S/S Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 48/51

Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)

top secret
NSC 48/5

United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia

References:

References: A. NSC 48 Series2
B. NSC Action No. 4713
C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 14 and 15, 19514
D. NSC 13 Series5
E. NSC 22 Series6
F. NSC 34 Series7
G. NSC 37 Series8
H. NSC 60/19
I. NSC 81 Series10
J. NSC 101 Series11
[Page 34]

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 48/412 as amended and adopted at the 91st meeting of the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 471), and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the United States Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

The approved statement of policy is accordingly circulated herewith for information and appropriate action. Also enclosed for information is the NSC staff study on the subject contained in the Annex to NSC 48/3,13 appropriately revised.

The President has also approved the Council’s recommendation in NSC Action No. 471–c. Accordingly, the statements of policy contained in NSC 48/2, the NSC 13 Series, the NSC 22 Series, the NSC 34 Series, the NSC 37 Series and the NSC 81 Series are superseded herewith; further action on the NSC 101 Series is canceled, but NSC 60/1 is not superseded.

James S. Lay, Jr.
[Annex 1]

Statement of Policy on Asia

general considerations

1. United States objectives, policies, and courses of action in Asia should be designed to contribute toward the global objective of strengthening the free world vis-à-vis the Soviet orbit, and should be determined with due regard to the relation of United States capabilities and commitments throughout the world. However, in view of the communist resort to armed force in Asia, United States action in that area must be based on the recognition that the most immediate overt threats to United States security are currently presented in that area.

2. Current Soviet tactics appear to concentrate on bringing the mainland of Eastern Asia and eventually Japan and the other principal off-shore islands in the Western Pacific under Soviet control, primarily through Soviet exploitation of the resources of communist China. The attainment of this objective on the mainland of Eastern Asia would substantially enhance the global position of the USSR at the expense of the United States, by securing the eastern flank of the USSR and permitting the USSR to concentrate its offensive power in other areas, particularly in Europe. Soviet control of the off-shore islands in the Western Pacific, including Japan, would present an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.

[Page 35]

3. The United States should, without sacrificing vital security interests, seek to avoid precipitating a general war with the USSR, particularly during the current build-up of the military and supporting strength of the United States and its allies to a level of military readiness adequate to support United States foreign policy, to deter further Soviet aggression, and to form the basis for fighting a global war should this prove unavoidable. This should not preclude undertaking calculated risks in specific areas in the over-all interest of the defense of the United States.

4. The United States should seek the firm establishment and effective application of the principle of collective security and should, except in those instances when on balance the need for unilateral action outweighs other considerations, act in and through the United Nations, preserve solidarity with its principal allies, and maintain the continued cooperation of other friendly nations.

long-range objectives

5. The long-range national security objectives of the United States with respect to Asia are:

a.
Development by the nations and peoples of Asia, through self-help and mutual aid, of stable and self-sustaining non-communist governments, friendly to the United States, acting in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and having the will and ability to maintain internal security, withstand communist influence, and prevent aggression.
b.
Elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia or its reduction to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.
c.
Development of power relationships in Asia which will make it impossible for any nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area.
d.
Insofar as practicable, securing for the United States and the rest of the free world, and denying to the communist world, the availability through mutually advantageous arrangements, of the material resources of the Asian area.

current objectives

6. In view of the threat to United States security interests resulting from communist aggression in Asia, it should be the policy of the United States to:

a.
Detach China as an effective ally of the USSR and support the development of an independent China which has renounced aggression.
b.
Maintain the security of the off-shore defense line: Japan–Ryukyus–Philippines–Australia and New Zealand. Deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated by the USSR and expedite the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of Formosa. [Page 36]Attempt by all practicable means to forestall communist aggression in South and Southeast Asia.
c.
Assist Japan to become a self-reliant nation friendly to the United States, capable of maintaining internal security and defense against external aggression and contributing to the security and stability of the Far East.
d.
Promote the development of effective security and economic relationships among the free nations of Asia and the Pacific area, including the United States, on the basis of self-help and mutual aid, with appropriate United States assistance.
e.
Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel, (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK miltary power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.
f.
Consistent with e above and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.
g.
Assist the countries of South and Southeast Asia to develop the will and ability to resist communism from within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.
h.
In accordance with 5–d above, take such current and continuing action as may be practicable to maximize the availability, through mutually advantageous arrangements, of the material resources of the Asian area to the United States and the free world generally, and thereby correspondingly deny these resources to the communist world.

7. In accordance with the above, the United States should pursue in the respective areas of Asia the courses of action set forth in the following paragraphs.

8. While continuing to recognize the National Government as the legal government of China, the United States, with respect to Communist China, should now:

a.
Continue strong efforts to deflate Chinese Communist political and military strength and prestige by inflicting heavy losses on Chinese forces in Korea through the present UN operation.
b.
Expand and intensify, by all available means, efforts to develop non-communist leadership and to influence the leaders and people in China to oppose the present Peiping regime and to seek its reorientation or replacement.
c.
Foster and support anti-communist Chinese elements both outside and within China with a view to developing and expanding resistance in China to the Peiping regime’s control, particularly in South China.
d.
Stimulate differences between the Peiping and Moscow regimes and create cleavages within the Peiping regime itself by every practicable means.
e.
Continue United States economic restrictions against China, continue to oppose seating Communist China in the UN, intensify efforts to persuade other nations to adopt similar positions, and foster the imposition of United Nations political and economic sanctions as related to developments in Korea.
f.
In order to be prepared for Chinese aggression outside Korea, to protect the security of UN and U.S. forces, and to provide for appropriate military action in the event that UN forces are forced to evacuate Korea, expedite the development of plans for the following courses of action, if such action should later be deemed necessary:
(1)
Imposing a blockade of the China coast by naval and air forces.
(2)
Military action against selected targets held by Communist China outside of Korea.
(3)
Participation defensively or offensively of the Chinese Nationalist forces, and the necessary operational assistance to make them effective.
g.
Continue as a matter of urgency to influence our allies to stand with us and fully support the taking of such actions as those indicated in f above if military operations outside Korea should be required.

9. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should:

a.
Seek an acceptable political settlement in Korea that does not jeopardize the United States position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN.
b.
In the absence of such a settlement, and recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue the current military course of action in Korea, without commitment to unify Korea by military force, but designed to:
(1)
Inflict maximum losses on the enemy.
(2)
Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression.
(3)
Limit communist capabilities for aggression elsewhere in Asia.
c.
Continue its efforts to influence our allies to increase their support of and contribution to the UN operations in Korea.
d.
Develop dependable South Korean military units as rapidily as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of the UN forces there.
e.
If the USSR commits units of Soviet “volunteers” sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.
f.
If the USSR precipitates a general war, withdraw UN forces from Korea as rapidly as possible and deploy United States forces for service elsewhere.
g.
Working in and through the organs of the United Nations where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations efforts for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from communist control.

