751G.00/1–2451: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Secretary of State 1

secret

1302. Be Deptel 904, January 16. Ngo Dinh Diem’s willingness to serve is interesting and encouraging sign of evolution of attitude of sectarian fence sitters. We also agree with his thesis that central government must be strengthened. Bishop Thi informed me of the receipt of Diem’s letter by Bao Dai; he states that Bao Dai has not yet answered it. It appears, however, that Cabinet now in formation will hold some form of Catholic participation.

As Department is aware, Bao Dai’s antipathy to Ngo Dinh Diem is extreme—based on life-long contact between the two men, Diem’s persistent disdainful attitude toward the former Emperor at his refusual of all previous calls to join the government.

Despite undoubted advantages of some Catholic participation in Cabinet, government of Vietnam under Catholic direction would have to overcome some disadvantages. Catholic community in Vietnam does not constitute centrist element between Communists and rightists as it does in much of Europe. Catholic position is that of precarious minority of less than a tenth of this population, suspected by many of the majority of being too westernized. Disparagers of Ngo Dinh Diem or other leading Catholics call them “men of the mission” meaning that they are captives of French colonizing Christianity. Catholics themselves aware of their exposed situation and their attentisme owes at least as much to fear of being compromised in eyes of country with Freneh-Bao Dai axis as it does to reserves and misgiving about Bao Dai.

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Diem himself is a distinguished and respected Viet but is said by some of those who know him to be almost monk, too rigid and unworldly to run a government, especially a Viet Government.

What kind of program the Catholic groups would prosecute if called to office is problematical. They are patriotic, sympathetic to the West and have higher standards of probity and conduct than those generally prevailing in Vietnam.

Leaders like Diem, and his brother, Bishop Thuc, have confirmed few details of their policies but somehow the things that they have proposed or which have been proposed in their names, with or without their knowledge, that, if carried out, radically change present political and military picture. Diem and Thuc have at times indicated to us that they consider March 8 accords out of date and they have at least occasionally been attracted by the idea of turning over the problem of Vietnam to a UN good offices committee.

They have indicated to us their interest in the scheme for replacing Bao Dai with a regency on behalf of Bao Long, Bao Dai’s heir, consisting of the Catholic Empress and the aged Prince Cuong De now in Japan: Whether Diem and Thuc are the authors of this scheme or merely the most prominent sympathizers is not known.

Although basically opposed to Communism, the Catholics, like many other groups in Bao Dai’s Vietnam, have never actually lost contact with the Viet Minh. There are still many communicants on the other side of the barricades. It is noteworthy that when Cuong De, allegedly travelling with Catholic backing, made his abortive attempt to return to Vietnam, some months ago, he accepted the hospitality of Ho Chi Minh’s man, Quy in Bankok.

The leading Catholics, especially Ngo Dinh Diem, like many Viets retain a healthy respect for the Japanese. Some of them, seeking at substitute for French force in defense of the country and doubting that the US will provide it, have been looking for a way to attract Japanese participation, possibly under US supervision. They expect Cuong De to be useful in this regard.

I am inclined to believe that while the participation of the Catholics: in a broad scale government of national unity is desirable and probable, they should not lead it at this stage. However, Catholic entry in government will doubtless bring over many attentistes and would heighten the tone of the rest of the Cabinet.

Bao Dai is well aware of the regency scheme attributed to Catholic circles and can presumably be counted upon to verify the motives of Catholic entry into government.

It is not inconceivable that Bao Dai himself in some circumstances, might take the regency on test. However, for all his faults he is, probably firmer against the Communists than many other would-be leaders at this time.

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If he were to be dumped or shunted out of the way with French cooperation and a show of American involvement, the result might be a boomerang and we would look like the puppeteers we are alleged to be.

It is possible that the paucity of leaders of Vietnam may only be overcome when the national army is a reality, assemblies and parliamentary methods exist and when a measure of freedom of the press is restored. At that time new leaders could come forward and find a forum on which to distinguish themselves before the people.

Department pass Paris. Sent Department 1302, repeated info Paris 578.

Gullion
  1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.