PSA Files: Lot 58D2071
Record of a Meeting at the Pentagon Building, Washington, September 20, 1951, 3:30 p.m.
Participants
| French | United States |
| General de Lattre | Mr. Lovett |
| General Allard | General Collins |
| Ambassador Bonnet | General Olmsted2 |
| General Brink | |
| Colonel Dickens | |
| Lt. Colonel McGarrigle | |
| Major Cunningham (interpreter) |
Mr. Lovett welcomed General de Lattre and invited him to open the conversation.
General de Lattre spoke at length about the importance of the war in Indochina. He said that every day he asks those whom he meets in the United States if Indochina and Korea are not one war. The answer is always “Yes”. He said that General Collins had agreed with him that “if you lose Korea, Asia is not lost; but if I lose Indochina, Asia is lost.” Tonkin is the key to Southeast Asia, if Southeast Asia is lost. India will “burn like a match” and there will be no barrier to the advance of Communism before Suez and Africa. If the Moslem world were thus engulfed, the Moslems in North Africa would soon fall in line and Europe itself would be outflanked.
General de Lattre recalled that at Fort Benning, the previous day, he had spoken of the paramount importance of infantry in the war of today and the war of tomorrow. He recalled that at the end of World War II, the Soviet Marshal Zhukov had told him that Russia would need fifteen years to replace the calamitous losses among her youth before she could fight another war. This is the importance of Asia to the Russians, as illustrated in Korea—to fill their need for young manpower for the infantry to fight their wars. The United States must decide if it is necessary to hold Asia. If the answer is yes, then it must give him the material he needs for the defense of Indochina.
Mr. Lovett recalled that last Friday3 he had expressed to General de Lattre the hope that he would regard the Pentagon “comme chez vous”. General de Lattre did not need any further expression of our understanding of his problem. However, Mr. Lovett wished to clear [Page 518] up something that may confuse the General, as it confuses many American citizens. He explained that an appropriation of funds for FY 1951 means that these funds are to be obligated in FY 1951, but does not necessarily mean that the actual production of matériel will take place in that year. The American fiscal year begins on July 1st. Mr. Lovett said that in order to meet General de Lattre’s problem, which we so well understand, we must take account of what we are able to do. He pointed out that Congress has not yet approved the Military Aid funds for 1952. Beginning about March 1952, we will get more industrial production than we are getting now.
Mr. Lovett said that General de Lattre had made a very persuasive presentation of the needs of his theater. Although, in one sense, your theater of war is the same as ours, we must recognize that the United States has a primary obligation in other theaters, whereas your primary obligation is in your own theater. Mr. Lovett said that he would ask General Collins to respond specifically to the requests which General de Lattre had made this morning.
General de Lattre interrupted to remark that he had seen in the paper yesterday evening that the Department of State had made a statement exactly contrary to what he was aiming to achieve.
Mr. Lovett said that he would like to explain how this had come about. There had been a report from the French press agency that the United States would place Indochina on the same or higher priority than Korea, where the United States has had 89,000 casualties. There was an immediate Congressional reaction that such a decision would be wrong. The Department of State had responded to the rumor by stating the actual facts, i.e., that such a decision had not been made. The purpose of this statement had nothing to do with General de Lattre’s visit. Mr. Lovett said he thought General de Lattre would find encouragement in the information which General Collins was about to give him.
General de Lattre referred to the battles of last May and June in Indochina. Earlier, the Vietminh had been able to support their troops in battle for only a day or a few days at a time. With each succeeding month, they were able to sustain their forces in longer operations. This resulted in an ever-increasing rate of wear and consumption of matériel by the French and Vietnamese forces. In June, there had been less than 6,000 shells in all Indochina. General Brink had told him that additional supplies of ammunition were expected momentarily. Then it was learned that the ship carrying them had been diverted to Korea. Consequently, during eight days the French forces were “in a most dramatic situation”. Owing to the lack of reserve ammunition, it was impossible to counter-attack. When no counter-attack [Page 519] was ordered, his men were asking if the General had lost his energy because of the death of his son, but he could not tell them the real state of affairs. The General said that he no longer felt personal ambition. His future is nothing. He is only trying to do his duty to his country and the whole free world. Nevertheless, he would not volunteer for disaster. If the means to continue the war were not made available to him, he could not recommend to his country that it continue to sacrifice the flower of its youth without hope of victory, and he would explain to his country and to the United States why it was impossible to carry on.
Mr. Lovett expressed his understanding. The U.S. wants to do whatever is possible, but it would be misleading to let General de Lattre think that everything is possible.
