Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

S/S Files: Lot 63D531: NSC 48 Series

Progress Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense to the National Security Council

top secret

[Washington,] September 25, 1951.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia

References:	A. NSC 48/51
	B. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject, “United States Courses of Action in Korea”, dated September 5, 19512
	C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 11, 19512

The enclosed memorandum by the Secretaries of State and Defense and its attached Progress Report with respect to NSC 48/5 on the subject, prepared jointly pursuant to the direction of the President and in accordance with the understanding of the State and Defense Departments stated in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of September 11, is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council and is being scheduled on the agenda of the Council meeting on September 26, 1951.

Attention is invited to the fact that the enclosed Progress Report provides background for Council consideration at its meeting on September 26, of the course of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and submitted by the Secretary of Defense in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of September 5, 1951.³

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Annex 1]

Memorandum for Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Subject: First Quarterly Progress Report on NSC 48/5—“United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia”

Ref:	NSC 48/5 and note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council, 17 May 1951
	Joint State–Defense Memorandum of 5 September 1951 to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council on “Responsibilities of the State and Defense Departments for Coordinating the Implementation of NSC 48/5”*

In accordance with the President’s directive on the implementation of NSC 48/5 and the above-referenced memorandum, there is submitted herewith the first quarterly progress report on NSC 48/5. It is requested that this be circulated to the Council members for information.

• Dean G. Acheson
• Secretary of State
• Robert A. Lovett
• Secretary of Defense

[Annex 2]

Memorandum for Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 48/5—“U.S. Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia”

NSC 48/5 was approved by the President on May 17, 1951. He directed that implementation of NSC 48/5 be under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense, and that they transmit joint progress reports at least quarterly. The responsibilities for the joint coordination of the implementation of NSC 48/5 were outlined in the memorandum from the Secretaries of State and Defense of September 5, 1951.^† This first progress report is submitted in accordance with the directives of the President and that memorandum. It is requested that this progress report, as of 25 September 1951, be circulated to members of the Council for their information.

a—general considerations and long-range objectives

The statements and consideration contained in paragraphs 1 to 4 of NSC 48/5 appear as valid today as when this policy was adopted. Despite the armistice talks the Communist bloc has shown no apparent lessening in its intention to resort to armed force in Asia if necessary to gain local objectives. U.S. action in Asia must continue to be based on the recognition that the most immediate overt threats to U.S. security are currently presented in that area. Such threats may even have increased during the past four months as a result of the rapid and intense build-up of Chinese Communist and North Korean military forces, and the increased tensions in the Far East threatening the security of Japan. Meanwhile, there has been no indication of any change in current Soviet tactics to bring the mainland of eastern Asia and eventually Japan and the other principal off-shore islands in the Western Pacific under Soviet control. There is every indication that the USSR will exploit to the fullest the resources of Communist China, to attain this objective. To date the U.S. has succeeded in avoiding a general war with the USSR, but developments in the Far East have reduced the margin of maneuverability on which the Soviet Union can play without resorting to greatly expanded hostilities, if the Soviet Union determines to force a decision in Korea primarily by military means. In general, the principle of collective security has been effectively applied in the interests of the United States, although our allies have displayed an anxiety over the risks involved which has led them to considerable caution and reluctance to proceed as rapidly and as far as we would like with respect to certain proposals for military and economic action against the aggressors.

With respect to the long-range national security objectives of the U.S. specified in paragraph 5, tangible progress toward the achievement of these objectives cannot be recorded in the brief period covered by this report. However, there appears to be slow but steady progress in the development of stable and self-sustaining non-Communist governments friendly to the United States and able to maintain internal security. The preponderant military power of the USSR in Asia, particularly in conjunction with the development of Chinese Communist forces on a modern scale, has not lessened to any appreciable degree. On the positive side, progress can be noted toward the general unity of Asian and non-Asian countries, as exemplified at the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference. The United States and the rest of the free world continue to maintain access to the material resources of the Asian area, but the complete denial of these resources to the Communist bloc has not yet been accomplished.

b—implementation of current objectives and courses of action

NSC 48/5 recognized that Communist aggression threatens U.S. security interests in many areas of Asia. The following paragraphs outline the highlights of the implementation of U.S. objectives and courses of action, particularly with respect to the situation in Korea where the security of the U.S. is most directly affected at this time.

i——u.s. policy with respect to japan⁴

Japanese Peace Treaty: (Paragraph 10a)

Except for ratification processes, implementing action has been completed on paragraph 10a. The signing of the US-UK draft treaty by 48 nations at San Francisco marks a turning point in Asia and represents a significant potential change in the power situation in Asia. Furthermore, as a result of the peace treaty negotiations and the holding of the Peace Conference, considerable progress has been made with respect to paragraph 6c in assisting Japan to become a self-reliant nation friendly to the U.S., capable of maintaining internal security and defense against external aggression, and contributing to the security and stability of the Far East.