10. With respect to Japan the United States should:

a.
Proceed urgently to conclude a peace settlement with Japan on the basis of the position already determined by the President, through urgent efforts to obtain agreement to this position by as many nations which participated in the war with Japan as possible.
b.
Proceed urgently with the negotiation of bilateral security arrangements with Japan on the basis of the position determined by the President to be concluded simultaneously with a peace treaty.
e.
Assist Japan to become economically self-supporting and to produce goods and services important to the United States and to the economic stability of the non-communist area of Asia.
d.
Pending the conclusion of a peace settlement continue to:
(1)
Take such steps as will facilitate transition from occupation status to restoration of sovereignty.
(2)
Assist Japan in organizing, training, and equipping the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Patrol in order to facilitate the formation of an effective military establishment.
e.
Following the conclusion of a peace settlement:
(1)
Assist Japan in the development of appropriate military forces.
(2)
Assist Japan in the production of low-cost military matériel in volume for use in Japan and in other non-communist countries of Asia.
(3)
Take all practicable steps to achieve Japanese membership in the United Nations and participation in a regional security arrangement.
(4)
Establish appropriate psychological programs designed to further orient the Japanese, toward the free world and away from communism.

11. With respect to Formosa the United States should:

a.
Continue, as long as required by United States security interests, the mission presently assigned to the 7th Fleet.
b.
Encourage political changes in the Nationalist regime which would increase its prestige and influence in China proper.
c.
Provide military and economic assistance to increase the potential of the Chinese forces on Formosa for the defense of Formosa and for such other uses as may be determined as a result of the planning pursuant to 8–f above.

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12. The United States should continue the policy with respect to the Philippines set forth in NSC 84/2.14

13. The United States should continue the policy with respect to South Asia set forth in NSC 98/1.15

14. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should:

a.
Continue its present support programs to strengthen the will and ability to resist communist encroachment, to render communist military operations as costly as possible, and thus to gain time for the United States and its allies to build up the defense of the off-shore chain.
b.
Continue programs of information and educational exchange in the countries of Southeast Asia.
c.
Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore and expand their commerce with each other and the rest of the free world, stimulate the flow of the raw material resources of the area to the free world, and assist in establishing small arms production in appropriate locations in Southeast Asia under suitable controls.
d.
In Indochina:
(1)
Continue to increase the military effectiveness of French units and the size and equipment of indigenous units by providing timely and suitable military assistance without relieving the French authorities of their basic military responsibilities or committing United States armed forces.
(2)
Continue to encourage internal autonomy and progressive social and economic reforms.
(3)
Continue to promote international support for the three Associated States.
e.
In Indonesia, the United States should seek to strengthen the non-communist political orientation of the government, promote the economic development of Indonesia, and influence Indonesia toward greater participation in measures which support the security of the area and Indonesian solidarity with the free world.

15. With respect to regional security arrangements, the United States should:

a.
Conclude the post-treaty security arrangements with Japan as provided for in 10–b above.
b.
Maintain the security relationships with the Philippines as provided for in 12 above.
c.
Conclude a security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand.
d.
Consider the desirability of security arrangements with other countries of Asia, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
e.
Encourage and support closer economic and political cooperation with and among the countries of Asia in keeping with the objective stated in 6–d above.

[Page 40]
[Annex 2]

NSC Staff Study on United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia *

problem

1. To determine United States national objectives, policies, and courses of action with respect to Asia.

united states long-range national objectives in asia

2. The long-range national security objectives of the United States with respect to Asia are:

a.
Development by the nations and peoples of Asia, through self-help and mutual aid, of stable and self-sustaining non-communist governments, oriented toward the United States, acting in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and having the will and ability to maintain internal security and prevent communist aggression.
b.
Elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia or its reduction to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.
c.
Development of power relationships in Asia which will make it impossible for any nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area.
d.
In so far as practicable, securing for the United States and the rest of the free world, and denying to the communist world, the availability through mutually advantageous arrangements, of the material resources of the Asian area.

analysis of the situation

3. United States objectives, policies, and courses of action in Asia should be designed to contribute toward the global objectives of strengthening the free world vis-à-vis the Soviet orbit, and should be determined with due regard to the relation of United States capabilities and commitments throughout the world. However, in view of the communist resort to armed force in Asia, United States action in that area must be based on the recognition that the most immediate threats to United States security are currently presented in that area.

4. Current Soviet tactics appear to concentrate on bringing the mainland of Eastern Asia and eventually Japan and the other principal off-shore islands in the Western Pacific under Soviet control, primarily through Soviet exploitation of the resources of communist China. The attainment of this objective on the mainland of Eastern [Page 41]Asia would substantially enhance the global position of the USSR at the expense of the United States, by securing the eastern flank of the USSR and permitting the USSR to concentrate its offensive power in other areas, particularly in Europe. Soviet control of the off-shore islands in the Western Pacific, including Japan, would present an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.

5. Asia is of strategic importance to the United States.

a.
The strategic significance of Asia arises from its resources, geography, and the political and military force which it could generate. The population of the area is about 1,250,000,000. The demonstrated military capacity of the North Korean and Chinese armies requires a reevaluation of the threat to the free world which the masses of Asia would constitute if they fell under Soviet Communist domination.
b.
The resources of Asia contribute greatly to United States security by helping to meet its need for critical materials and they would be of great assistance in time of war if they remained available. At least until stockpiling levels are met, this phase of the area’s importance to the United States will continue. Further, the development of events which might lead to the exhaustion of such stockpiles would magnify the importance of this source of supply. The area produces practically all the world’s natural rubber, nearly 5% of the oil, 60% of the tin, the major part of various important tropical products, and strategic materials such as manganese, jute, and atomic materials. Japan’s potential in heavy industry is roughly equal to 50% of the Soviet Union’s present production. Therefore, it is important to U.S. security interests that U.S. military and economic assistance programs be developed in such a manner as to maximize the availabilities of the material resources of the Asian area to the United States and the free world.
c.
Control by an enemy of the Asiatic mainland would deny to us the use of the most direct sea and air routes between Australia and the Middle East and between the United States and India. Such control would produce disastrous moral and psychological effects in border areas such as the Middle East and a critical effect in Western Europe.

6. The fact of Soviet power and communist aggression in Asia establishes the context within which the policies of the United States must operate.

a.
The problem of China is the central problem which faces the United States in Asia. A solution to this problem, through a change in the regime in control of mainland China, would facilitate the achievement of United States objectives throughout Asia. Therefore, United States policies and courses of action in Asia should be determined in the light of their effect upon the solution of the central problem, that of China.
b.
The communist attack in Korea has transformed the Far East into a theater of combat. Whether the Kremlin or Peiping intends that hostilities be extended into other areas of Asia or aggression committed in another part of the world is as yet unknown. The United [Page 42]States must expect either eventuality. In any case, the United States should use the resources which can be disposed, without unacceptably jeopardizing our objectives elsewhere, to prevent the communists from achieving a victory in Korea and to build resistance to communist encroachments in Asia.
c.
Our ability to achieve national objectives in Asia will be conditioned by the capabilities and global commitments of the United States and by the weight of the effort the enemy is willing and able to make. Consequently, there is required a constant and careful scrutiny of policies and actions on the basis of which decisions can be made which will advance us toward our ultimate objectives without sacrificing immediate security interests.

