Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1
790.5/5–1551
Conference Report on Tripartite Military Talks on Southeast Asia Held at Phoenix Park, Singapore, May 15–18, 19511
The three heads of the French, British and American Delegations, here undersigned, are in unanimous agreement on the report attached herewith.
This report includes the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the studies, made in common, during the course of the Tripartite Military Conference held in Singapore from 15 to 18 May 1951.
Present
| france | |
| General d’Armee | Jean de Lattre de Tassigny |
| General de Corps Aerien | Pierre Fay |
| Vice Admiral | Paul Ortoli |
| General de Brigade | Pierre Pelissie |
| united states | |
| Vice Admiral | Arthur D. Struble |
| Brigadier General | Francis G. Brink |
| united kingdom | |
| General | Sir John Harding, KCB, CBE, DSO, MC, ADC. |
| Air Marshal | Sir Francis Fogarty, KBE, CB, DFC, AFC. |
| Vice Admiral | The Hon. Sir Guy Russell, KCB, CBE, DSO. |
Observers
| new zealand | |
| Major General | K.L. Steward, CB, CBE, DSO. |
| australia | |
| Colonel | J. G. Wilton, DSO. |
| Group Captain | D. McLaughlin |
| Commander | C. M. Hudson |
Secretariat
- Colonel L. C. C. Harrison, M.C.
- Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Ellis, U.S. Marine Corps.
- Commandant J. A. E. Deleris.
Agenda
1. A review of the military situation in Indo-China and South East Asia.
2. Recommended military courses of action in the current situation to secure Indo-China, Thailand, Burma and Malaya and methods to ensure continuing exchange of information particularly regarding China, having a bearing on this problem.
3. Probable effects and recommended subsequent military courses of action in case of Communist uprisings within Thailand, Burma or Malaya.
4. Probable effects and recommended military courses of action in the event the Chinese Communists invade Indo-China, Thailand, Burma or Malaya.
5. Measures for coordinating convoy routing and protection of shipping arrangements in the South China Sea-East Indian Ocean area and for insuring a constant surveillance of war contraband activities.
Report prepared by the delegates of the French, United States and British Military Authorities at the Conference at Singapore held from 15th to 18th May 1951.
This report covers the agreed conclusions and recommendations of the conference and is presented in four parts:—
| Part | I | Exchange of Information |
| Part | II | Operational aspects of the defense of South East Asia |
| Part | III | Logistic Requirements |
| Part | IV | Control of shipping and the Surveillance of Contraband Traffic |
The Report has been prepared in both French and English and the texts possess equal validity. Any divergencies in the meanings of the [Page 66] two texts which may subsequently come to light will fail to be resolved between the Governments concerned.
[Here follows Part I, “Exchange of Information.”]
Part II
Operational Aspect of the Defense of South East Asia
introduction
1. We record below the situation and requirements for Indo-China, Burma, Siam and Malaya in respect of Items 2, 3 and 4 of the Agenda and set forth the conclusions and recommendations.
General
2. The security of all the countries of South East Asia is interdependent, and instability in one will affect all the others.
item ii
Indo-China
Conclusions
3. At this time the defense of Tonkin should be recognized as the key to the security of South East Asia and should receive the highest priority in the area for the allocation of any required forces or resources that are or may become available.
4. Under the existing conditions the Forces of the French Union dominate the present situation in Indo-China.
5. The French retain the sole responsibility for the security of Indo-China.
Recommendations
6. To continue the accelerated delivery of the material aid already programmed.
7. To make arrangements for the examination of the logistic problem in Indo-China by representatives from the armed forces of all three countries, the necessary meetings taking place periodically at Saigon as required.
8. There should be a full exchange of information especially covering China between the countries concerned, and to this end arrangements should be made for representatives from the armed forces of all three countries to meet periodically as required and at such places as are appropriate.
9. To set up an adequate signal organization between Saigon and Singapore and to this end arrangements should be made to enable representatives from the armed forces of France and Britain in South East Asia to meet periodically to discuss this problem.
Burma
Conclusions
10. The first requirement for Burma is political stability, and under the present circumstances there would be no purpose in increasing military [Page 67] aid to Burma beyond that already contemplated by the British until the quality of the Burmese Army has improved and its reliability was assured. There are now arms and equipment supplied by the British in store in Burma that are not being used.
11. The Burmese Army needs tuition and guidance. The resources already available to them through the British Military Mission are not being fully utilized.
Recommendations
12. Military aid beyond that already contemplated should not be given to Burma under the present conditions.
13. All possible steps should be taken to increase the effectiveness of the British Military Mission.
Thailand
Conclusions
14. The current Thai Government is anti-Communist.
15. The will of the Siamese Government and the people to resist Communism in the main rests on developments in Indo-China and Burma.
16. The improvement of their armed forces and police would be an important contributory factor in the stability of Siam.
Recommendations
17. The United States continue to furnish military assistance in the form of material, advice and training to the Thai armed forces.
Malaya
Conclusions
18. The security of Malaya is the sole responsibility of the British, and they have control of the internal security situation at the present time.
19. The situation in peripheral countries has a direct bearing on the internal security situation in Malaya.
20. The successful conclusion of the current operations in Malaya has a direct bearing on the stability of South East Asia.
Recommendations
21. That the campaign in Malaya should not be jeopardized by the diversion of forces now engaged in it.
General Recommendations
22. The most profitable action in this entire matter is to achieve the most rapid possible build-up of coordinated anti-Communist strength by seizing and retaining the initiative in South East Asia.
23. That steps be taken to prevent the smuggling of arms and military equipment into the four countries discussed herein. Common studies should be made by our Governments with the object of preventing [Page 68] the supply of such arms and military equipment from or through peripheral countries.
item iii
General
24. The effect of a successful Communist uprising in any one of the countries concerned will be the serious weakening of the anti-Communist strength of the others.
