Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/4–551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison)

secret

[Washington,] April 5, 1951.

Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty and Allied Security Arrangements

Participants:	Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
	FE—Dean Rusk
	S—John Foster Dulles
	John M. Allison

Sir Oliver Franks called by request to discuss problems connected with the Japanese Peace Treaty and Allied security arrangements in the Pacific. Mr. Dulles opened the conversation by referring to the recent meeting between Sir Oliver and Secretary Acheson¹ as the result of which the Secretary had received the impression from Sir Oliver that in the latter’s opinion there were no insuperable obstacles to the coordination of United Kingdom and American views on a Peace Treaty and that Sir Oliver would do all in his power to bring this about. Sir Oliver confirmed this impression. Mr. Dulles then went on to say that we had become increasingly concerned of recent weeks at what appeared to be delaying tactics followed by the United Kingdom and that whereas some time ago it had been the United States which seemingly was not anxious to proceed quickly with a Peace Treaty. Now it began to look as if that was the United Kingdom position. We were beginning to wonder whether or not the United Kingdom still adhered to their previous desire for conclusion of an early Treaty. The recent Aide-Mémoire left by Sir Oliver² which, without any explanatory reasons being given, stated the United Kingdom desire that the Chinese Peoples’ Government be participants in the Treaty negotiations and that Formosa be ceded to China was an example of tactics which made it very difficult to make progress. If the United Kingdom were to insist at this point on attempting to solve the question of Communist China’s participation or the future status of Formosa, it could only delay matters and perhaps hold up all progress. The same situation had been true with respect to the delay of over six weeks in receiving the views of the United Kingdom with respect to a Pacific Island security arrangement. Sir Oliver interjected at this point to say that he had the views of his government on the latter question and would make them available when desired. Mr. Dulles further pointed out that the United States had made a strenuous effort to keep the United Kingdom completely and fully informed of its actions, that the United Kingdom had been the first nation approached in the Japanese Peace Treaty negotiations and that the United States had incorporated into its draft text of a Treaty several important points to meet the views of the United Kingdom. The United States felt that it had done its share and that we could now justifiably look to the United Kingdom Government for some evidence of its desire to cooperate with us. In our opinion it is of first importance that the United States and the British Commonwealth nations, particularly the United Kingdom, preserve unity of action in so far as possible and the United States feels that if the two great English-speaking nations can effectively cooperate in these matters, it will be a real contribution to progress.

Sir Oliver said that he wished to talk very frankly and personally for a while about the problems which had been raised. He admitted delays in United Kingdom determination of policy and stated that he could give at least a partial explanation. Sir Oliver pointed out that for several months the Foreign Office has been without real guidance and direction from the top and that while it knew that a change was inevitable, it did not know when or in what form that change would come. It was, therefore, difficult for important decisions to be taken when guidance was being divided between several Ministers assisted from time to time by opinions received from Mr. Bevin’s sick bed. However, this situation has now changed and Sir Oliver was confident that there would be more prompt action from now on. He also pointed out some of the difficulties faced by the United Kingdom Government and the unfortunate effect of what he termed Mac-Arthuritis. He pointed out that whether one agreed or disagreed with what General MacArthur was doing, it was, nevertheless, a fact that his actions had caused considerable concern in Europe and Britain, and that that had conditioned to some degree United Kingdom actions. Sir Oliver went on to say that he was willing to do whatever was considered best and most helpful in making it possible for our two governments to understand thoroughly their respective policies and the reasons back of them and that he would take immediate steps to obtain from his government the detailed reasoning back of its request for Chinese Communist participation in the Peace Treaty negotiations as well as the suggestions of his government as to how this might be brought about. He would also endeavor to get a fuller statement of its position on the Formosa issue and with respect to many of the points of difference between us on the Japanese Peace Treaty. Sir Oliver felt there was no real likelihood of their being difficult in solution in the final analysis, but he did consider that the problem of the relation of Communist China to the whole matter was one of considerable importance and one upon which it would be most difficult to reach agreement. With respect to the Treaty itself, Sir Oliver pointed out that, as we know, the United Kingdom were themselves preparing a draft Treaty text and would shortly have it ready for presentation to us. He expressed the opinion that it would be very difficult and unsatisfactory to attempt to reconcile the two drafts by cable and suggested that it would probably be helpful if either some of their officials could come to Washington or some of the Americans could go to London so that the two texts could be discussed thoroughly and adjustments made. It was agreed that this was probably the best thing to do and Sir Oliver was told that we would get in touch with him later to give him our suggestions on this point.

[Here follows a portion of the memorandum devoted to discussion of a potential Pacific Pact; for text, see page 186.]

Mr. Dulles then reverted for a moment to the earlier discussion concerning Communist China and Formosa and again stated that it would be helpful to receive the views of the United Kingdom as to how Communist China could be brought into the picture. With respect to Formosa, he inquired as to why the United Kingdom had suggested that it be ceded “to China” and not to “the Republic of China” which were the words used in the Cairo Declaration. Sir Oliver said he did not know and took these words down, implying that he would put the question to his government.³

1. In his memorandum of his conversation held April 2 with Sir Oliver, Mr. Acheson had stated in part:

   “Secretary Acheson asked him whether the long delays in acting on Korean statement and Japanese treaty were due to any deliberate effort to block or obstruct and whether the British had some policy which they were not disclosing to us; and whether Sir Oliver thought we were drifting to real trouble. … So far as British policy was concerned, he [Sir Oliver] thought it was a matter of their not having any. The Foreign Office had been quite leaderless. Various bureaus had gone ahead drawing up papers. When we gave them a draft of a treaty, the particular Far Eastern bureau concerned had had a pride of authorship and had wanted us to see their draft. He did not think there was any desire to block or obstruct. He thought that ten days’ or two weeks’ talk would clear that situation up easily. … The Secretary, in general, explained to him fully our views that only American and Japanese power—the latter potential—existed in the Far East. Japan was now a primary end in itself. We had to move and move fast. We could not be paralyzed by looking only at all the difficulties. Sir Oliver agreed and thought that there would be no difficulty in London. … The Secretary said to Sir Oliver that, as a result of the talk, he had been reassured that there was no fundamental rift or misunderstanding between Washington and London. In the Secretary’s opinion what should be done, beginning tomorrow, is to have a series of specific talks about specific points, looking toward the State Department’s coming out with clear proposals, which Sir Oliver could then get behind and put across in London. He agreed that this was the right procedure.” (The Harry S. Truman Library: Dean Acheson Papers)

2. See footnote 1, p. 953.

3. On April 9 Mr. Dulles prepared an addendum to this memorandum of conversation. The entire text reads:

   “Mr. Dulles stated that he hoped a situation would not arise where the U.S. would have to choose between dealing with Japan without awaiting a common position with the U.K., or incurring such a delay in an effort to reach agreement with the U.K., as would involve grave risk that Japan would be lost to the free world.” (694.001/4–551)