Signature of the treaty by Pakistan, Indonesia, Ceylon, the Associated States of Indochina, and the Philippines establishes Japan’s relations with most of the non-Communist Asian nations. Bilateral treaties are expected to be signed by Japan with India and Burma. While Japan’s relations with China remain undetermined, it appears certain that Japan will not establish relations with Communist China but will in due course negotiate a treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa.

Under the treaty Japan should be able to develop trade relationships with other nations, particularly those of Asia, which will contribute to the objective of a “self-reliant” nation. The continuing close relationship to be maintained with the United States, including the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan, and the development of Japanese defensive forces, should create the necessary situation of strength in Japan and thereby contribute to the security of the Pacific area and of the United States.

Economic Support for Japan: (Paragraph 10c)

Since the outbreak of the war in Korea, the U.S. has been procuring goods and services in Japan for UN forces in Korea at the rate of approximately $25 million per month. Use of Japan as a source of materials has greatly facilitated the supplying of UN forces and at the same time has contributed significantly to Japan’s economic position. Japan’s commercial exports have increased from a level of about $70 million per month for the July–September 1950 period to a level of $125 million per month in April–June 1951. While exports to the Chinese mainland dropped sharply during this period due to export controls imposed in Japan, the Japanese exports to the non-Communist countries in Asia during April–June 1951 were more than 2½ times the dollar value of the July–September 1950 level. Dollar earnings resulting from U.S. procurement in Japan for Korea and the partial “pay-as-you-go” arrangement for U.S. occupation forces instituted on July 1, 1951, plus the higher level of commercial exports, made possible the termination on July 1, 1951, of the economic aid programs for Japan.

Transition from Occupation Status: (Paragraph 10d(1))

In his Constitution Day speech on May 3, 1951, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers authorized the Japanese Government to undertake a review of laws and ordinances enacted or promulgated as a result of occupation directives. The Japanese Government formed an ordinance Review Committee to undertake this task, and although the only positive action so far taken relates to the depurge, the Committee is studying various laws and ordinances with the view of recommending new legislation in the Diet or other appropriate changes by Executive action.

Since May 17, 1951, Japan has been admitted to membership in the International Labor Organization, UNESCO, three committees of the International Materials Conference, the International Cotton Advisory Committee, and the International Wheat Council. Additional Japanese Government Overseas Agencies have been established at Washington, Ottawa, and London bringing the total number now in operation to 19.

Between June 26, 1951 and September 7, 1951 SCAP authorized the Japanese Government to release from purge restrictions approximately 135,000 persons, including nearly 60,000 former Japanese Army and Navy officers. Of the 57,000 purgees remaining, about 10,000 are former military personnel, of whom 3,000 were general officers. SCAP on September 14, 1951, delegated to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs authority to communicate directly with foreign missions accredited to SCAP on any subject, with the proviso that all contractual agreements are subject to prior approval of the Supreme Commander. The Far Eastern Commission voted on September 20, 1951 to call the next meeting whenever requested by any member. Such a suspension of meetings will not affect the validity of existing FEC policy decisions, which will remain in effect until the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Formation of Military Establishment: (Paragraph 10d(2))

With respect to Japan’s defensive capabilities, progress has been made, under American guidance, in assisting Japan to develop the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Patrol. The President approved on August 29, 1951 the establishment of a Japanese-manned coastal security force, organized and equipped along normal coast guard lines, composed of vessels with appropriate armament and speed and under SCAP operational control, to be operated in waters contiguous to the Japanese islands. On 19 September SCAP was authorized-to take formal action to establish this force. Consultation is now taking place between the Departments of State and Defense with regard to the release of heavy equipment to the Japanese National Police Reserve, and the development of plans for the formation of an effective Japanese military establishment.