7. The guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy as it relates to meeting the threat of Soviet aggression is the promotion of the establishment of a system of collective security based on the principles of the UN Charter. The United States is consequently forced inevitably to weigh elements of policy toward Asia against their effect upon the free world coalition, a coalition fundamental to our world-wide struggle for security against Soviet aggression.

8. The principal obstacles to the execution of United States policy in pursuit of its objectives in the Far East are as follows:

a. The policy and action of the Soviet Union.

(1)
The Soviet Communists have historically considered Asia as one of their principal objectives; Bolshevik ideology devotes a prominent place to the capture of the “colonial and semi-colonial” areas of the world, by which is meant principally Asia. Soviet policy in Asia has been aided by the fact that communists have been successful to a large degree in subverting indigenous nationalist movements; the capture of these movements has been a goal of Kremlin policy.
(2)
The Kremlin has not yet resorted to the large-scale and open employment of Soviet armed forces, although the aggression by both North Koreans and Chinese Communists indicates that the Kremlin is willing to undertake greater risks than in the past.
(3)
The Kremlin, besides supplying and directing leadership of communist parties in Asia, and building centers of subversion, infiltration, and revolution, is providing military assistance to communist forces in Asia, both in matériel and in technical personnel.
(4)
The fact that the Soviet threat is world-wide in character has prevented the concentration of free world effort against the various forms of communist aggression in Asia. The combination of political, military, technical and propaganda support given by the Soviet Government to the communist assault in Asia confronts the United States and its principal allies with a major challenge which vitally affects world power positions.

b. The policy and action of Communist China.

(1)
Communist China is already involved in a major military aggression in Korea, is publicly committed to an attempt to seize [Page 43]Formosa, may attack Hong Kong, and may increase its support to Ho Chih Minh to include the use of Chinese forces in Indochina. Communist success in these efforts would expose the remainder of Southeast Asia to attack and would sharply increase the threat to Japan and the remainder of the off-shore island chain. Such prospects lend greater effectiveness to the ordinary communist techniques of penetration and subversion and cause many Asians to remain on the side lines during the present phase of the struggle.
(2)
The effect upon the Chinese themselves and upon Asians generally of the prestige won by the Chinese Communists through their successful conquest of China must not be overlooked. Efforts by India and other Asian nations to rationalize the communist revolution in China as a basically nationalist movement, and to establish friendly relations with the Peiping regime, probably stems in some degree from a basic admiration for the achievement of power by a regime which is Asian, revolutionary, and antagonistic to the West.
(3)
The significant Chinese minority groups in various countries of Asia can be used as instruments of communist policy because of their ties with the mainland, susceptibility to pressure, and natural tendency to support elements in China who have won power.

c. Lack of unity among the principal non-communist nations with respect to Asian problems.

(1)
United States policy in Asia is frequently handicapped through lack of unity among important friendly nations who are basically anti-communist but who differ with the United States and among themselves in their estimates of the strategy to be pursued because of conflicting interests. Divergencies have recently arisen on certain Far Eastern issues with, for example, the United Kingdom, Canada, and India. Regrettably these differences are not easily responsive to compromise since they represent divergencies of national interest and public opinion difficult to remove.
(2)
The national interest of the United Kingdom dictates a different attitude with respect to the relative importance of Europe and Asia. At the same time both the United Kingdom and India have acted toward China and Formosa on the basis of an interpretation of events in China and a strategic estimate of the situation differing from those of the United States.

d. Lack of unity among non-communist Asian nations.

(1)
Antipathies in Asia, arising from the variety of cultures, languages and religions, mean that there is no firm base for regional action or cooperation. The abortive efforts of Nehru, Chiang Kai-shek and Quirino to form regional associations attest to this difficulty. Mutual bitterness created in India and Pakistan by the partition of British India constitutes a major deterrent to South Asian regional cooperation.
(2)
This lack of affinity among Asian nations means that our policies and programs must be devised and adapted to the situation prevailing in each country but does not mean that we should [Page 44]cease to strive for closer cooperation among the Asian states, particularly for security purposes. For example, our efforts to bring about settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes, particularly the Kashmir controversy,16 should be given as much weight as our efforts to win India and Pakistan as allies. With the possible exception of a crisis created by a communist invasion of South Asia, we cannot expect India and Pakistan to cooperate politically or militarily until major outstanding disputes are resolved.

e. Lack of support from non-communist countries of Asia.

(1)
The peoples of Asia will be greatly influenced by their judgment as to the probable outcome of the struggle between the Moscow-Peiping axis and the free world. They will be reluctant to commit themselves to take sides in a general war and, more particularly, to align themselves in advance with a probable loser. Hence, any impression that the free world neither can nor will meet the threat of communist aggression against the countries of Asia, by force if necessary, will undermine effective resistance to communist aggression on the part of indigenous peoples.
(2)
The effect of the Korean struggle upon the military and political prestige of the participants is of the greatest importance to the course of events in other parts of Asia.
(3)
The general lack of confidence in government, deficiencies in military capabilities, and the absence of a sense of the necessity and urgency for building the defenses of their own countries is a weakness in Asia and should elicit our efforts to instill this sense and to stimulate action by the countries themselves.

f. Asian resentments and suspicions toward the West.

(1)
We should not over-estimate the reservoir of good-will toward the United States in Asia. Communism has appeared in Asia in the form of Asians preaching nationalism and promising Utopia to the poverty-stricken masses. Democracy has too often been associated with the privileged white man and the memories of colonial exploitation. Communism has succeeded in exploiting the two great revolutionary movements which have dominated the recent history of Asia—the national revolution against western imperialism and the social revolution against the poverty and distress of the people.
(2)
Despite the skill of communist propaganda, however, the indigenous institutions of Asia have been surprisingly resistant to communism and have thus far limited the spread of communist control to those areas in which the communist revolution could be supported by strong communist armies. This resistance to communism must not be confused with pro-Americanism. The United States faces a formidable political and propaganda task in establishing relations with Asia on a basis of mutual confidence and common interest, and in influencing the intense nationalism to take a direction harmonious with the interests of the free world.
(3)
Indian Government policy, probably encouraged to some extent by the United Kingdom, has recently opposed United [Page 45]States efforts to support the principle of collective action against the Chinese Communists. It is not likely that Nehru will be persuaded at any time in the near future to agree that Chinese Communist aggression in North Korea is wholly unjustified, or that Formosa should not be turned over to the Chinese Communists. Press attitudes in South Asia—particularly in India and Pakistan—are hostile to United States policy toward Communist China and most politically-conscious South Asians appear to believe the United Nations resolution naming Communist China an aggressor passed only as a result of bludgeoning tactics by the United States. Most politically-conscious South Asians are probably afraid of the USSR and Communist China and are not likely to consider overt political or military action against either until such time as South Asia may be actually invaded.

g. Weakness in the leadership and political structure of non-communist Asian countries.

