Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison)


Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty and Allied Security Arrangements

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
FE—Dean Rusk
S—John Foster Dulles
John M. Allison

[Here follows the portion of this memorandum devoted to discussion of a Japanese peace treaty (on page 964).]

Sir Oliver then turned to the question of the Pacific Pact and said that he was now prepared to give the considered views of his government on this question. He confirmed that the main concern of the United Kingdom Government was the inclusion of the Philippines in a single Pacific security arrangement with the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Prior to giving the reasons for his government’s stand, Sir Oliver said he wished to make two important general statements and these were taken down at the time as follows:

“The United Kingdom is most anxious that any discussions on the Philippine issue in relation to a Pacific Pact should not in any way jeopardize the successful conclusion of a Pacific Pact between Australia, New Zealand and the United States.”
The action being taken in this respect by the United Kingdom Government is with the full knowledge of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand.

Sir Oliver went on to say that the United Kingdom hopes very much that the problem of the Philippines can be dealt with other than by straight inclusion of them in a Pact with Australia and New Zealand. While admitting that it was of no official concern to the United Kingdom what action the United States deemed desirable in relation to the Philippines, he wished to state that if the United States desires to do exactly the same thing with the Philippines and at the same time as with Australia and New Zealand, the United Kingdom would have no objection. In response to questions Sir Oliver made clear that this meant that the United States could conclude with the Philippine Islands an identical and simultaneous arrangement with that being concluded with Australia and New Zealand.

Sir Oliver stated that in the opinion of his government, it would have a very bad effect on the countries of Southeast Asia, both island and mainland, to pick out only one of the Southeast Asian countries for inclusion in a Pact and leave out the others. The United Kingdom had hoped that over a period of time it would be possible to bring [Page 187] many of the countries of that area together in some common defense arrangement, but that it would be invidious to set up at this time what would appear to be a general defense arrangement and have only one of the Southeast Asian countries included. The Government of the United Kingdom appreciates the point made by the United States that an arrangement restricted to Australia, New Zealand and the United States might appear to be a banding together of white powers as opposed to yellow or brown. However, the United Kingdom is not certain that the purposes of the United States would best be secured by the inclusion of the Philippines. The special relationship of the Philippines to the United States is well known throughout Asia and the United Kingdom Government fears that the solitary inclusion of the Philippines might have the opposite effect of that intended.

Sir Oliver was questioned as to the exact meaning to be placed upon his first statement that the United Kingdom did not wish to jeopardize conclusion of a Pact between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, and in response he said that speaking personally he would assume that should the United States, after consideration of the matter, determine that for what seemed to it good reasons such as, for example, Congressional opinion, it could only go ahead with a Four-Power Pact that the United Kingdom under those circumstances would reconsider its position. However, he was certain that the United Kingdom views were strongly held and that it would be most unhappy to see the Philippines included in a single Pact with Australia and New Zealand. Mr. Dulles stated that while he regretted the position taken by the United Kingdom Government, nevertheless we would give it the most serious consideration in an effort to see whether or not it would be possible to accommodate our views to theirs.

[Here follows resumption of discussion relating to the question of a Japanese peace treaty (on page 967).]