Psychological and Educational Programs: (Paragraph 10e(4))

From May to September, inclusive, 1951, 264 Japanese national leaders, including 53 Diet members, visited the United States under 55 projects of the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas exchange of persons program. In addition 484 Japanese students are presently enrolled for academic work under the same program. A Fulbright Agreement was signed between the United States and Japan on August 28, 1951 envisaging operation by the fall of 1952 of the normal program of educational exchange between the United States and Japan, by use of Surplus Property funds. Daily half-hour VOA broadcasts to Japan in the Japanese language were initiated on September 3, 1951.

Policy Evaluation:

While there has been definite and steady progress along the above lines, US-Japanese relationships may enter a more difficult period. The prospect of the indefinite presence of U.S. troops in Japan will create the delicate and permanent problem of meeting both the requirements of Japan’s sovereignty and independence and the need for the security of Japan against Soviet attack. Other factors will complicate this basic issue. Among these are the economic attractions of China and Manchuria, the revival of Japanese spirit of nationalism, and the hope or expectation that foreign activities in Japan will decrease and come to an end quickly. These questions of policy deserve special study.

ii—u.s. policy on the security of the off-shore defense line and the development of effective security relationships in asia

(Paragraphs 6b, 6d, 10b, 11, 12, and 15)

General:

With respect to the maintenance of the security of the off-shore defense line—Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Austrialia and New Zealand—and to the development of effective security and economic relationships among the free nations of Asia and the Pacific, progress has been made during the past four months. The President’s address at San Francisco⁵ provided a major policy statement on U.S. support for the development of effective security and economic relations in the Pacific and in Asia.

Japan: (Paragraph 10b)

With respect to Japan, the implementation of paragraph 10b of NSC 48/5 has been completed insofar as the negotiation and signing of bilateral security arrangements with Japan are concerned. The US–Japan security treaty signed at San Francisco fully meets U.S. security and operational requirements during the immediate post-treaty period and guarantees the security of Japan until adequate Japanese defense forces can be developed. An exchange of notes with Japan provides for the continued support from Japan for UN operations in the Far East. The detailed arrangements to be carried out under the bilateral treaty are to be contained in an Administrative Agreement with Japan which has yet to be completed in Washington and negotiated with the Japanese Government. It seems clear that the Japanese Government, a large majority of the Japanese people, and the nations represented at San Francisco recognize the necessity for security agreements between the United States and Japan, and support the bilateral US–Japan treaty. Concerning external threats to Japan’s security, the USSR continues to have the capability of launching an amphibious and airborne attack on Japan. However, no indications have become available during the period of this report to indicate that the Soviet Union intends to exercise this capability at this time.

Philippines: (Paragraphs 6b and 12)

The Philippines have strongly supported and enthusiastically accepted the US–Philippines Treaty for mutual security which becomes an important part of security arrangements in the Pacific.⁶ This treaty publicly confirms the close relations which have existed between the two nations and the obligation of the United States to guarantee the integrity of the Philippines from external attack (“U.S. Policy with Respect to the Philippines,” NSC 84/2).⁷ This treaty has to a large degree alleviated the Philippine fear of renewed Japanese aggression and has been an important factor in securing Philippine signature to the Japanese Peace Treaty. Due largely to U.S. aid and the resulting increasing efficiency of Philippine forces, progress in improving internal security and reducing the menace of the Huk armed forces has been steady and generally satisfactory.

Australia and New Zealand: (Paragraphs 6b and 15)

The trilateral security treaty signed by the United States with Australia and New Zealand formalizes mutual defense arrangements among these countries, allays Australian and New Zealand fears of a Japanese resurgence.⁸

Indonesia: (Paragraph 6b)

The presence of Indonesian representatives at San Francisco and their signature of the Japanese Peace Treaty represent a significant step toward Indonesian alignment with the free world and the United States. One of the significant political developments of the San Francisco Conference was the reestablishment of friendly relations between the Japanese and the Indonesians, from which it appears that Indonesia greatly desires to develop close ties with Japan. If Indonesia moves farther towards the United States and away from Indian “neutrality”, the stability and security of the off-shore island defense line in the Western Pacific will be thereby further enhanced.

Formosa:⁹ (Paragraphs 6b and 11)

The mission assigned to the Seventh Fleet remains unchanged. (Para. 11a). The Chinese Communists have not tried to assault Formosa and there is no evidence of any impending attempt.

With respect to military and economic assistance, the U.S. government requested the Chinese Nationalist government, in an aide-mémoire of 20 July¹⁰ to formulate and propose for urgent consideration with U.S. representatives practical procedures to bring military and civilian expenditures on the island under planned control. Efficient implementation of U.S. assistance programs depends on the effective development of such procedures. Although the Chinese government has accepted the aide-mémoire in principal, discussions between U.S. and Chinese officials are still being conducted in order to reach a final settlement.

