Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Policy Planning Staff Files: Lot 64D563¹

[Extracts]

Substance of Discussions of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, June 8, 1951, 11 a.m.²

Washington, June 8, 1951, 11 a.m.

top secret

Present

General Collins3	Mr. Perkins7
Admiral Sherman4	Mr. Rusk
General Twining5	Mr. Nitze8
Admiral Struble	Mr. Ferguson9
Admiral Lalor6	Mr. Tufts10
	Mr. Gleason11

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Admiral Struble’s Report¹²

Admiral Struble said that the British representatives at the Singapore meeting did not want the French to know about the U.S.-U.K. shipping arrangement in the area. The British had been clearly concerned about command arrangements and this had affected their attitude toward the talks. The French were anxious for more information about China and had obtained some information about Formosa about which they were skeptical.

Military Intelligence. The French wanted a good U.S. intelligence officer to meet with their intelligence people and with British Intelligence officers to put out an agreed tripartite intelligence report. Admiral Struble said that he had taken the position that he could not agree to the preparation of agreed reports. He had said that we would be prepared to assign a good officer and to furnish intelligence information and so forth. He felt that the French were using this problem as a foundation stone in building a theater command. The U.K. agreed to improve intelligence activities in the area. Admiral Struble said that he had seen no reason why a U.S. officer could not attend intelligence meetings and discuss intelligence problems. There was much concern about the problem of obtaining information on contraband traffic. This was wanted to assist the French in halting this traffic. Admiral Struble said that he agreed that we would discuss the subject of intelligence and its improvement but that we would not go into a discussion of anything that looked like the formation of a theater command.

The French thought that the defense of Tonkin was vital to the defense of South East Asia. General Brink—who has been in the area a long time—felt that DeLattre was making a fine stand. There was increasing confidence. Everyone was working hard. DeLattre was not demanding assistance on every task. Admiral Struble said that he had had a very favorable impression of the French effort. He said that the meeting had agreed to state in its report that Tonkin is a vital area in the current situation.

U.S. aid is arriving in good quantities now. General Brink is doing a splendid job.

DeLattre showed much concern about confidence in the local situation. He would not discuss evacuation even in the broadest terms. Admiral Struble said that he had, therefore, dropped this suggestion because he felt that confidence in the local situation was more important than getting our long range views on the table. Admiral Struble said that there had been about 50 persons present at the meetings and that he had, therefore, been somewhat concerned regarding security. General Collins asked why there had been so many at the meetings. Admiral Struble said that the U.K. and French delegations each consisted of about 20 persons.

Admiral Struble said that he had not pressed for a discussion of the possibility of Chinese Communist invasion for he had felt that this might upset the boat.

Admiral Struble said that he felt that DeLattre had not been too well briefed in Paris.

Admiral Struble reported that the French had agreed to improve communications between Singapore and Saigon.

Burma. Admiral Struble said that the U.K. mission in Burma is apparently not doing well. The U.K. has some military equipment in Burma but it does not want to distribute it because relations with the Burmese are poor. Apparently the British and the Burmese are not speaking to each other. The Air and Naval Missions there are doing a little. The French had shown much interest in this question. They had pointed to the importance of Burma and emphasized the dangers in the situation. The French felt that something should be done about it. Harding (British) said that the U.K. was ready for a joint mission to Burma or even for turning the job over to someone else. Burma appears to be the weakest spot in South East Asia and the U.K. is not going to improve the situation. Admiral Struble said that he did not know whether the U.S. would want to put a mission in Burma and that he had not discussed this problem. General Collins agreed that Burma is an important area, but said that we did not want to send a mission to Burma. Admiral Struble thought that the Chinese Communists were thinking in terms of political infiltration rather than invasion. He said that the Chinese were making some headway. He doubted that Burma would be invaded. There had been considerable discussion of the problem of the Chinese Nationalists along the border between Burma and China. DeLattre said that he was imprisoning every Chinese Nationalist he could get his hands on. These Nationalist forces could be a source of trouble and DeLattre wants to avoid any excuse for Chinese Communist action. General Collins asked how many Nationalists there were on the border. Admiral Struble said there were 10 to 15 thousand. Mr. Rusk asked whether the British or French had pressed for action on this problem. Admiral Struble said that he had avoided the subject and had allowed the British and the French to make their statements. They had not pushed him for any action.

Thailand. The French have no confidence in the stability of the Thai government. They think that it will blow and bend with the wind. The British were not so outspoken. Admiral Struble felt that we should continue our aid program. General Collins asked whether there was any confirmation of the French view. Admiral Struble said that General Brink thought that the situation was not as bad as the French portrayed it. General Collins said that Cole¹³ was not enthusiastic about the situation in Thailand.

