Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty

Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

secret

[Tokyo —1951.]

Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting April 17, 9:00 a. m.¹

British Draft

Ambassador Dulles suggested that it might be advisable to arrange for Mr. Iguchi to go over the British treaty draft.² He asked Mr. Fearey to take care of this, not giving Iguchi a copy of the draft but letting him take notes and asking him to provide the Mission with the Japanese Government’s views on the draft before the Mission’s departure. It seemed desirable, Ambassador Dulles said, to have Japan share some of the responsibility for dealing with the British proposals. At least we should know how they feel about those proposals as a factor in developing our own attitude. The British draft probably embodies all the detailed material which any of the Allies are likely to bring up.

Reparations

Ambassador Dulles said that he planned to take up with Mr. Yoshida the possible desirability of reparations from current production. He said that he was giving thought to this possibility again in the belief that reparations on the Italian Treaty model might help to reopen channels of trade with the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and other reparations claimant countries. It seemed doubtful whether these channels could be satisfactorily reopened unless the trade was on a basis sufficiently advantageous to those countries to appear in the guise of reparations. Otherwise bitterness might be such that iron ore from the Philippines and other essential materials might be cut off. If, on the other hand, Japan does a portion of its business with these countries for a limited period on a reparations basis, and raw materials start flowing into Japan from the reparations claimant countries and manufactures out once more, the result may be an overall advantage to Japan.

Ambassador Sebald asked if such a program might not actually stifle trade by injecting a disturbing element into normal trade channels. Ambassador Dulles said that this might be the case but he did not think so. The program would last only five years. There are, he said, two possible difficulties to consider. The first is the problem of possible economic disturbance, mainly in the receiving country, where the government would be receiving and marketing cheap Japanese manufactures in competition with domestic manufactures and normal trade. The second is possible political disturbance resulting from the creation of hopes in the recipient countries for larger quantities of reparation than are likely in fact to be received. These factors must be weighed against the good which might result from Japan’s recognition of its obligation to make further reparation.

British Attitude

Ambassador Dulles next raised the question of whether Japan would be willing to proceed on a treaty without the UK if necessary. He inquired whether it would be premature to raise this question with the Japanese, possibly unnecessarily frightening them, and Ambassador Sebald said that he thought it was. He pointed out that we were not yet at an impasse with the British. Ambassador Dulles agreed, adding that our difficulties with them were not of a momentous character and, if we could assume reasonable good will on both sides, should be reconcilable. He said that he believed that a team of people in the UK Foreign Office had been working on the British draft for some years, as had been the case in the State Department, and that this long and detailed draft was the logical result of such prolonged consideration. He said that he had never expected that the final treaty would be as short as our original proposal and that, desirable as a short and general draft was, we would not want to sacrifice agreement with the British and others on a treaty simply to preserve a literary and artistic triumph. If the British wish to include detailed provisions which will add to the length of the treaty but to which the Japanese and the U.S. do not have substantive objections it might be desirable to accept the British proposals.

Conversations with Mr. Yoshida

Ambassador Sebald said that his conversations with Mr. Yoshida might fall into two parts. The first might be a private and confidential talk in which he would provide Mr. Yoshida with background information on American Far Eastern policy, not related particularly to the treaty, in order to reassure Mr. Yoshida and help to stiffen him up. It would seem reasonable to suspect that the bolt from the blue of General MacArthur’s relief had aroused fears that the U.S. planned to throw over Japan in some way. Ambassador Dulles said he intended to inform Mr. Yoshida that the U.S. does not shift its policies in this way, that U.S. policies toward Japan have firm bi-partisan support and are unchanged. His purpose would be to convince Mr. Yoshida that U.S. relations with Japan, at least as far as the U.S. is concerned, are on a solid basis. Ambassador Dulles raised the question of whether it might not be advisable for General Ridgway to be present at this first conversation. He noted that having just arrived from Washington he was in a stronger position than General Ridgway to provide assurances regarding overall U.S. policy, but that was a matter General Ridgway was going to have to go on living with in the future. The meeting would consist of two Americans saying that the U.S. was a country which Japan can dependably live with.

Mr. Johnson said that General Ridgway was not General MacArthur and that it would be a mistake for him to act as if he were General MacArthur. He did not believe that General Ridgway planned to stay aloof from the Japanese people to the extent that General MacArthur had. Unless we plan to cast American leaders in the aloof position of the Emperor we must sooner or later begin to develop our relations on a more equal basis, and General Ridgway was the man to advance this process.

Ambassador Sebald agreed that it would be desirable for General Ridgway to be present at the meeting but said that it was first necessary that Mr. Yoshida make a courtesy call on the General. It was agreed that the suggestion should be made to Mr. Yoshida that he do so that evening, permitting the conversation of Ambassador Dulles, General Ridgway and Mr. Yoshida to be held the following morning. Ambassador Dulles and members of the Mission would then meet with Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Iguchi in the afternoon to discuss treaty problems.³

Ambassador Dulles next said that he wished to obtain the fullest and most expert information possible as to the nature and extent of Japanese anxieties arising from the change in command. Colonel Babcock said that the Japanese have fears but Mr. Yoshida very likely would not express them. Ambassador Sebald said that when he called on Mr. Yoshida directly following General MacArthur’s removal the Prime Minister had said that he was frankly concerned but he did not say why. It was agreed that a briefing session with appropriate Headquarters’ officials should be set up for Ambassador Dulles that afternoon in order that he might become impregnated with what seemed to be Japanese feelings on current issues.⁴

At this point General Ridgway entered and, after an exchange of preliminary comments, Ambassador Dulles began an extended briefing on the background of the treaty problem.

1. The usual list of persons is not included with the source text. Accompanying Mr. Dulles on this trip were Earl D. Johnson, Colonel Babcock, and Mr. Fearey. The party arrived in Japan April 16.

2. A British draft dated April 7 had been handed to an officer of the Embassy in London on April 9. He had been informed, in part, as follows:

   • “(a) Text of draft airpouched Washington Saturday [April 7] and should be presented to Dept shortly by Brit Emb. Text given Comwlth HCs in London today and will probably be given Fr and Neth Govts next week. No present thought of giving text to USSR or CPG, or to Philippines, Burma or Indonesia.
   • “(b) Out of deference to Dept’s known objection, all reference to limitation ship-building capacity omitted; this is of course subject to possible objection by Comwlths especially Austral and NZ.” (Telegram, 5331 from London, April 9, London Post Files, 350 Japan 4/9)

   Record of the exact date of delivery of the draft to the Department has not been found in the files; a copy of the draft is included in Lot 54 D 423.

3. In a memorandum of his conversation held later on April 17 with Mr. Katsuo Okazaki, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Sebald stated in part that arrangements were then made for Prime Minister Yoshida to call on General Ridgway late in the afternoon of the 17th and for the General, Mr. Yoshida, and Mr. Dulles to meet at 11:00 a. m. the following morning (Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty). No memorandum of either conversation has been found in Department of State files. For the memorandum of a meeting on peace treaty matters held at 3:00 p. m. on April 18 with Mr. Yoshida, Mr. Dulles, and other officials present, see p. 985.
4. A memorandum of April 17 on this subject, prepared for Mr. Dulles by Mr. Spinks, is enclosed with a letter of April 21 from Ambassador Sebald to U. Alexis Johnson, neither printed. (794.00/4–2151)