General Collins then explained what his staff had been able to accomplish toward expediting the deliveries of Army supplies. He recognized that March was too late for the delivery of the vehicles which had been promised, because the most favorable season for operations in Indochina is in January and February. Consequently, his staff had arranged that 4500 vehicles would be delivered by the first of January 1952. This should be a material help. This promise was contingent on the availability of the necessary shipping. In addition, of the 330 combat vehicles requested, all would be available by the end of the year, with the possible exception of the M3A1 scout car. On signal equipment, it was simply impossible to meet the demand for 2700 radios at this time. However, 600 would be available by the end of the year. In small arms, 8900 Thompson sub-machine guns and 500 machine guns would be available by the end of the year. Thus, if the shipping is available, we will be able, by the end of 1951, to meet all the critical items on the list which General de Lattre left with General Collins, with the exception of radios, and ¼ of them could be delivered.
In addition to expediting these deliveries, General Collins had asked his staff to review the reserves which General Ridgway has for his operations in Korea with a view to making as much as possible available to Indochina. He could make no promises but assured General de Lattre that we will do all we can. There is a limit beyond which we cannot go, but we may even cut a certain percentage of their equipment from our own troops in Europe.
Third, General Collins said that he had directed his staff, in coordination with General Olmsted’s office, to reexamine the allocation of funds for military aid for Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The law allows ten per cent transferability of funds between areas. Our staff will study means to make money more immediately available for Indochina.
General Collins reviewed these three measures which he had directed his staff to take, and said that, in the short time he has been able to [Page 520] study the situation, that is the best he could do. General de Lattre assured General Collins that he would make all the use humanly possible of the materials given him. However, many things can happen even by the first of January.
Mr. Lovett explained that the first of January was the date for completion of shipments, that the matériel would begin arriving much sooner.
General Collins said that we will do everything possible to make the deliveries even earlier.
Ambassador Bonnet inquired as to the availability of shipping.
Colonel Dickens said that the question of shipping had not been fully explored in the limited time available, but that it appeared that shipping would not present any problem.
General de Lattre said that sometimes while he is in the United States he feels like a beggar asking for these things. He would like to feel that “I am your man just as General Ridgway is your own man. Your own spirit should lead you to send me these things without my asking.”
Mr. Lovett observed that if we had not regarded him in this way we would not have taken the measures which General Collins had just outlined.
General de Lattre replied that this confidence meant very much to him and made him very happy.
There was some discussion regarding the routing of shipping to Indochina. Mr. Lovett directed that ships carrying these critical items be routed directly to Indochina. If matériel for other destinations has to be loaded on any of these ships, such matériel should be bottom-loaded and dropped off on the return trip. Mr. Lovett congratulated General Collins for being able to follow through so quickly on the items which General de Lattre had listed as critical.
General de Lattre said that since he saw that the United States officials had confidence in him, he would write regularly to General Collins and keep him informed of the situation in Indochina. “We shall be hand in hand.”
Mr. Lovett then raised the question of critical Navy items, particularly LCM’s.
General de Lattre decided that he would prefer to have the LCM’s delivered at the earliest possible date, regardless of whether or not they were equipped with armor. Armor could be fitted on them locally at such time as it became available.
General de Lattre then explained the importance to him of his request for aircraft. His Hellcats were “finished”. They must be replaced by F–86 jets in order to impress the native Vietnamese and deter Chinese aggression.
[Page 521]Mr. Lovett said that there was no possibility of making jet aircraft available.
General de Lattre explained his need for two squadrons of “Packet” aircraft. He needs a capability to air-drop 1500 to 1600 men. At the present time, he is limited to a drop of 600 men.
Mr. Lovett said that the Air Force now has the question of transport aircraft under study. He suggested that General de Lattre may wish to explore with his own Government the possibility of allocating to Indochina some of the C–119 aircraft which are in the 1951 French MDAP.
General de Lattre said that his Government would probably tell him that these are needed for SHAPE.
Mr. Lovett observed that the United States is faced with the same problem.
Colonel McGarrigle reported that of the B–26 aircraft now programmed, eight would be delivered by the end of 1951 and eight more by June 1952.
General Collins observed that the Secretary could not possibly be acquainted with all the details of the Air Force and Navy items. He suggested that General de Lattre save time by discussing other items directly with the Air Force and the Navy, just as he had discussed the Army items with him this morning. It was agreed that Ambassador Bonnet and General Olmsted would make necessary arrangements for this.
In conclusion Mr. Lovett said that we regard General de Lattre as a comrade in arms and will do everything possible for his theatre within our capabilities.
General de Lattre replied, “Do not say my theatre. It is not my theatre; it is our theatre.”
The visitors left at 1640.
Major, GSC
Office of Foreign Military Affairs