Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty
Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting April 18, 9:30 a. m.
Ambassador Dulles’ Speech
Ambassador Dulles suggested that Mr. Johnson sound out General Ridgway on whether he would consider it appropriate to be present during his April 23 speech.1 Ambassador Sebald said that he believed [Page 983] that General Ridgway’s attendance might be undesirable, the General being left to sit on the stage as Exhibit A without any clearly defined function. Ambassador Dulles recalled that General Marshall when Secretary of State had sat on the platform when Mr. Dulles had made an address in Paris some years ago in order to give weight to what Mr. Dulles said, and he did not see why General Ridgway should not be present for the same purpose. Ambassador Dulles further stated that he believed Mr. Yoshida and a number of other distinguished Japanese should also be present.
Mr. Johnson said that he also was lukewarm on the question of General Ridgway’s attendance, believing it might be preferable for General Hickey2 or General Fox to be present. Colonel Babcock said that he believed General Ridgway should be allowed to feel his way in establishing contact with the Japanese, determining how far and how fast he wished to go. Ambassador Dulles said that he agreed but believed that if General Ridgway wished to break with tradition and mix around more this might be a good occasion to begin, and that it therefore seemed appropriate for Mr. Johnson to sound out the General on the question. He said that he probably would not have a draft of his speech before Saturday and that it therefore might not be possible to clear the final draft with Washington.
Addendum to U.S.–Japan Bilateral Treaty
Ambassador Dulles said that Mr. Yoshida should be informed that we will want to suggest some slight changes in the addendum regarding the Korea operation.3
Shipping Conventions
Ambassador Dulles said that he had had lunch the previous day with Senator Magnuson, who had said that he believed that Japan should undertake in the treaty to sit down after the treaty had come into effect and negotiate regarding its participation in international shipping conventions. Ambassador Dulles said that this seemed a reasonable proposal and that consideration should be given to including such a provision in the treaty draft.
Seals
Ambassador Sebald mentioned that the Japanese Government had agreed to consider that the exchange of letters between Ambassador Dulles and Prime Minister Yoshida regarding post-treaty fishery relationships also covered sealing.
Treaty Signing Ceremony
Ambassador Dulles raised the question of where the treaty signing ceremony should be held. Ambassador Sebald said that he believed it [Page 984] should be in Tokyo. Ambassador Dulles said that he understood that Mr. Clutton had advised his Government that if the ceremony were held in Tokyo it would poison relations between the Allies and Japan for the future. Ambassador Sebald said that he had talked the matter over with Mr. Iguchi, who had indicated that the Government had no objection to Tokyo as the site. Ambassador Sebald said that Mr. Clutton had stated that he had learned second or third hand that Mr. Yoshida opposed Tokyo as the site but that he (Ambassador Sebald) had run the matter down and learned that the Japanese Government thought the idea of Tokyo an excellent one. Mr. Clutton had also said he had reason to believe that Yoshida would refuse to sign the treaty, running in a caretaker cabinet at the last minute to do so. Mr. Iguchi, however, had informed him that this was not true. The impression in some quarters to the contrary had arisen from possible difficulties on the question of who should head the delegation, since the Speaker of the Lower House and the President of the Upper House outranked Mr. Yoshida as Foreign Minister. Ambassador Sebald had suggested that Mr. Yoshida head the delegation as Prime Minister. Mr. Iguchi had stated that Mr. Yoshida had vociferously denied ever stating that he would refuse to sign the treaty, pointing out that he had negotiated the treaty and it would be absurd for him later to refuse to sign it.
British Delaying Tactics
Ambassador Dulles cited several examples of what appeared to be deliberate delaying tactics by the British on the Japanese treaty and related issues. Representatives of the Foreign Office and Board of Trade and a British legal expert would be in Washington to go over the U.S. and British drafts next week, following which Ambassador Dulles might go to London. It would be necessary before his departure to find out from the President whether he should inform the British that we intend to proceed without them if necessary.
Conversation with General Ridgway and Mr. Yoshida
In response to Mr. Johnson’s question as to what Ambassador Dulles planned to say at his meeting at 11:00 o’clock with General Ridgway and Mr. Yoshida,4 Ambassador Dulles said that he planned to emphasize that there had been no change in fundamental U.S. policy and that that policy, like the house which had withstood the earthquake, could now be considered firmer than ever. The only question was whether the Japanese remain equally firm following the dramatic events of the past week. The fact that the Mission is here and that the U.S. is pushing firmly ahead is convincing proof that the U.S. [Page 985] has not altered its views. It is up to the Japanese to show that they are as solid as we. Ambassador Dulles said that he hoped to find out from Mr. Yoshida what the Japanese fears were and to get Mr. Yoshida’s suggestions on the points he should hammer in his speech. Ambassador Dulles said he further expected to emphasize the esteem in which General Ridgway is held in the U.S. and the great confidence which the American people have developed in him as a result of his work in Korea. He also planned to inform Mr. Yoshida of the details of the bi-partisan backing of his Mission.
Finally, Ambassador Dulles said, he intended to point out the absurdity of an overall peace in the light of Mr. Malik’s termination of the treaty discussions and other Russian actions. Talk of an overall peace is really a smoke screen sent up by Japanese who wish to attack the Government or who do not wish peace at all. Mr. Johnson suggested that it might not be advisable completely to burn our bridges behind us on the question of an overall peace. Although it appeared at present an unlikely possibility, it was conceivable that we might change our views on the desirability of an immediate peace settlement. In such circumstances it would be better if we had left ourselves in a position to blame Soviet recalcitrance for the further delay rather than British objections or other difficulties with our Allies. In other words, it might be advisable for us to leave ourselves at least a little room in which to turn around.
- For text of Mr. Dulles’ speech, “Peace without Fear,” delivered in Tokyo April 23, see Department of State Bulletin, May 7, 1951, p. 726.↩
- Maj. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Chief of Staff to SCAP.↩
- Reference is to draft Addendum to Agreement Between the United States and Japan for Collective Self-Defense. See Annex III to the letter of February 10 from Ambassador Dulles to Mr. Acheson, p. 876.↩
- No memorandum of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.↩