(1)
The new and heavy responsibilities of national independence, the surge of great revolutionary forces, the lack of educators, educational facilities, trained administrators and technicians both in government and in economic life, and the serious economic dislocations resulting from the war and from changing production and trade patterns have made impossible demands upon Asian leadership.
(2)
This structural weakness is common to the entire area and may be expected to persist for a long period. The United States should give the most thorough consideration to means to encourage the development of competent leadership and to stimulate its rise in the countries of Asia.
(3)
In India, the keystone to stability in South Asia, and in the other countries of the area, every effort must be made to help stabilize conditions and keep in power the present governments which, generally speaking, are the strongest non-communist governments in continental Asia. Alternatives in India or Pakistan would be anarchy, governments of the extreme Right, or governments of the extreme Left.

h. Delay in the achievement of the security of Japan.

(1)
The policies of the Soviet Government have delayed a peace settlement which would have restored Japan to an independent status and have made it necessary to provide military defenses for Japan. Until the security of Japan can be achieved, the threat of communist invasion will remain.
(2)
The reluctance of other nations, particularly Australia and the Philippines, to agree to the development of military strength in Japan is a factor which the United States must consider and overcome.

i. Problem of American personnel in Asia.

(1)
The formulation and execution of programs designed to support objectives of the United States in Asia are handicapped by the lack of qualified and experienced personnel available to live and work in Asian countries.
(2)
In providing personnel to Asian nations, it is necessary to exercise utmost care in selecting individuals not only technically qualified but of a temperament suitable for life in Asia and creditable to the United States Government. Our aim must constantly be one of furnishing the necessary personnel for the particular needs of the individual country and at the same time avoiding the impression that the United States endeavors to “colonize” or “Americanize” those countries to which aid is being given.

9. The principal elements in Asia which support or facilitate the achievement of United States objectives and which to a greater or less extent offset the above obstacles, are:

a. The basic interests of the non-communist nations.

(1)
The leading groups and the peoples of the non-communist nations are striving to promote the goals of the two great revolutionary movements of Asia-national independence and economic betterment. Their objectives are sovereignty, stability, rising living standards, land reforms, military strength, and peaceful friendly international relations. Their goals and objectives match the objectives and the policies of the United States.
(2)
The historic friendship of the United States for the peoples of Asia, our support for their independence, and our contribution to their economic betterment have encouraged a degree of confidence in our motives and intentions. Therefore, although the policies of these governments may diverge from ours, they may fail to understand the nature of the forces which threaten them, and may oppose our actions at a given time, we should not lose sight of our basic credit in Asia.

b. Asian fear and suspicion of the Chinese.

(1)
As long as China was divided by civil war the non-Chinese peoples of Asia showed little concern over China. The rise of a militant armed China under Communist leadership poses the threat of Chinese imperialism, intensifies antipathies between Chinese and non-Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, including the Philippines and Indonesia, and menaces the newly won independence of the non-communist nations.
(2)
This new menace might eventually stimulate active cooperation among the Asian nations to resist the Chinese Communists. Such cooperation would constitute a third factor, in addition to the movements for national independence and economic betterment which motivate the nations of the Far East. Such a third factor would be to our interest if it rallied the nations of Asia closer together for mutual security, contributed to a firmer base for regional action and cooperation, and eventually developed an impact upon China itself. The probability for the development of the potentials of such a third factor probably would be in direct ratio to the strength shown in Asia by the Anglo-Franco-American resistance to aggression in that area.
(3)
While most politically-conscious South Asians appear to oppose our policy toward USSR and Communist China, there is reason to believe that many of them in responsible positions [Page 47]recognize the dangers of Sino-Soviet aggression and would not hesitate to fight in the event of a communist invasion. Nehru has stated publicly that his government would not tolerate an invasion of Nepal and there are indications that Indian defenses are being strengthened on the Indo-Burmese border.

c. Internal conflicts in Communist China.

(1)
The imposition of Communist totalitarian control upon China produces a situation alien to Chinese traditions, inimical to Chinese interests and contrary to Chinese characteristics. The extent to which the internal conflicts in this situation will affect acceptability of the regime in China to the Chinese people will be determined in large measure by its ability to improve economic conditions, provide well-functioning government, that is, satisfy in general the economic and political desires of the population. The Communist regime can be expected to make the fullest use of both propaganda and police force to achieve its ends.
(2)
Conflicts arise between the regime and the Soviet Government, between the regime and the people, between the regime and local governments, between local governments, and within the regime itself. Factors likely to alienate support from the regime in China include the harsh controls of a police state, its lack of respect for individual and family rights, the forsaking of domestic reform and reconstruction for the militarization of Chinese society and costly military venture abroad in the face of a universal desire for peace and work rather than war and conscription, and basically, the responsibility of the regime for solving China’s historic economic dilemmas. Failure of the regime to provide concrete satisfaction for the traditional Chinese discontents would contribute substantially to a basic instability of the regime.
(3)
It is difficult to measure the degree of hostility in China to the regime; it is undoubtedly widespread and exploitable. However, its exploitability is affected by numerous factors and changes with events and circumstances. For example, failure to expel UN forces from Korea in spite of huge losses increases the opportunity for conflicts to be intensified. On the other hand, successful engagement in military adventures elsewhere with increased support from the Soviet Union would tend to mitigate the conflicts, accompanied as it would be by further tightening of controls and rigidity of the power of the ruling clique.
(4)
The possibility of cleavages within the Chinese Politburo must not be overlooked. While it seems apparent that the present Peiping Government is controlled by Stalinists whose alliance to Moscow is complete, it is reasonable to suppose that individuals or groups may exist within the Chinese Communist party who are aware of and reluctant to accept the implications for the future historic role of China of an unswerving adherence to a policy of abject subservience to Moscow.
(5)
While it would be unwise to expect or to predicate policy upon a change within the Peiping regime, the potential rifts must be calculated and maximum advantage taken of conditions and situations of tension which might favor a clash within the regime or the coming into power of a group, which, even though still Communist, might follow a course less advantageous to the aims [Page 48]of world communism and therefore more favorable to the interests of the United States. Those rifts again would be fostered by failures met in China’s adventures outside its frontiers.

d. Historic Russian-Chinese conflict.

(1)
For over a century the Chinese have contended with active Russian encroachments on the sovereignty and the interests of China, far more frequently than with any other single nation. Russian expansion into China has been persistent; Russian claims against China’s boundaries and possessions perpetual. The historic conflict today could again flare out over Soviet encroachments in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Manchuria, rivalry over the controlling influence in Korea, disputes over courses of action in Japan, Southeast Asia, and India, and finally, Chinese rebellion against excessive Soviet control of internal Chinese affairs. At the same time the Kremlin may entertain apprehensions that Chinese expansion in Asia might in the long-run threaten the security of Russia.

c. Geographic and material assets.

