Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 54 D 423

The Deputy to the Consultant (Allison) to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)

secret

[Washington,] April 5, 1951.

Subject: U.K.–U.S. Views on Japanese Peace Treaty

There are given below certain observations on the extent to which the United States has endeavored to meet the views of the United Kingdom with respect to a Japanese Peace Treaty as well as comments upon the obvious inconsistency of the United Kingdom expressed objectives and certain of the means by which they expect to attain them.

On six specific points which the United Kingdom raised and which had not previously been agreed to by the United States, this Government has either accepted completely the United Kingdom position, accepted the position with certain modifications or expressed a willingness to receive from the United Kingdom concrete suggestions as to how their position should be treated in a formal Treaty of Peace.

In the following three cases the United States has completely accepted the United Kingdom point of view:

1. The United States has agreed that Japan should not be bound by the Treaty to apply for U.N. membership and that the Allied or Associated Powers should not be bound to support Japan’s application for U.N. membership.

2. The United States has agreed that the revival of non-political pre-war bilateral treaties should be only on the initiative of the allied state concerned.

3. The United States has agreed with the United Kingdom point of view that there should be no specific reference in the Treaty to the possible retention of United States armed forces in and about Japan after the Treaty comes into effect.

In the following two cases the United States has agreed at least in part with the United Kingdom position:

1. The United States agreed, at the suggestion of the United Kingdom, that in the Treaty Japan should renounce all past and present claims in the Antarctic Continent. However, the United States did not agree that Japan should foreswear any future claims to that vast territory, much of which has not yet been explored. Such a demand would appear invidious and not in keeping with the overall philosophy of the Treaty.

2. The United States has agreed with the British contention that the Japanese should make a one hundred percent restoration of all allied property in Japan, but the United States has not seen fit to have this spelled out in the Treaty itself but rather to leave it to domestic Japanese legislation. However, it is the intention of the United States that before the final signing of the Treaty, definite assurances be received that the Japanese Government intends to take such action.

There has been one case in which the United States has asked the United Kingdom for suggestions as to the drafting of a clause which would carry out their desires, namely, that any Most-Favored-Nation clause should be so drafted that each territory (such as colony or protective state) should count as a separate country.

The above six specific cases are those in which the United Kingdom position was initially different from that of the United States. It should be borne in mind that in most of the clauses of the Treaty recommended by the United Kingdom, the United States had already taken a position in accordance therewith.

The outstanding points of difference which remain, other than procedural, are;

1. That undesirable Japanese political societies be outlawed.

2. That there should be a reference in the Preamble to the responsibility of the Japanese militarist regime for having provoked a state of war.

3. The United Kingdom demand that Japanese “excess” shipping capacity be destroyed.

4. That stocks of Japanese monetary gold be made available for reparations.

5. That Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries be not returned to the Japanese.

The first three items above would seem clearly undesirable if we accept the view expressed by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff that

“The continued alignment of Japan with the West can only be achieved on a voluntary basis, which would mean the establishment of an identity of interest politically, economically and military.”

It is interesting to know that the views of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, including that quoted above, have been approved by His Majesty’s Government. It is difficult to see how there could be created between Japan and the West an identity of interest, “politically, economically and military” if the Treaty cast doubt upon the good faith of the Japanese and their intention not to revive ultra-militaristic societies, calls attention to the sins of their military in beginning the war and requires the Japanese Government to destroy a substantial portion of its economic productivity capacity. The British contentions with regard to making available for reparations Japanese gold stocks and assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries would appear to be entirely unrealistic in view of (1) the inability of the Allied Powers to agree on a definition of reparations shares and (2) the unlikelihood that in those countries where the U.S.S.R. has a voice in the joint control of Japanese assets that these assets would in fact be released for general distribution. The United Kingdom also completely ignores priority of the United States claims for compensation for its advances to Japan during the occupation in order to prevent disease and unrest and to assist in the economic rehabilitation of Japan so that Japan would not be a continuing burden on the Allies.

While the United States has made an honest and sincere effort to meet the British point of view wherever possible, I cannot readily recall to mind any case in which the United Kingdom has made any effort to accommodate itself to the United States position. In one possible exception the present United Kingdom position is that there should be no further reparations from industrial assets in Japan, but it is not clear that the United Kingdom adopted this position out of any deference to the United States. Rather, it appears more likely that this position was adopted only after the United Kingdom had become convinced of the practical impossibility and uselessness of attempting to take out of Japan further industrial plants.

I recommend that in your conversation with Sir Oliver Franks, his attention be specifically drawn to the instances in which the United States has accommodated itself to the United Kingdom point of view and to the manifest inconsistency between the General United Kingdom position, agreed to by its government, and the insistence of the United Kingdom on including in the Treaty, clauses which would go far toward nullifying the effort to create an identity of interest between Japan and the West.