751G.5–MAP/9–2051
The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: In our recent conversations with General de Lattre, we assured him that Indochina enjoyed a priority for military end-items second only to Korea, ahead of all other recipients of military aid. General de Lattre said that this so-called “priority” [Page 522] for Indochina meant nothing to him, that all he knew as a soldier was that he was not getting enough for his needs.
A spot check of MDAP shipments based on Department of Defense reports to us indicates that General de Lattre’s complaint about the value of his priority is by no means wholly unjustified. It appears that other MDAP recipients have been receiving very substantial shipments of items on which promised deliveries to Indochina are farthest behind.
For example, General de Lattre particularly complained of the in-adequacy of jeep deliveries. Under the combined FY 1950 and FY 1951 program, Indochina was to receive 968 jeeps. 444 had been shipped to port as of July 31, 1951. Our last report with respect to estimated deliveries indicates that shipments of the remaining 522 are not expected to be completed until the third quarter of 1952 although this may since have been advanced. Yet, as of July 31, 1951, 4,547 jeeps had been shipped to port for Title I countries, including 2,939 units for France, and 873 for Stockpile A; 1,185 had been shipped to port for Title II countries; 50 for Indonesia and 236 for Canada (reimbursable aid).
Another item which General de Lattre mentioned was cargo trucks. The total program for Indochina of 2½ ton 6×6 trucks calls for 906 units. As of July 31 last, 393 had been shipped. Deliveries were estimated to be completed in the first quarter of 1952. Yet, as of July 31, 1951, 7,362 trucks of this type had been shipped to port for Title I countries, including 4,641 for France and 1,548 for Stockpile A; 399 had been shipped to port for Title II countries, 17 for Thailand and 451 for Canada (reimbursable aid).
The same situation prevails, although not to such an extreme degree, in the case of communications equipment, 155 mm. Howitzer shells, and other items on the Army program.
We do not yet have the figures for shipments to port for August or for any part of September. However, it seems more than likely that items which are high on the list of urgent needs for Indochina are currently on their way to other MDAP recipients. It might be possible before General de Lattre leaves to give him assurance of specific expedited deliveries to Indochina by diverting some of these shipments.
While there are doubtless other items on General de Lattre’s lists, such as helicopters and C–47s, which we cannot supply quickly, it would certainly be most desirable not to send General de Lattre away altogether empty-handed.
We are delighted that you have found it possible, together with General Collins, to see General de Lattre. I urged him to seek an appointment in the knowledge that you would give him a sympathetic hearing. During the course of our conversations in the Department with him on [Page 523] Monday1 I reiterated the vital importance which we attach to holding Indochina, which importance Secretary Acheson stressed to M. Schuman. I also told him that we would again remind the Department of Defense of the disastrous political consequences which might be expected to arise from the loss of Indochina, though I assured him such repetition was unnecessary in view of the established position of this Government regarding the importance of the countries which he is; defending.
Sincerely yours,
- September 17.↩