694.001/4–551
The Secretary of State
to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
secret
Washington, April 5,
1951.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I enclose herewith
a draft of a suggested memorandum to the President which the
Secretaries of State and Defense might sign jointly if it meets with
your approval. The Memorandum is, I think, largely self-explanatory
and a copy was provided informally to your Department on April 3.
Mr. Dulles or I shall be glad to supply supplementary background, if
you desire.
I hope that this can be considered by the Department of Defense as a
matter of urgency. The political situation, particularly in
Australia where the Japanese peace settlement has been made an issue
in pending general elections (the vote to take place on April 28)
makes it important that we should be able promptly to indicate a
willingness, at least in principle, to make a security arrangement
with Australia and New Zealand along the lines approved by the
President’s letter of January 10, 1951.1 Also this willingness has a close
bearing on currently active negotiations with the United Kingdom
regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty which will not exclude rearmament
by Japan.
I understand that the documents brought back by Mr. Dulles2 from his Presidential
Mission to the Western Pacific and the State Department’s tentative
and suggestive draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty3 are under consideration by your
Department. I hope, however, that it may be practical to get the
enclosed memorandum to the President without awaiting the complete
views of the Department of Defense with reference to the detailed
language of the other documents referred to.4
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Draft Memorandum for the President
secret
In your letter of January 10, 1951 designating Mr. John Foster
Dulles as your special representative for the purpose of
conducting
[Page 184]
negotiations incident upon bringing about a Japanese Peace
Treaty you stated inter alia that the
United States:
“Desires that Japan should increasingly acquire the ability
to defend itself, and that, in order further to implement
this policy, the United States Government is willing to make
a mutual assistance arrangement among the Pacific Island
nations (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, the
United States and perhaps Indonesia) which would have the
dual purpose of assuring combined action as between the
members to resist aggression from without and also to resist
attack by one of the members, e.g. Japan, if Japan should
again become aggressive.”
Consideration of this matter, particularly during the course of
Ambassador Dulles’ visit to Japan, the Philippines, Australia
and New Zealand, made apparent that the desired results can be
better achieved by a series of
arrangements rather than by a single
arrangement.
- 1.
- Japan is not legally, economically or politically in a
position now to undertake what the Vandenberg Resolution
speaks of as “continuous and effective self-help and
mutual aid”. Therefore, it would not be practical at
this time to make more than a provisional arrangement with Japan which, as
contemplated by the memorandum which you approved on
September 7, 1950, would give the United States the
right to garrison forces in Japan while avoiding any
prohibition of Japan’s inalienable right to self-defense
and to possess the means to exercise that right.
Accordingly, the Dulles Mission drafted in Japan the
tentative text of a bi-lateral treaty along these lines
which would in essence give the United States the right
to maintain armed forces in and about Japan until the
United States was of the opinion some other arrangement
would satisfactorily provide for security in the Japan
area. In this connection the Japanese Prime Minister
stated in his communiqué issued concurrently with Mr.
Dulles’ final communiqué in Japan that “when we recover
our independence and join the council of free nations as
an equal member, the substance and scope of the Japanese
contribution will be determined according to the extent
of our economic and industrial recovery.”5
- 2.
- In the case of the Philippines, Ambassador Dulles
found interest in a mutual assistance arrangement with
the United States which would not, however, put the
Philippines in the position of being in effect an “ally”
of Japan. This latter is a step for which their public
opinion was not yet prepared.
- 3.
- In the case of Australia and New Zealand it was found
that their public opinion also would not accept an
“alliance” with Japan but that there was much interest
in a mutual assistance arrangement, initially limited to
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This would
provide for consultation and coordination of planning
with other states in a position to contribute to the
security of the Pacific area. The
[Page 185]
tentative text6 of such an arrangement was
drafted, in Canberra, by Ambassador Dulles and the
Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.
- 4.
- The United Kingdom has strongly objected to a single
arrangement between the United States, Japan, the
Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and possibly
Indonesia, on the theory that to identify in this way
the island chain would increase
the mainland danger, particularly
to the U.K. positions in Hongkong and Malaya. However,
the United Kingdom does not object to a series of
arrangements between the United States and Japan, the
United States and the Philippines, and the United
States, Australia and New Zealand, which would provide
for consultation and coordinated planning with as common
denominator the influence and participation of the
United States.
- 5.
- With respect to Indonesia there is evidence that it
wishes to be invited to participate in some form of
mutual security arrangement, but that it would not
accept such an invitation. Politically it may be
important to have it publicly known that Indonesia would
be welcome in a mutual security arrangement and this
matter is now being given further study.
With your approval, a tentative and suggestive draft of a
Japanese peace treaty has now been circulated which, in
accordance with the memorandum you approved on September 7,
1950, will not restrict Japan’s right to rearm. It is thus
important that the United States promptly be in a position to
announce publicly its intention to supplement this treaty
proposal by arrangements for “assuring combined action … if
Japan should again become aggressive.” (Your letter of January
10, 1951.)
It is accordingly recommended that Mr. Dulles’ terms of reference
as contained in your letter of January 10, 1951, be amended to
authorize “mutual security arrangements” (plural) instead of “a
mutual security arrangement” (singular).
It is believed that the three arrangements contemplated, one with
Japan, one with the Philippines, one with Australia and New
Zealand, and possibly one with Indonesia, will in fact achieve
what your letter of January 10, 1951 described as “the dual
purpose of assuring combined action as between the members to
resist aggression from without and also to resist attack by one
of the members, e.g., Japan, if Japan should again become
aggressive.”7