(1)
The United States has greater and more flexible access to the Far East than does the Soviet Union. The Soviet Far East is dependent on the Transiberian railroad for logistic support and has no ready access to any countries other than China. Control by the United States of the sea and air approaches to the Asian littoral provides unlimited lines of communication.
(2)
Nearly one-third of the population of the Far East inhabits insular areas with resulting advantages in defense. This third, which combines the workshop of Japan with the raw materials of the great off-shore islands of the South Pacific could be built into a powerful system.
(3)
Japan’s population, industrial capacity, geographical position, and relationship to the United States resulting from the Occupation, make it an important asset to the free world.

policy guide lines for united states action

10. In view of the threat to United States security interests resulting from communist aggression in Asia, it should be the policy of the United States to:

a.
Detach China as an effective ally of the USSR and support the development of an independent China which has renounced aggression.
b.
Maintain the security of the off-shore defense line: Japan–Ryukyus–Philippines–Australia and New Zealand. Deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated by the USSR and expedite the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of Formosa. Attempt by all practicable means to forestall communist aggression in South and Southeast Asia.
c.
Assist Japan to become a self-reliant nation friendly to the United States, capable of maintaining internal security and defense against external aggression and contributing to the security and stability of the Far East.
d.
Promote the development of effective security and economic relationships among the free nations of Asia and the Pacific area, including the United States, on the basis of self-help and mutual aid, with appropriate United States assistance.
e.
Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.
f.
Consistent with e above and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.
g.
Assist the countries of South and Southeast Asia to develop the will and ability to resist communism from within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.
h.
In accordance with 2–d above, take such current and continuing action as may be practicable to maximize the availability, through mutually advantageous arrangements, of the material resources of the Asian area to the United States and the free world generally, and thereby correspondingly deny these resources to the communist world.

principal courses of action

11. There are set forth below analyses of the principal courses of action which the United States should follow in order to move toward its objectives in Asia. These are necessarily expressed in outline form and reflect much that is already under way. Obviously, the fluidity of the current situation with respect to Asia dictates continuous scrutiny and consideration of possible courses of action.

The Problem of Communist China

12. The belligerent activities of the present Soviet-supported regime in Peiping confront the United States with its fundamental policy problem in Asia. Communist control of mainland China and Peiping’s close alliance with the USSR are altering the global balance of power to the great disadvantage of the United States and its allies. The extension of consolidation of Sino-Soviet power in Asia could critically endanger United States security interests, if it runs its full course without hindrance.

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13. The Chinese Communists seek to enhance the joint power position of the USSR and China and to establish Chinese Communist hegemony over Asia. Aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists aim at eliminating Western influence and power from the whole Far East, particularly from Japan, the principal off-shore islands, and Southeast Asia. The present regime in Peiping now is firmly allied and is cooperating closely with the USSR. The development of a military and political axis between Peiping and Moscow is being rapidly promoted under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1950 which is being implemented through a Soviet program of increasing economic, and particularly, military assistance to Communist China, and through an expanding network of Soviet advisors in Chinese Communist military, economic and political organizations. In line with its over-all policy of developing the maximum strength of its satellites, there is strong reason to believe that the USSR is now attempting to establish a well-equipped and well-trained modern Chinese Communist Army, Air Force and Navy.

14. Profound changes are taking place within China. The Chinese Communists have temporarily abandoned their reconstruction plans which were their primary objectives in early 1950. The Peiping regime has adopted, and is ruthlessly putting into effect, measures placing China on a complete war footing. The militarization of China includes repressive secret police controls, violent anti-U.S. and anti-foreign propaganda, transfers and decentralization of industry, widespread air raid and defense precautions, enrollment of university and middle school students in newly-organized military training establishments, rapid construction of air fields throughout China capable of handling jet planes, and the increasing size of Chinese Communist military, naval and air forces.

15. The following actual or potential contradictions in conditions on the mainland could facilitate United States efforts to bring about an independent China:

a.
Widespread and growing popular dissatisfaction over declining standards of living, violent and repressive political controls, casualties in Korea, and arbitrary dependence on the USSR.
b.
The consequences of the Korean military campaign for the Peiping regime, including the great burden of military expenditures and increasing shortages of essential raw materials, the loss of valuable trained manpower and materiel, and weakened capability for maintaining internal control.
c.
Increasing tensions between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet regime regarding expanding Soviet control in China, possible failure of the Soviet Union to intervene more directly in Korea or fulfill Peiping’s military assistance requirements, and competition over Communist leadership in Japan and Southeast Asia.

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16. In view of the above factors, it is the primary objective of the United States in Asia to sever or weaken the alliance between Moscow and Peiping. This objective would be served if any of the following took place:

a.
Replacement of the present Peiping regime.
b.
Change in the character and policies of the Peiping regime from alliance with Moscow to a position of neutrality or a “leaning toward” the free world.
c.
A political fragmentation of China resulting in the emergence of local regimes pursuing policies at variance with those of the central government.

17. The above objectives might be sought through an effort to destroy and disrupt China’s economic, transportation and communications facilities by naval and air action and a naval blockade. However, the launching of hostilities against Communist China under present conditions does not appear desirable or feasible for the following reasons:

a.
In North Asia, military actions against China might precipitate Soviet military operations against us in Japan and Korea, in view of the terms of the Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1950.
b.
Within China, United States air and naval actions might result in driving the Chinese people closer to the Peiping regime and solidifying the Moscow-Peiping alliance beyond any hope of modification in our favor.
c.
In Asia and the world at large, unilateral United States hostilities against Communist China itself would dissolve any possibility of developing unity of action on critical problems of the Far East, complicate our NATO and Commonwealth relations, and leave us isolated in the Far East.
d.
The diversion of available United States air and naval strength into an operation against the China mainland, which could hardly develop otherwise than into a major action, might create such imbalance in our military deployment as to facilitate Soviet aggressive action in some other vital section of the world arena, and particularly in Europe.