The military assistance already provided the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa has begun to improve their capability to defend the Island, though their over-all combat effectiveness is still limited. The most important development in MDAP in Formosa has been the success of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in obtaining the agreement of the Generalissimo in reorganizing the Chinese Nationalist Army in such a way that, from an organizational standpoint, combat capability will be markedly increased. This new organization is built around 31 Infantry Divisions which are half the size of U.S. divisions but which follow the U.S. pattern of divisional structure. This reorganization is necessary to take full advantage of the capabilities of U.S. arms and equipments now on hand and to be received.

During the period of this report the Military Assistance Advisory Group grew to a size of approximately 280 military personnel, and a 30-day combat reserve of POL was established on Formosa. However, very limited quantities of other programmed matériel were delivered.

iii—u.s. policy with respect to communist china¹¹

(Paragraphs 6a and 8)

Detachment of Communist China from the USSR and Sino-Soviet Relations: (Paras. 6a,8b, 8c, and 8d)

The four months since NSC 48/5 was approved is too short a period in which to obtain concrete results in the implementation of the current U.S. objective in paragraph 6a and the courses of action listed in paragraphs 8b, c, and d. However, efforts have been increased to make these courses of action effective. With respect to the general status of Sino-Soviet relations, there are as yet no outward signs or reliable indications of any real friction of significant consequences. All indications point to increased coordination and planning between the USSR and Communist China. The latest open reaffirmation of Sino–Soviet solidarity appeared in the Stalin-Mao exchange of 2 September, which vigorously reemphasized the military significance of the Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1950.

Effects of the Korean War on Communist China: (Paragraph 8a)¹²

The successful UN military operations in late May and June inflicted additional heavy losses on Chinese forces in Korea and helped to deflate Chinese Communist political and military strength at that time. This action undoubtedly contributed to the sudden opening of armistice negotiations in late June. On balance, the war in Korea has had both beneficial and harmful effects upon China. It does not appear that in any absolute sense the present UN operation has seriously affected Chinese Communist political and military strength insofar as internal conditions are concerned. The over-all strength of the Chinese Communist regular forces has actually increased from roughly 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 troops. There are many indications that the Soviet Union is equipping and training, at a rapid and accelerated rate, a modern Chinese Communist armed force with armor, artillery and aviation units. As a result of the intervention in Korea, the best Chinese Communist forces have been deployed from outlying provinces in China and concentrated in Manchuria and Korea. Yet, the Chinese Communist regime has been able to maintain and perhaps even increase its political control of China in spite of the heavy losses of men in Korea and the many extra painful burdens which the people in China have been forced to endure to an ever-increasing extent. There is as yet no evidence of any impending economic breakdown in Communist China as a result of the strains of conducting a large-scale war, or of the imposition of certain economic restrictions by the majority of UN members. Nor is such a breakdown of China’s essentially primitive economy to be expected. However, it is believed that economic restrictions are beginning to be felt by Communist China both in its capability to wage aggressive war and its domestic economy. But no economic or political conditions yet pose a direct or serious threat to the stability of the Chinese Communist regime.

On the other hand, the war in Korea has provided a cause for dissatisfaction on a large scale within Communist China and may have planted the seeds of wide-spread discontent. There are strong indications that Communist political control is increasingly based on policy suppression rather than voluntary public support. The war in Korea has greatly increased Communist China’s dependency on the USSR for economic and military resources. Such dependence has undoubtedly increased Soviet control and influence which in turn can intensify latent hostility between the Chinese and the Russians. In the second place, Chinese Communist intervention in Korea probably has intensified rivalry between Peking and Moscow for hegemony in Korea, although it is unlikely that such rivalry will endanger basic Communist objectives in the near future. There are reports of friction between the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. The campaign in Korea has deferred Chinese Communist military plans for intervention in Southeast Asia and the capture of Formosa, an object of continued U.S. military actions in Korea as stated in paragraph 9a(3). However, the over-all military position of Communist China has not been restricted to such an extent that Communist China’s capability for a decisive intervention in Indochina and in Burma has been greatly lessened. Finally, continued intervention in Korea and failure to reach a settlement has increased Communist China’s isolation and diminished its world standing.