Thailand
Conclusions
25. A potential threat exists in Thailand in the form of Chinese Communist Fifth Column.
26. The Siamese Government is capable of controlling a Communist uprising, providing it is not accompanied by external aggression from Communist China.
Recommendations
27. Material aid priority should be increased in the event of local uprisings.
28. Requests from the Siamese for further assistance should be studied in the event of a serious uprising that appears to be beyond the capabilities of the Siamese to contain. No useful purpose will be served by intervening with token forces only.
Burma
Conclusions
29. An uprising exists in Burma at the moment and the initiative appears to lie slightly with the insurgents.
30. The ability of the Burmese government to defeat a Communist uprising is largely dependent upon the amount of external aid received by both sides and the degree of effectiveness with which that aid is used.
Recommendations
31. Everything possible must be done to improve the training and efficiency of the armed forces.
32. When the stability of the government is assured and the forces are able to use it, material aid should be increased.
33. If the uprising appears to be gaining success additional assistance should be considered. No useful purpose will be served by intervening with token forces only.
Malaya
Conclusions
34. The British are controlling the situation in Malaya and progress is expected without any additional aid.
[Page 69]35. The British are capable of containing any anticipated further Communist uprising in Malaya and require no further aid.
Recommendations
36. The forces committed in Malaya should not be diverted at the expense of the current campaign.
item iv
General
37. The effect of a Chinese Communist invasion of any country would be the immediate creation of a new situation throughout South East Asia.
38. A successful invasion of any one of the countries by the Chinese Communists will have a serious effect on the ability of the other countries to defend themselves.
39. An unsuccessful invasion by the Chinese Communists will materially strengthen the anti-Communist position in South East Asia.
Indo-China
Conclusions
40. It appears likely that a major offensive by the Chinese Communists against Indo-China could not be contained without allied assistance and cooperation, to the forces of the French Union, in particular with reference to the defense of Tonkin which is the corner stone to the defense of South East Asia.
41. Appendix “A”5 is a preliminary French assessment of the additional forces which would be required in order to ensure successful defense of Tonkin against a major Chinese Communist invasion.
42. The reinforcements listed in the French assessment are not available from resources within South East Asia and the source of any additional forces should not be considered at this conference.
Recommendations
43. The respective governments should take note of this situation and the estimate of forces required.
Burma
Conclusions
44. The Burmese Armed Forces, without assistance, cannot resist successfully a Chinese Communist invasion of Burma.
45. Appendix “B” is a preliminary British assessment of the additional forces that would be required to reinforce the Burmese Armed forces in order to repel a Chinese Communist invasion.
Recommendations
46. The respective governments should take note of this situation and the estimate of forces required.
[Page 70]Thailand
Conclusions
47. An invasion of Thailand by the Chinese Communists is unlikely by sea or air and therefore an invasion is only probable through Indo-China or Burma.
48. If a Chinese simultaneous invasion of Indo-China and Burma is successful, the military situation of Thailand will probably be untenable.
49. A successful invasion of Indo-China by the Chinese Communists would make an effective defense of Thailand unlikely.
50. If Indo-China stands firm but Burma is successfully invaded by the Chinese, it appears possible to defend Thailand only if additional troops are brought in. No estimate has been made of the forces required for these operations but it is anticipated that they would be considerable.
51. In the event of an invasion of Burma, the defense of Thailand is an essential adjunct to the defense of Indo-China.
Recommendation
52. The respective governments should take note of this situation.
Malaya
Conclusions
53. The probability of a sea or air-borne invasion of Malaya by the Chinese Communists is remote, therefore Malaya can only be invaded if either Indo-China and Thailand, or Burma and Thailand have fallen.
54. Singapore is vital to the communications in South East Asia. It is the British intention to defend it in the event of Communist Chinese invasion of Malaya.
55. It was stated by the British Commanders in Chief that, if Malaya is exposed to Chinese invasion, in addition to the forces likely to be available, they would require a corps of three divisions with supporting arms and services and the necessary supporting sea and air forces to maintain the security of Malaya.
Recommendation
56. The respective governments should take note of this situation and the estimate of forces required.
additional general conclusions
The Time Factor
57. The gaining of time is of the highest importance to the development of the French operations for the defense of Indo-China and for the improvement of the internal situation in Thailand, in Burma and in Malaya. It would therefore appear undesirable if any action were taken which might give the Chinese a pretext for intervention.
[Page 71]Localization of Chinese Intervention
58. Should a Chinese Communist penetration in South East Asia take place, it would be desirable to take steps to prevent becoming involved in a general war with China.
Additional Forces
59. If a major Chinese invasion of South East Asia is to be successfully withstood, additional forces will be needed. These additional forces will be the sum of the forces needed for a defense of Indo-China and Burma. It is recommended that, in estimating the forces that would be required for this purpose, the French and British estimates in Appendices “A” and “B” should be noted.
[Here follow Appendix “A” to Part II, an estimate of reinforcements necessary to permit the French to resist a Chinese Communist invasion of Tonkin; Appendix “B” to Part II, “Possible Chinese Communist Operations Against Burma;” Part III, “Logistic Requirements;” and Part IV, “Control of Shipping and Control of Contraband Traffic.”]
- For documentation on the background of this conference, see pp. 332 ff.↩
- Gen. d’Armée Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner in Indochina; Commander of French Union Forces in Indochina.↩
- Gen. Sir John Harding, Commander of British Land Forces in the Far East.↩
- Vice Adm. Arthur D. Struble, Commander of the U.S. First Fleet.↩
- Not printed.↩