Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/4–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison)

secret

[Washington,] April 12, 1951.

Participants:	Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
	Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counsellor, British Embassy
	S—John Foster Dulles
	John M. Allison
	BNA—Livingston Satterthwaite

Sir Oliver called by request and was given an Aide-Mémoire (copy attached)¹ answering the March 30 Aide-Mémoire² from the British Government which stated that the Chinese Communist regime should be invited to participate in the Treaty negotiations and that Formosa should, by the Japanese Peace Treaty, be ceded to China. Mr. Dulles pointed out that it was obviously impossible for the United States Government to have any dealings with the Chinese Communist régime but that should the United Kingdom Government for its part deem it advisable to furnish the Chinese Communist régime, with which it had official relations, a copy of the United States draft Treaty, the United States for its part would interpose no objections.³ However, the United States did wish to make clear that if the British Government should decide to take such action, the United States would hope that this would not result in any undue delay and that the British Government would not request the United States to delay action on the grounds that the Chinese Communists had not had adequate time to comment.

With respect to Formosa, Mr. Dulles emphasized the view of the United States that a Treaty with Japan should do nothing which would of itself and suddenly eliminate all international concern over the disposition of Formosa; nor did it appear wise to the United States Government that Japan by a Treaty should be compelled to take action which might in fact result in Japan itself becoming embroiled in a controversy or being given an opportunity to claim that the “China” to which Formosa had been turned over was not the “China” to which the Japanese had intended, by the Treaty, Formosa should be turned over. Mr. Dulles then reviewed at some length the United States general position with regard to Formosa and the undesirability of turning over to a Communist regime the island and people of Formosa without some attempt being made to determine the desires of the people of that island. Mr. Dulles also referred to the possibility that it might be desirable in some manner to provide that any possible future disposition of Formosa might recognize a considerable degree of autonomy and might impose certain international obligations respecting the maintenance of neutrality by the island and the continuance of the present mutual and profitable trade relations with Japan.

Mr. Dulles then stated that he understood that Sir Oliver had been disturbed about the somewhat exaggerated and sensational press stories which had been appearing with reference to the British position regarding Communist China and Formosa and stated that he too thought it was unfortunate that there had been so many press stories. However, Mr. Dulles did point out that the stories probably would not have been so sensational and exaggerated had they not appeared at a time when there was widespread feeling that differences between the United Kingdom and the United States had in fact become serious and of concern to a large number of people.⁴

1. Mr. Dulles bad drafted this aide-mémoire. It follows in part:

   “2. As the Government of the United States does not recognize the Central Peoples’ Government of China it would not find it possible to invite that regime to participate in negotiations with it for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan. The Government of the United States accordingly does not see how, in so far as it is concerned, the views of His Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom could be implemented.

   “3. As regards Formosa it is noted that the declaration of Cairo provided, not for the cession of Formosa ‘to China’, but that ‘Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China’. In view of present differences of opinion as to what now constitutes the ‘Republic of China’ and as to the bearing upon the Cairo declaration of intervening events, it is the view of the Government of the United States that Japan, by the peace treaty, should renounce all rights, titles and claims to Formosa and the Pescadores, but that Japan should not itself be brought into the highly controversial question of what now is or should be the status of Formosa and the Pescadores, nor should the treaty be looked upon as the vehicle for the solution of this question.” (Lot 54 D 423)

2. See footnote 1, p. 953.
3. In a memorandum of a conversation which he held on April 11 with F, S. Tomlinson, Counselor of the British Embassy, Mr. Allison had reported in part that the United Kingdom, after considering “Mr. Dulles’ request for specific suggestions as to how Chinese Communists participation might be brought about” had decided that “it was probably best for the United Kingdom Government to transmit a copy of the United States draft to the Chinese Peoples Government.” (694.001/4–1151)

4. In his memorandum of a conversation held April 14 between himself, Sir Oliver Franks, and Mr. Rusk, Mr. Allison stated in part that Sir Oliver had contended that although Mr. Dulles had said that the United States would have no objection should the United Kingdom deem it necessary to give Communist China a copy of the draft peace treaty, the official Departmental press statement on the general subject [of participation by the People’s Republic in the peace negotiations] had not in any way hinted at this and the [American] press had been able “to play up the story as a complete and flat rejection of everything the United Kingdom had requested.” (Lot 54D423)

   Sir Oliver’s reference may have been to discussion of the issue at the news conference held by Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, on April 11. According to the Department’s transcript, Mr. McDermott under questioning repeatedly refused to state that the Department was rejecting British proposals regarding participation of the People’s Republic in the negotiations, nor did he indicate that the Department was in any way acceding to these proposals. (Department of State, “Daily News Conferences”, 1951, volume vi)