Effect of Economic Restrictions Against Communist China: (Paragraph 8e)

On May 18, 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution recommending that every State embargo shipments to North Korea and Communist China of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war. This Resolution also recommended that every State prevent the circumvention of controls applied by other States under this Resolution. The action which this Resolution envisaged each State would take unilaterally, represented a long step toward such complete control, although such action would be narrower than the position adopted by the United States in December 1950 when this Government terminated virtually all economic relations with Communist China.

A majority of the members of the United Nations have reported compliance with this Resolution in one form or another, as have several non-member countries. In addition, largely subsequent to the adoption of the Resolution, many States recently have taken measures going beyond the generally understood scope of the Resolution. For example, Danish ship owners have agreed not to charter vessels for China trade. Greece has placed in force a law prohibiting the chartering of Greek vessels for transporting items embargoed under the Resolution. Honduras prohibits all vessels flying its flag from calling at Communist Chinese ports and from transporting materials which might serve the Communist Chinese war effort. Italy prohibits its public vessels (85% to 90% of its total shipping) from loading strategic materials destined for Communist China. Liberia prohibits vessels under its flag, except on written approval, from carrying any goods embargoed under the Resolution to any place in the Soviet Bloc, including China. The Norwegian Government has reported steps to prevent Norwegian vessels from transporting such embargoed goods to Communist China. The Republic of Panama, by Decree dated August 18, 1951, prohibits any vessels flying the Panamanian flag from calling at Communist China ports, and Panamanian shipping to Communist China has diminished greatly during the past month.

There are indications of a falling off in the total water-borne carriage of Free World shipping of goods to Communist China. However, United States authorities are aware of possible loopholes permitted by transfer of registry and continuing trade by other flag vessels, and studies are going forward on an urgent basis looking to appropriate multilateral action within and outside the United Nations to further tighten controls over shipping by friendly nations. Increased activity by satellite shipping lines, particularly Polish, complicates the problem of total supply.

There continues to be a substantial volume of goods shipped into China. This trade still includes a certain amount of strategic commodities, but very little consists of direct war materials. Increased smuggling has followed the imposition of more rigid controls in Hong Kong in June, including reported smuggling activities from the US-controlled Ryukyus. The United States continues day-by-day efforts to observe and bring to the attention of responsible authorities infractions of their regulations by smugglers and others who attempt to evade controls applying to trade with Communist China.

iv—u.s. policy with respect to korea

(Paragraphs 6e and 9)

U.S. Objectives: (Paragraph 6e)

The President and U.S. Government officials have reiterated during the past four months the ultimate U.S. political objective of a united, independent and democratic Korea. The testimony during the Senate hearings on the situation in the Far East also set forth this objective. However, events of the past four months have not brought this ultimate objective nearer to attainment. In fact, the build-up of Communist forces in Korea, described below, implies a determination of the Communists to maintain their hold at least over North Korea. On the other hand, the current objective of the United States in Korea, as outlined in paragraph 6e, has been attained to some extent for the period covered by this report. The policy of inflicting heavy punishment on Communist forces, to compel them to seek a settlement, produced results last June following a successful U.S. counter-offensive north of the 38th parallel.

Armistice Negotiations: (Paragraphs 6a and 9b)

On 23 June 1951, Deputy Foreign Minister Malik of the USSR broadcast a speech suggesting that the Korean problem could be settled and that the “Soviet peoples” believed that discussions should be started, as a first step, on a cease-fire and armistice providing for a “mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel.” The last 3 months since this turn in the Korean situation have resulted in a situation of arduous but sporadic negotiations and limited hostilities. No real progress has yet taken place.

After exchanges on the preliminary arrangements for holding armistice talks, when the United Nations Command offered a hospital ship as a neutral location, the UN and the Communists agreed to open talks at Kaesong on 8 July. Protracted discussion of the agenda ensued for nearly three weeks. The Communists made clear that they would demand a return to the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line, and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The most difficult issue regarding the agenda was the Communist insistence on an agenda item specifying the withdrawal of foreign troops. On the basis that it was a political question having no proper place on an agenda for a military armistice, the UN delegation refused to accept such an item, and was supported in firm statements made by the Secretaries of State and Defense. On 26 July the UN and Communist delegates finally agreed to the agenda, as a result of mutual acceptance of a final agenda item which substituted “Recommendations to the Governments of the countries concerned on both sides” in place of “Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea”. Even so, the UNC made clear that it was not committing itself in advance to any specific agreement regarding this item. There was some reason then to believe that progress could be made in reaching an agreement on the substantive issues.

