum—its sovereignty. We would have a grantor which, itself, had no title.

4. The present formula has been discussed with, and informally agreed to by, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Any change would have to be explained to it. That might, and probably would, precipitate controversy and seriously delay the treaty making process at a moment when, unless there is quick affirmative action to consolidate the presently negotiated positions, they may collapse both as regards Japan and as regards the other Allied Powers.

1. An unsigned covering note reads: “This was prepared—but not used—for J[ohn] F[oster] D[ulles’] meeting with Gen. Marshall 6/27/51—2:30 p. m.”

   No memorandum of the mentioned meeting has been found in Department of State files.

2. Quotation is from Article 3 of draft of peace treaty dated June 14.
3. For text of the September 7 Joint Memorandum of the Secretaries of State and Defense to President Truman, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1293.