Malaya. It was clearly stated that Malaya was the sole responsibility of the British. The British presented the military situation and their action very clearly. They are using 20,000 troops with much effectiveness. It is a long range problem, and Admiral Struble said that he could not see anything more that could be done to improve the situation. He thinks there is some progress but it is slow. He felt that there should not be any diversion of U.K. forces from Malaya. Mr. Rusk asked whether there had been any suggestion of a need for U.S. aid for Malaya. Admiral Struble said there had not.

Indo-China. The French recognized that Indo-China is their sole responsibility. They asked for more aid. DeLattre complimented General Brink for his activities. Admiral Struble said that DeLattre had impressed him as a good man for the job in Indo-China. DeLattre is, however, something of a prima donna. Admiral Struble thinks that it is necessary to back him up.

Admiral Struble said that his general conclusion was that a coordinated build-up of anti-communist strength in South East Asia is needed. The important points seem to him to be the following: the political sitution in Burma and the possibility of a Chinese invasion; the political situation in Indo-China and the large possibility of a direct Chinese invasion.

Admiral Struble believes that DeLattre wants to establish an allied command for South East Asia with DeLattre as the Supreme Commander. His proposal for a joint intelligence operation was the first step. DeLattre wants to establish a strategic reserve of six to eight divisions. Admiral Struble said that he could not accept or agree to any statement on this. The matter was discussed at some length. He said that he had been willing to permit the French to make a unilateral statement about the size of the forces needed to defend Indo-China in the event of a Chinese invasion. He had also been willing to permit the British to make the same kind of a statement for Burma. These estimates could then be forwarded to the governments for their information. Admiral Struble thought that it would not be desirable for him to appraise these estimates. Therefore, the estimates are merely forwarded in the report of the meeting. Admiral Struble said that he thought the British estimate that two divisions were needed for the defense of Burma—the Rangoon-Mandalay area—was too low. In any event the divisions would have to be there prior to the invasion if they were to be of any use.

Admiral Struble reported that the Americans believe that DeLattre could hold off a minor invasion with his present forces, but not a major invasion. He said that DeLattre appreciated our desire to help in the event that evacuation became necessary, but did not want to discuss this matter.

He said that the French went after the British strongly on their intentions. They wanted to know whether Malaya would be defended vigorously and whether Singapore would be defended if Malaya fell. Although the French made a big point of this, it was Admiral Struble’s view that Singapore meant nothing if Malaya fell.

Admiral Struble thought that if Burma or Thailand fell, subsequent developments would be entirely up to the Chinese Communists. General Collins noted that the land communications in the area are poor. Admiral Struble thought that the Burma road is being put in pretty good shape. Mr. Nitze asked whether the Kra Isthmus could be held. General Collins thought that the British ought to be able to hold that isthmus. He pointed out that the Japanese had had a Navy and that the Chinese Communists do not. The British ought, therefore, to be able to hold whatever forces the Chinese Communists could deploy and supply in the area. However, there is a good railroad.

Admiral Struble felt that Thailand would fall if either Burma or Indo-China falls.

Admiral Struble said that the French brought up the problem of logistics, and that he had indicated a readiness to discuss the problem and to take whatever action was possible. The French want ship repair facilities at Singapore and Subic Bay. The French have no way to support their vessels in the area. They also want aviation repair facilities so that the planes we are now furnishing can be repaired in the area rather than be sent back to France. They also want reserve supplies stocked in the Philippines or Singapore or both. Admiral Struble said that the British and the Americans had agreed to look into these problems but that he had been unable to agree to any specific proposals. He said that he had avoided discussing the use of the Philippines since he was not sure whether there would be any objection to French use of Subic Bay. He said that it was his personal view that the French will need help along these lines if the fighting in Indo-China continues. Admiral Sherman thought that it would be advantageous to us to assist the French in these ways. It would be more economical than to supply them with new equipment. General Collins thought that the French should be able to train their own repair crews but that we would have to supply the spare parts. Admiral Sherman thought that this assistance would increase our potential in the Philippines and would be useful to us for that reason.

Admiral Struble said that DeLattre and the British were strongly of the opinion that any possible pretext for Chinese Communist intervention should be avoided. He said that he had agreed to a statement along these lines. The report also contained a statement about the importance of avoiding general war. Mr. Rusk asked what would constitute a pretext in the view of the British and the French. Admiral Struble replied that the bombing of Chinese territory and the presence of Chinese Nationalist forces along the borders were the points which the British and French had in mind.