Discussions on a demarcation line, the first issue on the agenda began on the 27th of July and continued until 23 August, when the Communists suspended the negotiations. During these 4 weeks both delegations persistently presented their respective proposals on where to draw the demarcation line and set up a demilitarized zone. In session after session the Communists rudely and bluntly insisted on returning to the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, with a demilitarized zone of 10 kilometres north and south of the parallel. The Communist delegation refused to consider, discuss or even examine any deviation from this position. The UN delegation firmly and factually reiterated over and over its proposal of a demarcation line that followed the general line of contact between opposing forces at that time and a demilitarized zone approximately 20 miles in depth. The UN delegation indicated a willingness to discuss minor modifications of its proposals. However, the Communists showed no interest in the UN proposals or in offering any modifications to their proposals. During the period 26 July–23 August the talks were suspended once by General Ridgway¹³ when Communist armed forces crossed the neutral zone of Kaesong without authorization. The Communists admitted this violation of the [de] militarized zone, agreed not to permit a recurrence, and consented to stricter measures for the neutralization of the Kaesong area. However, this area still remained within Communist lines.

On 23 August the Communists suspended the talks on the grounds that a UN aircraft had bombed the neutral zone. The Communists demanded acceptance by the UN of responsibility for the alleged incident and guarantees against a repetition before they would permit resumption of the negotiations. For nearly a month the Communists staged a bizarre series of false and fabricated “incidents” which they charged against the UN Command as violations of the neutral zone. The Communists demanded full acceptance by the UNC of each charge before they would agree to resumption of the talks. At the same time, Communist propaganda became increasingly hostile and belligerent against the U.S. The UNC investigated each allegation and found no UN responsibility in any case but one. On 10 September a UN plane did violate the neutral zone by mistake; after making a careful investigation, the UNC immediately admitted responsibility for the incident. General Ridgway also repeated his desire for a resumption of the talks. Suddenly the Communists agreed on 19 September, but couched their message in such a way as to keep alive all their fabricated incidents.

Continuation of Military Operations: (Paragraph 9b)

In the absence of an agreed-upon armistice or likelihood of immediate settlement, the UNC has continued the military course of action in Korea on a basis of limited objectives, while maintaining and strengthening the general military positions across Korea reached in June, and maintaining a program of interdiction of enemy supply lines. During July and August both sides restricted military ground action to the minimum without ceasing hostilities completely. As a result, the losses inflicted on the Communists have substantially decreased since their last unsuccessful offensive. The military operations of the UN have succeeded in establishing a strong defensive line across Korea, which will make difficult any attempt to overrun South Korea by Communist forces. Continued military pressure on the Communists, coupled with their policy of build-up in Korea, has placed certain limitations on Communist capabilities for aggression elsewhere in Asia. Recently, a marked increase in hostilities has occurred in Korea.

Current Situation in Korea:

Chinese Communist and North Korean Build-up: The Chinese Communists have used the past 3 months’ relative lull in hostilities to build up striking forces larger and more powerful than any combined force yet available to the Communists in Korea since the outbreak of war in June 1950. The Communists now have the capability of undertaking a large-scale sustained offensive at any time. It is believed that such an offensive could be sustained for at least 4 weeks on the scale of a 40 to 50 division attack. There are many factors underlying this rapid build-up of Communist military strength from the apparently low point reached last June as a result of the extremely severe punishment inflicted by troops of the UN Command. During the first two weeks of September, the heaviest vehicle sightings of the war were reported. Greatly increased Communist troop strength now is located within operational distance of the front. A Communist armored division has moved into the immediate battle area, and Chinese Communist forces have already received direct tank support in local action. There are continuing indications that the USSR is supplying heavy equipment and new-type weapons to the Chinese Communists, including tanks, heavy artillery, and rocket launchers. In the air, Chinese Communist strength in Manchuria has increased, air action is extending farther and farther south, and the enemy has increased his capability of sustaining a relatively large number of jet sorties on consecutive days. Soviet and Chinese propaganda has made use of the Communist build-up.

Soviet Volunteers: (Paragraphs 9e and 9f)

Increasing numbers of Soviet technical personnel in Korea, as anticipated in paragraph 9e, have become more and more evident. However, it is probable that such personnel are assigned either as operators of such special equipment as radar and anti-aircraft, or as advisors on the use of tanks and heavy artillery. There is, as yet, no evidence that Soviet or other non-Oriental combat units have entered Korea for direct participation in hostilities. Nor is there any indication that any Soviet “volunteer” units have entered Korea in sufficient size to jeopardize the safety of UN forces there.