18. Bearing in mind that rapidly shifting conditions in China and the Far East make it difficult to determine in advance the one course of action most likely to move us closer to our objectives, and, while continuing to recognize the National Government as the legal government of China, the United States, with respect to Communist China, should now:

a.
Continue strong efforts to deflate Chinese Communist political and military strength and prestige by inflicting heavy losses on Chinese forces in Korea through the present UN operation.
b.
Expand and intensify, by all available means, efforts to develop non-communist leadership and to influence the leaders and people [Page 52]in China to oppose the present Peiping regime and to seek its reorientation or replacement.
c.
Foster and support anti-communist Chinese elements both outside and within China with a view to developing and expanding resistance in China to the Peiping regime’s control, particularly in South China.
d.
Stimulate differences between Peiping and Moscow and create cleavages within the Peiping regime itself by every practicable means.
e.
Continue United States economic restrictions against China, continue to oppose seating Communist China in the UN, intensify efforts to persuade other nations to adopt similar positions, and foster the imposition of United Nations political and economic sanctions as related to developments in Korea.
f.
In order to be prepared for Chinese aggression outside Korea, to protect the security of UN and U.S. forces, and to provide for appropriate military action in the event that UN forces are forced to evacuate Korea, expedite the development of plans for the following courses of action, if such action should later be deemed necessary:
(1)
Imposing a blockade of the China coast by naval and air forces.
(2)
Military action against selected targets held by Communist China outside of Korea.
(3)
Participation defensively or offensively of the Chinese Nationalist forces, and the necessary operational assistance to make them effective.
g.
Continue as a matter of urgency to influence our allies to stand with us and fully support the taking of such actions as those indicated in f above if military operations outside Korea should be required.

19. In carrying out its policies on China the United States should seek to develop the largest possible measure of support from the Asian peoples and nations.

Settlement of the Korean Problem

20. The United States has consistently sought as an ultimate political objective the establishment of a unified independent and democratic Korea. Since the North Korean invasion, the military objective of the United States in the United Nations has been to repel the aggression and to establish international peace and security in the area. The intervention of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea has so changed the situation that it appears militarily impossible now to bring about a situation under which a unified, non-communist Korea could be achieved by political means. Therefore, while in no way renouncing the ultimate political objective which we hold for Korea, the present task should be to bring about a settlement of the Korean problem which at the minimum will deny to Communist control that part of Korea south of the 38th parallel and will provide for the phased withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces as militarily practical.

21. Because it appears likely that both the United Nations and the communist forces will be able to maintain military positions in [Page 53]parts of Korea, the Korean situation could develop in one of the following ways:

a.
Chinese Communist agreement to cessation of hostilities and a political settlement of the Korean problem.
b.
A political and military stalemate during which the Chinese Communists neither offer nor accept any suggestions for settlement.
c.
A northward movement of the United Nations forces.
d.
A massive Communist drive, possibly supported by Soviet or satellite “volunteer” air and naval activities.

22. In view of the above possibilities the following considerations are pertinent: (a) the United Nations should not accept a settlement which leaves any part of South Korea in the hands of the aggressor;.(b) United Nations forces may be able to expel the aggressor from South Korea; (c) United Nations forces can continue to inflict heavy losses on the Chinese; (d) a settlement will permit the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea for use elsewhere and will put an end to Chinese losses in Korea; (e) a majority of the United Nations presently opposes another major crossing of the 38th parallel; and (f) it is important to maintain the maximum amount of unity within the United Nations regarding Korea. Unless the USSR provides greatly increased military support to the Communist forces in Korea for a massive drive south, it is conceivable that a cessation of hostilities and a political modus vivendi can be achieved. Such a modus vivendi would permit the withdrawal of non-Korean forces from Korea.

23. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should:

a.
Seek an acceptable political settlement in Korea that does not jeopardize the U.S. position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN.
b.
In the absence of such a settlement, and recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue the current military course of action in Korea, without commitment to unify Korea by military force, but designed to:
(1)
Inflict maximum losses on the enemy.
(2)
Prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggression.
(3)
Limit communist capabilities for aggression elsewhere in Asia.
c.
Continue its efforts to influence our allies to increase their support of and contribution to the UN operations in Korea.
d.
Develop dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of the UN forces there.
e.
If the USSR commits units of Soviet “volunteers” sufficient to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the United States in the best possible position of readiness for general war.
f.
If the USSR precipitates a general war, withdraw UN forces [Page 54]from Korea as rapidly as possible and deploy United States forces for service elsewhere.
g.
Working in and through the organs of the United Nations where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations efforts for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from communist control.

24. The United States should give special attention at all stages of the settlement of the Korean problem to the development of a strong ROK military establishment for continuation of the struggle against Communist forces (in case of a stalemate), and for the organization of a strong barrier to defend the ROK against future aggression. Particular emphasis should be placed on training capable Korean officers. Essential parts of the program to develop military stability are the restoration of the authority of the Republic of Korea in the area south of the demarcation line, and such economic and technical assistance, consistent with the absorptive capacity of the Korean economy, as will develop stability by the time United Nations forces are withdrawn from the peninsula. It is probable that the ROK will require the provision of air and naval assistance after withdrawal of U.S. and U.N. forces.

The Security and Stability of Japan

25. The power vacuum left by the defeat of Japan is of vital concern to the United States. The Kremlin might attempt to secure control of Japan, and thereby fill the vacuum, by an open attack or by the slower, indirect methods of subversion and infiltration. So long as American troops are stationed in Japan, an attack by the USSR would bring a clash with United States forces and undoubtedly war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore, unless the Kremlin has determined to embark upon World War III, in which case an attack on Japan would be but part of a global strategy, Soviet policy toward Japan will likely be directed toward fostering and exploiting the political and military weaknesses of the country which could be expected to prevail following the end of occupation.

26. In view of the above, the maximum deterrent to the Kremlin in the post-treaty period will be a Japan with a rapidly and soundly developing economy, internal political stability, and an adequate military capability for self-defense.

27. The policies of the United States should be formulated to bring about the situation of strength in Japan described above. Of all Far Eastern nations, Japan possesses the most advanced industry, greatest reservoir of technical and commercial experience, and the most energetic and industrious population. Control of the occupation of Japan has given the United States a unique opportunity to direct the resources [Page 55]of Japan toward the creation of a position of strength among the non-communist nations of Asia.

28. The courses of action to be followed toward Japan both now and in the post-treaty period should aim to:

a.
Preserve to a maximum degree the positive accomplishments of the occupation.
b.
Assist Japan to develop internal political immunity to Communism.
c.
Assist Japan to develop a sound economy.
d.
Speed the building of military defenses.
e.
Establish long-term relationships between the United States and Japan which will contribute to the security of the United States.
f.
Bring Japan into a multilateral security arrangement as soon as Japan becomes able to fulfill the obligations which such an arrangement would entail.

29. With respect to Japan, the United States should:

a.
Proceed urgently to conclude a peace settlement with Japan on the basis of the position already determined by the President, through urgent efforts to obtain agreement to this position by as many nations which participated in the war with Japan as possible.
b.
Proceed urgently with the negotiation of bilateral security arrangements with Japan on the basis of the position determined by the President to be concluded simultaneously with a peace treaty.
c.
Assist Japan to become economically self-supporting and to produce goods and services important to the United States and to the economic stability of the non-communist area of Asia.
d.
Pending the conclusion of a peace settlement continue to:
(1)
Take such steps as will facilitate transition from occupation status to restoration of sovereignty.
(2)
Assist Japan in organizing, training, and equipping the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Safety Patrol in order to facilitate the formation of an effective military establishment.
e.
Following the conclusion of a peace settlement:
(1)
Assist Japan in the development of appropriate military forces.
(2)
Assist Japan in the production of low-cost military materiel in volume for use in Japan and in other non-communist countries of Asia.
(3)
Take all practicable steps to achieve Japanese membership in the United Nations and participation in a regional security arrangement.
(4)
Establish appropriate psychological programs designed to further orient the Japanese toward the free world and away from communism.