The French had emphasized the problem of contraband. They assert that it is flowing to Indo-China from the Philippines via Bangkok and Macao. They also believe that a large part of the military supplies furnished Indonesia enter contraband channels. They think it is going straight to Malaya and Indo-China. The French hammered at this point insistently. Admiral Struble said that he had not been sure where the U.S. stood on the Indonesian question and was not sure whether we were supplying arms to Indonesia. He, therefore, agreed to include a statement in the report regarding contraband traffic in arms from peripheral areas. He had wanted to avoid any political problems. Mr. Rusk asked whether the British and the French were ready to furnish proof of contraband shipments. General Collins said that there had been evidence of such traffic including traffic from the Philippines to Indo-China. Admiral Struble said that he had agreed to recommend that the governments study this problem. Mr. Nitze asked whether the U.S. is sending military supplies to Indonesia. He said that he was not aware of any shipments. Mr. Rusk said that there was a program for equipping the constabulary with small arms. Admiral Struble said that small arms were important in the kind of fighting that is taking place in Malaya. General Collins thought that the shipments from the Philippines were the most important. Admiral Struble said that the British and the French believe that we are supplying equipment to some of these countries which enables them to manufacture small arms for export. Not much equipment is required to maintain guerrilla warfare on the Malayan pattern. Admiral Sherman said that the Indonesians take a very rigid attitude and say that they will supply anyone they want to supply. Admiral Struble said that the British and French think that we should not furnish supplies and arms in peripheral areas. They believe that these arms can only be used against us. He felt that the British and French had a strong point. Admiral Sherman said that he agreed.

Admiral Struble said that the French are trying to lay a basis for inter-allied command in the area. General Collins said that some propaganda about the necessity of an inter-allied command had appeared recently in the press. Admiral Sherman said that Senator Kefauver¹⁴ had asked him during the recent hearings what progress was being made toward the creation of a U.N. command for all such situations. Admiral Sherman said that he had stated that it would be very difficult to establish U.N. commands while the Soviet Union was seated in the Security Council. He did not know what the motivation of this line of questioning was. Mr. Rusk thought that Senator Kefauver might be trying to lay the foundation for his Atlantic Union concept.

Admiral Struble said that he had raised the question of what the British and French reaction would be to bombing by the Chinese Communists. He reported that the British and French had tried to evade this question although DeLattre had sought to use it as an argument for obtaining more aircraft for the area. Admiral Struble thought that both the British and the French had been instructed to avoid the topic of retaliatory action.

As to a blockade, the British and French both took the view that this was a political matter. As to preparations for global war, the British and French both felt that this was a broad subject. DeLattre attempted to use this to raise the question of a strategic reserve for the area. As to a Chinese Communist invasion, DeLattre said that this would result in a call for U.N. assistance; however, DeLattre wanted no reference to this in the record. He said that he was not authorized to discuss it. Admiral Struble said that he had included a paragraph on this matter in his own report. General Collins asked Admiral Struble what DeLattre’s action indicated. Did it indicate that the French would not ask for U.N. aid? Admiral Struble said that he did not believe that DeLattre had necessarily indicated the French point of view. General Collins asked whether the French had not already indicated that they would ask for U.N. assistance in the event of an invasion. Mr. Rusk said that the French probably would ask for assistance, but that they do not want to indicate their position in advance of an attack. As to the question of psychological warfare, Admiral Struble said that he had raised the question two times and had urged that a common policy should be developed. DeLattre had avoided the topic on the ground that it did not bear on the agenda item under discussion and that he was not authorized in any event to discuss it. The British delegation was willing but not anxious to discuss the subject.

On the problem of shipping controls, it was clear that the British did not want any reference to the fact that they and the Americans had discussed the subject before. The French said that they could not discuss the problem of command relationships in the field. Therefore, Admiral Struble said, it had been necessary to deal with this problem as a Naval problem. Possibly the respective Navy Departments can deal with this matter through their local commanders. He felt that it would be unnecessary and undesirable to have a French officer working on the problem in Saigon. The British in Singapore and Americans in Manila can deal with it adequately.

General Collins asked whether DeLattre had discussed the possibility of developing local Indo-Chinese forces. Admiral Struble said that DeLattre took the view that the Viet Namese can be made into good fighting men. General Collins asked whether the Viet Namese would be politically interested in fighting for the defense of their country while the French remained in Indo-China. Admiral Struble said that DeLattre had made a very strong statement about the excellent treatment given to the Viet Namese by the French. Admiral Struble said that he had avoided political discussions but was of the view that the Viet Namese could be made into good soldiers. General Collins asked whether General Brink believed that the French Mission could train the Viet Namese. Admiral Struble replied affirmatively.

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1. Files of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, 1947–1953.
2. Beginning in January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State met regularly, generally on a weekly basis. The purpose of these conferences was to exchange information and opinions rather than to achieve agreement on the various issues discussed. The source text indicates that this record is a State Department draft not cleared with any of the participants.
3. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
7. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
4. Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations.
5. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.
8. Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
9. John H. Ferguson, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
6. Rear Adm. William G. Lalor, Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
10. Robert W. Tufts, Member of the Policy Planning Staff.
11. S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.
12. Vice Adm. A. D. Struble was U.S. representative at the tripartite military talks at Singapore, May 15–18. For extracts from the report of that conference, see supra.
13. Brig. Gen. John T. Cole, U.S.A., Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group In Thailand.
14. Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee.