With regard to paragraphs 3 to 8, inclusive, of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff comments, it is my understanding, based on a conference with
Mr. Dulles, that the recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have been under discussion between our two Departments and
will present no difficulty for incorporation into the treaty.
On the question of signature of the treaty by Communist China, raised
in paragraph 9 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, it is my
understanding that China will not be permitted to sign this treaty.
I should appreciate your confirmation of this.1
The first sentence of paragraph 10 of the memorandum indicates
clearly that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would object to this treaty
coming into force as between Japan and any of the allied powers
until after the date of its ratification by the United States. As a
result of my discussion with Mr. Dulles, I am aware of the
difficulty which this point of view raises and I recognize that it
may not be practicable to give the United States such unlimited
control over the actions of its sovereign allies, as this sentence
would seem to call for. In view, however, of serious objection
raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I suggest that the matter be
brought to the attention of the President at the earliest possible
date for resolution.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense
secret
Washington, 26 June
1951.
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
1. This memorandum is in response to the request, contained in
your memorandum dated 15 June 1951, for the views and comments
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the draft Japanese
Peace Treaty dated 14 June 1951.
2. Inasmuch as the subject draft Treaty is no longer in outline
form but is approaching its final form as a legal document, and
because of the structure and the complexities of that document,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that they must address their
views to the specific language of certain articles therein, in
addition to stating or reaffirming certain principles and
objectives. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
advise that these comments do not include the views of the
Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), and have been made without benefit of
detailed legal analysis.
[Page 1157]
3. It must be insured that the Treaty does not come into effect
until the United States has ratified it. Accordingly, it is
suggested that Article 1 be changed to read:
“The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers
is hereby terminated as from the date on which the present
Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power
concerned, as provided for in Article
23.”
4. For reasons of national security the United States must retain
absolute control of the former Japanese islands enumerated in
Article 3, at least until favorable action is taken by the
United Nations on the United States request for a strategic
trusteeship for the area. It is the understanding of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that this right is guaranteed by Article 3 of
the Treaty and by Article 79 of the Charter of the United
Nations. However, it should be made certain that no other nation
will share or lawfully interfere with United States strategic
control of these islands. Furthermore, the Nanpo Shoto Islands
should be included in order to be consistent with the directive
of the President of 8 September 1950. For these reasons, it is
suggested that Article 3 be changed to read as follows:
“Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to
place under its trusteeship system, with the United States
as the sole administering authority,
the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude, the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan,
the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano
Islands, Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making
of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the
United States will have the right to exercise all and any
powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over
the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including
their territorial waters.”
5. It should be made certain that there be no basis, either
stated or implied, written into the Treaty which might provide
for the possible legal claim of Communist China to sovereignty
over Formosa, the Pescadores, Paracel, and Spratley Islands and
to property in the other islands referred to in Article 3, now
under the control of the United States, as well as to accession
of real property, such as consulates, buildings, and businesses,
formerly held by the Government of China or its nationals in
these areas. It would appear that in its present form the second
sentence of Article 4 (a) might afford
Communist China a valid claim over that territory were it to
sign and ratify this Treaty.
6. It is essential that there be no confusion between
occupational forces and armed forces which are to remain in
Japanese territory under or in accordance with U.S. bilateral
agreements with Japan. Accordingly, the first sentence of
Article 6 (a) should be changed to
read:
[Page 1158]
“All armed forces of occupation of the Allied Powers
shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the
coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not
later than 90 days thereafter.”
7. It is considered essential to prevent any requirement for
Japan to recognize such treaties as those between the USSR and
Poland and East Germany, and, specifically, the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of February 1950, as well as any other treaties or
arrangements for or in connection with the restoration of peace
which the USSR and such of its satellites as were belligerents
in World War II, including Communist China, might initiate. For
this reason, it is proposed that the first sentence of
subparagraph (a), Article 8, might be
changed to read:
“Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or
hereafter concluded by the Allied
Powers for terminating the state of war initiated
on September 1st, 1939, as well as any other arrangements
for or in connection with the restoration of peace made by the Allied Powers”
8. Under no circumstances should the United States sponsor
recognition or other benefits to Communist China or to a
Communist Government which might subsequently be established in
Korea. The language of Article 21, wherein China will be
entitled to the benefit of Article 14, would place a requirement
upon Japan (under the first sentence of Article 14 (a) 1) to enter into direct negotiations
with the Government of Communist China whenever the latter so
desires. This, in effect, would force Japan to recognize the
Chinese Communist Government inasmuch as the effect of Article
21 is to require a substitution in Article 14 of the word
“China” for the words “Allied Powers.” It is considered,
therefore, that revision of Article 21 is required.
9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that Communist
China not be permitted to capitalize upon the opportunity
afforded it of signing and ratifying this Treaty, which action
would carry with it, both stated and by implication, many
tangible and intangible military rights. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff would not object if Japan, subsequent to the ratification
of the subject Treaty, in the exercise of its rights as a
sovereign nation, entered into Treaty obligations with any
nation, as is provided for in Article 26. It appears, however,
that under Article 25 in its present form Communist China might
qualify as an Allied Power and thus be accorded all the rights
and benefits of an Allied Power accruing to the signators. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff and all of the members of the armed forces
of the United States would, for obvious reasons, find it
repugnant voluntarily to accord such rights to Communist China
and to be so associated with
[Page 1159]
a nation at present conducting major
hostilities against the United States. It is considered,
therefore, that revision of Article 23 (a) and of Article 25 may be necessary to prevent such an
eventuality.
10. It is considered essential to prevent the coming into force
of the Treaty until after the date of its ratification by the
United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view
that at the time the treaty of peace with Japan and the
concomitant bilateral treaty are agreed to, the date of their
coming into effect must, for cogent military reasons, be
determined in the light of the world situation generally, and
specifically in the light of the situation in the Far East.
Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that if a treaty
is to become effective prior to completion of hostilities in the
Far East, an arrangement providing as a minimum requirement for
continued United States use of Japan as a base in the event of
hostilities in the Far East, whether or not under United Nations
aegis, will be essential. Consequently, Article 23 (b) should be carefully studied to insure
that the objectives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
accomplished.
11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been informed that they will
soon be afforded opportunity to comment on a draft bilateral
United States-Japanese treaty of security. The foregoing
comments on the basic draft Japanese Treaty of Peace are made
without prejudice to their views on the bilateral treaty. In
this connection, they would reaffirm strongly their position
that United States security interests require that the proposed
Peace Treaty with Japan not be permitted to become effective
without the coming into effect simultaneously of a bilateral
United States-Japanese treaty of security.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
