751G.00/1–2351: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Blanché) to the Secretary of State
366. ReContel 362 January 22.1 De Lattre left town yesterday rather like bull-fighter turning his back on fixed, bull. As trophies he bore congratulatory effusions from Bao Dai, Huu and Tri, which tickled him so he could not wait next day’s press splash and called in British Consul and me to crow over them. Also inordinately pleased by AFP reports attitude in US changing to confidence.
It is true C-in-C has restored confidence and his personality overshadows Asia at moment. I believe Tri reflected consensus when he told Heath Hanoi would be goner by now if De Lattre had not replaced Carpentier who fought colonial war from Saigon. De Lattre points with pride—and gives Tri some credit—to population’s calm in face of his relatively frank communiqués on fighting. Also appreciated US contribution to morale in opening USIE library at critical time.
But at same time C-in-C, who courts US newsmen and speaks off record to them at frequent lunches and dinners, now blandly admits he was whistling in dark with brash New Year statements (Contel 299 January 1);1 also that things did indeed look dark January 15 (Contel 347 January 16)1 and he almost scraped bottom of reinforcement barrel to halt attacks (Contel 354 January 18).1 This tacit admission his stopping dependent evacuation was risky grandstand play, plus his stated belief VM will soon again attack in force, cannot but engender mixed feelings.
De Lattre rather harps on Tonkin as bastion against Communist sweep of southeast Asia which he can hold if France gives troops and US gives tools. Re troops, says openly French Government must give within measure of its ability (asking price is now 1½ divisions) because government knows it will fall if HC walks out on job. Re US aid, C-in-C stressed anxiety over case he considered symptomatic, that Brink had to go to Tokyo personally to get napalm in time; while everywhere lauding Brink for this, including before combat troops, C-in-C made point it was not comforting that situation was saved by personal action of one general. (Valid reservations to this undoubtedly reported from Saigon by Minister and/or Brink).
Withal, De Lattre speaks of Tonkin fighting as delaying action to buy time for European defense organizing under Eisenhower,2 which [Page 359] he considers needs 2 years. This view undoubtedly owes to his more European outlook but I believe he shares my basic feeling Chinese will not let IC go and Tonkin is eventually doomed.
Available information re current views local Nationalists, mostly gleaned reliable second hand, summed up as follows:
- 1.
- Fear De Lattre’s talk of Vietnam independence, while sincere, is personal talk, and would like official French Government statement;
- 2.
- Fear if French are successful defenders they will be too entrenched to leave, and that quantities of US military aid contribute to this morally as well as physically;
- 3.
- That Chinese invasion is coming.
Department pass Paris, Saigon. Sent Department 366, repeated information Paris 73, Saigon 202.