790.5/9–1751
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to the Conference Report on the Tripartite Talks on Southeast Asia, held in Singapore in May 1951,1 a copy of which was furnished to you on July 24, 1951. This Report has now been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In view of the United States (and apparently the British) position of no force commitments, no concrete military operational agreements were possible.
For your information there are attached hereto the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the recommendations contained in the Conference Report.2 Copies of these views have been forwarded to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff and French Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information, and both agencies have been requested to furnish their comments in return. Final implementation [Page 79] of some of the recommendations is being delayed until receipt of the British and French views.
In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the following views on the recommendations contained in the paragraphs of Parts II and III of the Conference Report indicated below:
“a. Paragraph 23.
It is believed that all practicable steps must be taken to prevent the supply of arms and military equipment to peripheral countries through denial of export licenses for commercial shipments. It is noted that some concern was expressed unofficially at the Conference regarding arms smuggling from Indonesia, and possibly other countries, from MDAP supplies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that coordination of the maximum obtainable intelligence on this subject be carried forward in the Intelligence Advisory Committee toward the end that the diplomatic representation of the State Department to these countries may be supported. With reference to the subject of common studies by our Governments the Joint Chiefs of Staff have notified the British Chiefs of Staff and the French Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of State will take such action as it deems appropriate.
b. Paragraph 27 and 28.
The recommendations are noted that material aid priority should be increased in the event of local uprisings, that further assistance should be studied in event of serious uprisings, and that no purpose would be achieved by the intervention in Thailand with token forces. It is believed that all changes in priority for material aid should be based upon studies rather than automatically.
c. Paragraph 32.
The Conference recommends an increase of material aid to Burma when the stability of the government is assured and the forces are able to use it. No mention is made of the source of military aid, but requests upon the United States are possible.
d. Paragraph 15 (f).3
It is recommended that French requests for U.S. hospital facilities outside Indochina, if required, be handled through the Chief of MAAG to the Associated States of Indochina.
e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the serious effect contraband traffic has on the Southeast Asia countries. Continued pressure should be exerted on non-communist countries for fuller cooperation in order to reduce this traffic. See subparagraph a above.”
The recommendation contained in paragraph 10(a), Part I of the Report is being forwarded to the Central Intelligence Agency.4
Sincerely yours,
- For extracts, see p. 64.↩
- The attachment does not accompany the source text.↩
- Paragraph 15(f), in Part III of the Conference Report, read as follows: “The respective medical authorities should examine further the requirement for hospital facilities outside Indo-China for the French Armed Forces.”↩
- Paragraph 10(a), in Part I of the Conference Report, read as follows: “Efforts should be made to increase our existing intelligence on China south of the Yangtze River with particular reference to the Indo-Chinese and Burmese-frontier areas and to the lines of communication to those areas.”↩