The Problem of Formosa

30. Possession of Formosa by a regime in alliance with or subservient to the Kremlin would endanger the off-shore defense line, Japan–Ryukyus–Philippines–Australia and New Zealand. The manpower [Page 56]and military and economic resources of the island are a potential asset to the free world in the event of general hostilities in the Far East. At the same time, the inheritance of military supplies of United States origin by Communist conquerors of Formosa would increase the threat to our Pacific position.

31. From a military standpoint, United States naval and air forces available for the defense of Formosa are considered adequate to insure the failure of an attack on the island in circumstances short of general war. However, without the participation of United States naval and air forces, the manpower, military and economic resources of the island are not now adequate for mounting a successful military invasion of the mainland and might not even be adequate for the defense of the island itself. Furthermore, antipathies between Formosa’s indigenous population and the Chinese Nationalist regime and the inadequacies of military and political leadership necessarily reduce the capabilities for defense, not to mention offense. An analysis of the military effectiveness of the possible use of Chinese forces on Formosa against the mainland of China is contained in a recent study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

32. International support for the denial of Formosa to the Peiping regime is seriously complicated by the fact that Formosa is the seat of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Governments who might otherwise support the denial of Formosa to Communist China for security reasons recoil from involvement of themselves or of the United States in the struggle between Peiping and Taipei for the control of China proper.

33. The United States faces in the Formosa problem the dilemma of simultaneously attempting to preserve the island from communist control and to win support from the Chinese people, friendly noncommunist governments, and non-communist Asians. It appears likely that support will materialize only if changes occur in the regimes in control at Peiping or Taipei or further aggression is committed by Communist China.

34. Ethnic and historical factors as well as international commitments, particularly the Cairo and Potsdam declarations,17 support the proposition that Formosa should be part of China. Consequently, although the United States is prepared to consider all factors relating to the eventual disposition of the island, the problem of Formosa cannot [Page 57]be separated from that of China. However, the United States did not contemplate at Cairo that Formosa would be turned over to a Chinese regime hostile to the United States nor, more particularly, that Formosa would be handed over to the Soviet Union by way of a Chinese satellite regime.

35. The interests of the United States would be served by the emergence of a non-communist government controlling both China and Formosa. Such changes in China as suggested in paragraph 16 above would provide a step toward this goal, as would be a political change in Formosa resulting in a regime with increased influence and appeal on the mainland. Mainland developments should be viewed as intrinsically separate in major degree from developments on Formosa, and American support accordingly should be given independently to mainland subversive movements with the problem of ultimate location of leadership of a resistance movement left to the ultimate decision of the Chinese themselves.

36. In order to prevent the capture of Formosa by communist forces and at the same time to develop optimum conditions for a solution of the Formosa problem, the United States should:

a.
Continue, as long as required by United States security interests, the mission presently assigned to the 7th Fleet.
b.
Encourage political changes in the Nationalist regime which would increase its prestige and influence in China proper.
c.
Provide military and economic assistance to increase the potential of the Chinese forces on Formosa for the defense of Formosa and for such other uses as may be determined as a result of the planning pursuant to paragraph 18b above.

Security and Stability of the Philippines

37. The United States desires in the Philippines an effective government, a stable and self-supporting economy and a Philippine military establishment capable of restoring and maintaining internal security. The immediate problem in the Philippines is to eliminate the Huk problem, strengthen internal resistance to communism, increase security against external danger and develop the Philippines as a strong and reliable ally of the United States.

38. It is recognized that the United States must continue for an indefinite period to assume responsibility for the external defense of the islands, to provide military, and economic assistance, to take appropriate measures to assure the institution of necessary political, financial, economic and agricultural reforms, and in general to participate in the defense and administration of the country. Such continued participation in the affairs of an independent country has its undesirable aspects but in the context of the present world situation there is no acceptable alternative.

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39. Since our ultimate goal should be to establish a Philippine Government and economy without need of American participation, United States programs in the Philippines should be designed to encourage the rapid development of Philippine initiative, leadership, and ability to function independently of outside assistance.

40. In order to achieve the immediate objectives enumerated in paragraph 37 above, endeavoring at the same time to progress toward the ultimate goal described in paragraph 39, the United States should as called for in NSC 84/2:

a.
Use all appropriate measures to assure that the Philippine Government effects political, financial, economic and agricultural reforms in order to improve the stability of the country.
b.
Provide such military guidance and assistance as may be deemed advisable by the United States and acceptable to the Philippine Government.
c.
Extend, under United States supervision and control, appropriate economic assistance in the degree corresponding to progress made toward creating the essential conditions of internal stability.
d.
Continue to assume responsibility for the external defense of the Islands and be prepared to commit United States forces, if necessary, to prevent communist control of the Philippines.

Strengthening of Southeast Asia

41. It is important to the United States that the mainland states of Southeast Asia remain under non-communist control and continue to improve their internal conditions. These states are valuable to the free world because of their strategic position, abundant natural resources, including strategic materials in short supply in the United States, and their large population. Moreover, these states, if adequately developed and organized, could serve to protect and contribute to the economic progress and military defense of the Pacific off-shore islands from Japan to New Zealand. Communist control of both China and Southeast Asia would place Japan in a dangerously vulnerable position and therefore seriously affect the entire security position of the United States in the Pacific. The fall of the mainland states would result in changing the status of the off-shore island chain from supporting bases to front line positions. Further, it would tend to isolate these base areas from each other, requiring a review of our entire strategic deployment of forces. Communist domination of the area would alleviate considerably the food problem of China and make available to the USSR considerable quantities of strategically important materials.

42. In the absence of overt Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, the general problems facing the United States in this area are: the real threat of Chinese Communist invasion and subversion, the political instability and weak leadership of the non-communist [Page 59]governments, the low standards of living and underdeveloped resources of the peoples of the area, the prevailing prejudice against colonialism and Western “interference” and the insensitivity to the danger of communist imperialism. Further acts of communist aggression in Southeast Asia can be expected to stimulate resistance on the part of countries which have thus far failed to take a positive stand.

43. Therefore, the general objectives of the United States in Southeast Asia are: (a) to contribute to the will and ability of all countries in the region to resist communism from within and without, and (b) to aid in the political, economic and social advancement of the area. For this purpose, the United States has developed support programs to strengthen the governments’ administrative and military capabilities, to improve living standards, to encourage pro-Western alignments, and to stave off communist intervention.

