751.G.00/1–2151: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon ( Heath ) to the Secretary of State 1
1291. 1. Bao Dai asked urgently to see me before my departure for Washington and his plane took me to Bon Me Thuot yesterday morning, an isolated district capital in the plateau region and a departure point for big game expeditions.
Bao Dai said one of the principal reasons for wishing to see me was concern over President Auriol’s insistence on publishing a letter sent by him last December to Bao Dai2 following signature of the Pau accords which contained following passage:
[Here follows the partial text of the letter, in which President Auriol urged that free elections be held in Vietnam.]
Bao Dai said that when this letter was handed him Letourneau had said this was purely a form communication requiring no answer. Since then, however, Letourneau had written to him that President Auriol [Page 356] desired the publication of this letter and that Auriol was firmly attached to the idea of “a new appeal capable of guaranteeing free elections to put an end to military operations”. Letourneau continued “it was more than ever evident that it was only by strictly Vietnamese action that an appeasement (apaisement) would be achieved. Letourneau added a postscript suggesting that Bao Dai’s traditional message to his people on Vietnamese new years (February 6) would be an appropriate time to make this appeal. In addition to Letourneau letter Bao Dai had received from his representative in Paris, Prince Buu Loc, a message that French were pressing for the publication of Auriol’s letter.
Bao Dai said that he was utterly against its publication at this time and it was for that reason that Giao in his speech at the banquet at Hue (Legtel 1286, January 20) had stated at length the impossibility of holding free elections at this time. Free elections were utterly impossible and to propose holding them now would be playing into Communist hands. The idea of free elections at this time would encourage the “fence sitters” to wait it out more than ever. It would operate to the internal and international discredit to his government to have the idea of free elections suggested by France, rejected at this time by his government. He suggested that Auriol’s insistence on publication was chiefly due to French internal political considerations and in part due to a lurking French desire to come to some sort of face-saving terms with Ho Chi Minh3 which would enable the French to retire from Indochina and still maintain that they had not abandoned the field because of the Communist military threat. This latter accusation was much more energetically and definitely formulated by Nguyen De, Chief of the Imperial Cabinet, in a later conversation with me.
I said to Bao Dai that I was expressing purely personal opinion but I saw no reason, since he felt that it would complicate the task of his government, why he should not object to the publication of this correspondence. On the other hand, I said that while I could understand elections might not be possible at present it might well be advisable for him at an early occasion to announce his intention to hold free elections as soon as peace arrived. Bao Dai replied that he had already promised his people, once peace was secured, there would be a national plebiscite to determine the form of the future Vietnamese Government.
To my inquiry whether the present was not the time to make an appeal for laying down of arms with appropriate promises of amnesty, Bao Dai replied that the non-Communist nationalist elements in [Page 357] Viet Minh were prisoners of the Communists. Communists would not allow them to rally to the government. Ho Chi Minh might allow some certain pseudo-nationalist members of Viet Minh to accept the amnesty but they would be merely agents who would plot new disorders and subversion.
2. Bao Dai then told me he had dissolved the government and that on January 24 Huu, whom he will retain as President of the Council, will present him a slate of the new Cabinet. When I inquired if Bao Dai were personally selecting and consulting with the candidates he replied in the negative. He was leaving to Huu the matter of negotiations and the preparations of a list of possible Ministers whom Bao Dai would select from this list. He said without much conviction that he hoped he would be able to form a strong government. If the government did not work out he would dispense with Huu. I said that from what he had told me at Hue he had at least two energetic men in Tri and Giao. Bao Dai replied pessimistically “yes, provided they were still willing to remain in the government 6 months from now”. To this I stated that were Tri and Giao really successful as Ministers, Bao Dai should not allow them to resign. He had the power, authority, the justification to insist that good men enter and continue in his government during this period of emergency.
I then took up question of the proposal Blum and I discussed with him on his announcing his social and economic aims with a detailed program. In spite of the fiscal and military difficulties in the government he should be in a position to announce certain projects of economic and social improvement for which funds were being provided by ECA. Later, Hochstetter, chief of publicity for STEM, who had come with me to discuss with Nguyen De, publicity for ECA program for the Heght Plateau region suggested that His Majesty might take occasion of the large distribution of textiles and other commodities for the needy on Vietnamese New Year day to make a public appearance and speech announcing the donation as one of the items in his program. Bao Dai agreed in principle without enthusiasm but finally said he should be interested in receiving from the Legation a list and dates of completion of ECA projects which might furnish the occasion for public appearances to impress his subjects with his concern for their social and economic welfare.
I had the impression Bao Dai was a harassed man who could not rid himself of the sneaking feeling that the moral conviction and idealism of many VM supporters was superior to those of his own followers and that he was conscious of his own lack of leadership. The jokes frequently heard in Saigon that “Bao Dai is the greatest fence sitter (attentiste) of them all” came to my mind.
Sent Department 1291, repeated information Paris 572.
- This telegram was transmitted in two parts.↩
- President Auriol’s letter to Bao Dai, December 15, 1950, and the latter’s reply, January 8, 1951, were transmitted to the Department of State as enclosures 1 and 2 to despatch 503 from Saigon, February 14, not printed (751G.00/2–1451). The French Embassy provided the Department with additional copies on March 6. The covering communication, note 122, indicated that the Auriol-Bao Dai exchange would probably not be published in the Journal Officiel of the French Republic. (751G.00/3–651)↩
- President of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.↩