Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

751G.00/1–2151: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State

secret priority

Saigon, January 21, 1951—6 p. m.

1290. During course consultation,¹ would expect discuss whole range of Legation proposals made in Legtel 1157 January 1 with appropriate officers and agencies in addition to standing by to contribute any information I can for discussions with Pleven.² I would also plan discuss few questions not covered in reftel and usual administrative, matters.

Principal fields of our concern are:

1. Military Strategic concept for IC and extent US aid. Mission of MAAG (with General Brink). Acceleration of procurement. US responsibilities and opportunities re national armies, and potential resistance groups. US policy in event loss of Tonkin or collapse resistance in IC. Policies on regional coordination for US offices in IC.

2. Information. Coordination of intelligence and psychological warfare activities of this post and with other agencies and countries. Expansion of information activities here with development USIE production and idea center. Selection public relations adviser for Bao Dai. Installation of US radio station and use of time on Viet radio.

3. Economic. Development Point IV program in relation other programs and agencies. Question of admissibility US technicians re Franco-Associated States formula. Question of possible eventual direct financing national armies or local government activities.

4. French policy. Re future evolution French Union relationship. Re program if Chinese Communists invade. Degree US participation in councils and plans. Relations Associated States and UN.

5. Miscellaneous. Representation of Associated States in US Embassy status for this Legation. Interests of other Departments in work this mission.

6. Pleven and Moch. I do not know agenda of Pleven–Moch talk but assume Far Eastern policy will be discussed. For what it may be worth I offer some speculation about frame of mind in which French would approach a discussion of IC and, insofar as they can be deduced in Saigon, the particulars on which they would want if not assurances from us at least some appreciation our thinking.

For past year French command here has angled for some intimation of US intention in case of Chinese attack; and their policies and conduct of relations with us have been at least partly framed to make possible US intervention in advantageous circumstances.

With our involvement in Korea and especially since situation became difficult French must be re-examining their estimates. I believe, however, they will be even more anxious know whether and in what circumstances US force might be used and that Pleven, if he does not ask particulars outright, may well try to document his impressions; the French will probably want know when the long-discussed strategic conversations may be held; extent of any further US financial aid which may be expected; and possibility of accelerating deliveries.

On our side, it seems to me we will want to know just what French intentions are in event of Chinese invasion; to verify at highest level their intelligence with respect to Chinese disposition and intentions; to arrange for increasing US participation in plans and intelligence relating to IC; to know whether they consider further concessions should be made to Viets in direction of modifying March 8 accords; and earliest date at which French believe Viet army could be ready confront VM in formal battle.

I should hope that in course of these conversations we could gain a sense of extent to which, if any, French last-minute liberalism at Pau and their decision accept a genuine Viet army may have been influenced by a heightened concern for defense of homeland and by desire to diminish within nearer future, this commitment in Asia, saving for the metropole the nucleus of a greater French army. These considerations seem to have been present at least to the public mind as manifested in IC just after reverses in Korea. Whether they played part in French decision we do not know, but a sense of the drift of Parisian policies and reflexes in this context is indispensable for formation of our own policies in IC, and an anticipation of French reactions to a Chinese invasion.

One specific thing we should ask French is whether they are prepared to recommend to their Assembly and government the appropriation of roughly 42 billion francs towards creation of Vietnam’s national army in 1951. Total cost for calendar ’51 according to recently completed draft budget prepared by Ministry of Armed Forces with French assistance will come to 58.6 billion francs exclusive of arms furnished by US and already contemplated or ordered from French.

Heath

1. Minister Heath departed from Saigon on January 22 for consultation in Washington, returning to his post on February 21.
2. On January 29, a French delegation including Premier Pleven and Jules Moch, Minister of Defense, arrived in Washington for conversations with U.S. officials. Regarding these proceedings, see editorial note, p. 366.