The Position of the UN Command in Korea:

By early summer the UN command had full control over the strongest possible defensive zone across Korea near the 38th parallel. During the lull in hostilities the UN has also strengthened its military capabilities. While the UN Command has been able to increase the firepower and defensive capacity of its positions, it still is subject to the basic weakness of a relatively-fixed strength in manpower. During the past 4 months there has been no substantial increase in the contribution from UN members to the effective combat forces in Korea, although efforts are being continued to influence our allies to increase their support, following the appeal of 22 June 1951 from the Secretary General of the UN (Para. 9c[).] Considerable progress has been made in reorganizing and intensifying the training of the Republic of Korea armed forces on a revitalized basis. It is probable that the combat effectiveness of these forces has increased to some extent in the past 4 months.

Position of Our Principal Allies in Korea: (Paragraph 9c)

In recent meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France,¹⁴ the Secretary of State has explained present policies in Korea and has outlined the courses of action we would expect to take in the alternative cases of achievement of an armistice or breakdown in armistice negotiations. The British and French expressed general understanding of the courses of action which it would be necessary to take should the armistice talks break down. They accepted the necessity for General Ridgway’s possession of a certain amount of latitude in his military operations. It is clear that the United Kingdom is anxious to avoid involvement in a mainland war with China and is apprehensive over the consequences of the UN becoming more heavily engaged in the Far East. Foreign Minister Morrison expressed doubts regarding the effectiveness of a blockade or “embargo” against Communist China. He also reiterated the British view that Communist China is not a servile satellite of the USSR and that the British did not desire to take steps which would drive Communist China toward the Soviets.

The Question of Relative Capabilities:

In view of the above, it is probable that the Chinese Communists have now, or soon will have, lessened the substantial disadvantages which they encountered during their successive offensives last Spring. The expansion of Communist air capabilities may present a real challenge to the present UN air superiority and relative freedom from air attack, both on the ground and at sea. Furthermore, the developing Communist capability in the air may subject UN ground forces to sustained strafing for the first time in the Korean operation. The Communists can exploit the completion of their build-up either to start large-scale hostilities with a much more damaging effect on UN forces, particularly in winter warfare for which the Communists will be better prepared than they were in 1950, or to improve their bargaining position in renewed negotiations in order to enforce their terms on the UN. Then, if the UN should continue to refuse such terms, resumption of the fighting might appear to be on a more evenly-balanced basis, from the Communist viewpoint.

Planning for Possible Breakdown of Armistice Negotiations:

During the past 2 months the Departments of State and Defense have consulted together on immediate courses of action to be taken in case the armistice negotiations come to a definite end. These courses of action have been developed within the framework of the policy objectives of NSC 48/5. The State and Defense Departments have drafted the paper contained in Appendix A. For the information of the National Security Council there is also attached, in Appendix B, a memorandum of 13 July 1951 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, entitled “United States Courses of Action in Korea.”¹⁵

v—strengthening of southeast asia

(Paragraphs 6b, 6g and 14)

The U.S. Policy of attempting to increase the will and ability of the countries of Southeast Asia to resist Communist encroachment has not been uniformly effective throughout this area. Yet, on balance, the results achieved by U.S. support programs during the past four months have been favorable. A more detailed report on policy implementation and evaluation in Southeast Asia, particularly regarding Indochina, will be submitted at a later date. This progress report does not cover developments in South Asia. With respect to Southeast Asia the following are highlights:

In Indochina, the Chinese Communists retain the capability of intervening and over-running Tonkin unless substantial reinforcements from the outside are forthcoming. The French might be able to hold out for a short time in the Haiphong redoubt, provided all-out Chinese Communists air attacks are not employed. An armistice in Korea would increase the likelihood of Chinese Communist intervention and, at the same time, greatly enhance Chinese capabilities. As far as internal military operations are concerned, Franco-Vietnamese forces have repulsed the Viet Minh drive to conquer Tonkin and firmly hold the key Red River Delta. However, the over-all internal military situation continues to be one of stalemate, and will remain so, according to General de Lattre, unless (1) MDAP aid as programmed is actually delivered in the immediate future and (2) MDAP aid is increased over that programmed for FY 1952. According to General de Lattre, if these measures are accomplished the Viet Minh will be eradicated within a period of from one to two years, barring Chinese Communist military intervention. Increases in MDAP aid, reinforcement from France and creation of new Vietnamese units have been counterbalanced by improved organization and training of Viet Minh units and increasing capabilities for logistical support from the Chinese Communists. Tripartite military conversations were held in Singapore on 15–18 May 1951; the three Governments have been considering the conclusion of those talks. The discussions held in Washington with Foreign Minister Schuman and General de Lattre in mid-September have served to reinforce U.S. support for the campaign against the Communists in Indochina.¹⁶ While a number of military problems in the U.S. military assistance program have been solved to the satisfaction of both Governments, these discussions have shown that France may have reached the limit of its capacity to continue operations in Indochina without increased U.S. aid, and that the U.S. may soon have to decide whether to assume an increasing share of the burden.

The political situation within the three Associated States shows improvement owing to the restoration of morale following the arrival of General de Lattre and increasing realization of the true nature of the Viet Minh movement. However, the Bao Dai-Huu Government of Vietnam still lacks the confidence and broad-based support of the people. In international affairs, the participation of the three Associated States in the Japanese Peace Conference marked the first attendance of the States at an international conference and increased their prestige in the world.

In Indonesia,¹⁷ the government and leading authorities have recently demonstrated an increased concern over the mounting threat of Communist subversion. With a recent series of arrests of key Indonesian Communist figures, the Indonesian authorities have adopted a tougher policy against the increasingly-grave internal security situation, and have shown an ability to stand up to the Chinese Communists on issues such as visas and entry of Chinese communists. The Indonesian Government made a momentous decision to attend the San Francisco Conference and especially to sign the Treaty of Peace. This event marks a significant development in the international orientation of Indonesia.

In Burma,¹⁸ although the Prime Minister and the Government are increasingly friendly to the United States and are cooperating with us to the best of their ability, they are faced by growing domestic problems and popular pressures which force them to proceed with great caution. Large areas of the country remain under the control of the various insurgent groups, and the Government is unable to prevent large-scale smuggling and illegal crossing of the Chinese border. The presence of KMT troops in border areas and their recent unsuccessful incursions into Yunnan have increased the Burmese people’s fear of Chinese Communist retaliation or intervention in Burmese affairs. The military potential of the Government has been reduced by disagreements between Lt. Gen. NeWin, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Socialist leaders in the Government, and by disputes among the leaders of the Kachins, the best fighters in the Army. There has been an apparently purposeful movement of Communist insurgents within Burma to the Northern Shan States, which may indicate an intention to proclaim an independent “Peoples Republic” in Northern Burma which could be used as a base for further Communist expansion. Because of internal pressure, the Burmese Government maintains its policy of neutrality in the “cold war”. While the position of the non-Communist forces has somewhat improved in Indochina and in Indonesia, the Communists have made some progress in Burma, although the Burmese Government shows a growing tendency to recognize the danger.

1. Dated May 17, p. 33.
2. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. National Security Council Action No. 561 indicates that at its 103rd Meeting, September 26, the Council took note of this progress report (S/S Files: Lot 62D1: NSC Actions). Documentation regarding Council action with respect to Korea is scheduled for publication in volume vii.
4. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” dated September 11, 1951. [Footnote in the source text. Neither the memorandum of September 5 nor that of September 11 is printed.]
5. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 11, 1951. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 777 ff.
5. For the text of President Truman’s address at the opening of the San Francisco Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty, September 4, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry 8. Truman, 1951 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 504–508, or Department of State Bulletin, September 17, 1951, pp. 447–450.
6. For documentation on the United States Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington on August 30, see pp. 132 ff.
7. Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1515.
8. For documentation on the Tripartite Security Treaty, signed at San Francisco on September 1, see pp. 132 ff.
9. Documentation on the question of Formosa is scheduled for publication in volume vii.
10. Not printed.
11. Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume vii.
12. Documentation on the Korean War is scheduled for publication in volume vii.
13. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.
14. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France met in Washington from September 10 to September 14, devoting their attention to a wide range of European and world problems. During the same period, Secretary of State Acheson held separate conversations with Herbert Morrison, British Foreign Secretary, and Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France. Documentation on the Washington Foreign Ministers Meeting and related discussions is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
15. Appendix B is scheduled for publication in documentation on the Korean War in volume vii.
16. For documentation on these discussions, see pp. 332 ff.
17. For documentation on U.S. relations with Indonesia, see pp. 583 ff.
18. For documentation on U.S. policy with respect to Burma, see pp. 267 ff.