44. Chinese Communist conquest of Indochina, Thailand and Burma, by military force and internal subversion, would seriously threaten the critical security interests of the United States. However, in the event of overt Chinese aggression, it is not now in the over-all security interests of the United States to commit any United States armed forces to the defense of the mainland states of Southeast Asia. Therefore, the United States cannot guarantee the denial of Southeast Asia to communism. The United States should continue its present support programs to strengthen the will and ability to resist the Chinese Communists, to render Communist military operations as costly as possible, and to gain time for the United States and its allies to build up the defenses of the off-shore chain and weaken communist power at its source.

45. The United States should develop its support programs in such form and in such manner in each country as will effectively stimulate the use of its resources to the advantage of the free world, contribute to the development of sound economies and adequate military establishments, and take into account the ability of each country to absorb and its willingness to put to effective use American aid. In any instance where a government friendly to the United States is conducting actual resistance to internal subversive forces or overt aggression, the United States should favorably consider contributions to the ability of such a government to continue resistance.

46. The general security problems of Southeast Asia are the subject of military staff conversations among the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

47. Programs of information and educational exchange should be continued in the countries of Southeast Asia and should be designed to develop on the part of the governments and peoples of the area, realization, and action in accordance therewith, of the vital objectives [Page 60]which they share with the United States and of the ways in which the achievement of these objectives are threatened by the aggressive purposes of Soviet Communism.

48. At the present time, the United States faces the following major problems in Southeast Asia:

a.
Defense of Indochina. The loss of Indochina to communist control would greatly increase the threat to the other mainland states of Southeast Asia and to Indonesia. The Viet Minh with the aid of strong Chinese Communist military intervention can conquer Indochina. Therefore, the forces opposing the Viet Minh must rapidly increase their military strength. Increased anti-communist manpower must come from the Associated States, principally Vietnam.
b.
Chinese Imperialism. The United States should expand and intensify the psychological warfare effort to increase an awareness in the area of the threat which Soviet and Chinese imperialism poses to the national independence, economic betterment and traditional ideals of each country in the region. The United States should seek to reduce the ties between the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and the Peiping regime, to neutralize the pro-communist support among these communities, and to endeavor to direct the political power and economic wealth of the Chinese communities toward the support of the countries which they are resident.
c.
The Role of Singapore and Malaya in the Defense of Southeast Asia. The location of the Malayan Peninsula makes it of great importance to Indonesia and Australia and New Zealand in the event Indochina and Thailand fall to the communists. Although the defense and internal security of Singapore and Malaya are British responsibilities, the Peninsula cannot be defended against an invasion from the north without outside support. Accordingly, the United States should coordinate its operational planning with the United Kingdom with respect to Malaya and adjacent areas.
d.
The Alignment of Indonesia. Indonesia’s strategic position, economic wealth including oil reserves, and political importance as an independent, non-communist nation are assets to the security of the United States in the Pacific. Consequently, the policies and actions of the United States must be directed to strengthening and maintaining the non-communist political orientation of the government and to promoting economic health and development. At present the Indonesian Government is pursuing a policy of political neutrality. The United States must endeavor to influence Indonesia toward greater participation in measures which promote the security of the area and toward solidarity with the free world. Among the factors which affect United States aid to Indonesia are (1) the results to be achieved in terms of United States national interests, (2) the attitude of the Indonesian government, (3) the needs of Indonesia, and (4) the ability to use aid profitably. The United States should give particular attention to the problem of technical assistance, in view of the serious lack of leadership and trained personnel in the country.

49. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should:

a.
Continue its present support programs to strengthen the will and ability to resist communist encroachment, to render communist [Page 61]military operations as costly as possible, and to gain time for the United States and its allies to build up the defense of the off-shore chain.
b.
Continue programs of information and educational exchange in the countries of Southeast Asia.
c.
Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore and expand their commerce with each other and the rest of the free world, stimulate the flow of the raw material resources of the area to the free world, and assist in establishing small arms production in appropriate locations in Southeast Asia under suitable controls.
d.
In Indochina:
(1)
Continue to increase the military effectiveness of French units and the size and equipment of indigenous units by providing timely and suitable military assistance without relieving the French authorities of their basic military responsibilities or committing United States armed forces.
(2)
Continue to encourage internal autonomy and progressive social and economic reforms.
(3)
Continue to promote international support for the three Associated States.
e.
In Indonesia, the United States should seek to strengthen the non-communist political orientation of the government, promote the economic development of Indonesia, and influence Indonesia toward greater participation in measures which support the security of the area and Indonesian solidarity with the free world.

Security and Stability of South Asia

50. South Asia, containing nearly half a billion people and important strategic materials, including manganese and mica, is the only subdivision of Asia which is not presently under communist domination or direct threat of communist control. Subversion or conquest of South Asia by Communist China and/or the USSR would provide the Soviet Union and its satellites with vastly increased manpower, natural resources, and strategic bases, and would deny the non-communist powers potential sources of manpower, actual sources of strategic materials, and strategic bases. The loss of South Asia to the Communist orbit would for all practical purposes mean the loss of all continental Asia.

51. United States objectives with respect to South Asia are to improve the security position of the United States by contributing to the stability of the independent and non-communist governments now in authority, and by influencing these governments to provide active support for the UN campaign in Korea and for United States policies regarding Communist China. Furthermore, the United States should influence these governments in the direction of benevolent neutrality or active support of the non-communist powers in the event of a global war. To attain these ends the United States should: [Page 62]

a.
Continue to encourage South Asian participation in and responsibility for solutions of international problems pertaining to Asia, with a view to convincing South Asians that Western Powers are not determined to dominate Asia.
b.
Develop attitudes in South Asia which would assist the United States and its allies to obtain facilities which would prevent the USSR from obtaining assistance of any sort from these countries.
c.
Create conditions which would lead South Asian countries to deny their resources to the Soviet bloc and make them available to the United States and the free world.

52. While continuing talks with the British regarding increased coordination of US-UK policies in South Asia, the United States should, in accordance with the policies set forth in NSC 98/1:

a.
Encourage more intimate consultation with South Asian Governments—particularly those of India and Pakistan.
b.
Support participation of South Asian countries in United Nations organizations.
c.
Adopt a sympathetic attitude toward any developments which might lead to formation of a regional association of non-communist countries in South Asia.
d.
Expand information and educational exchange programs.
e.
Continue to encourage creation of an atmosphere favorable to economic development and expansion of trade consistent with United States security interest.
f.
Provide such economic assistance as will contribute to the stability of the area, strengthen the Western orientation of the region, and facilitate transfer to the United States of materials related to national security.
g.
Provide so far as practicable within the framework of other demands related to national security, military supplies, equipment, and services required for internal security, self-defense, or participation in defense of the area.
h.
Depending on the political atmosphere and global military developments, seek to obtain such military rights in South Asia as United States may determine to be essential.
i.
Take all possible action consistent with U.S. security interests to prevent the USSR or its satellites from obtaining from South Asia strategic materials currently being denied the Soviet bloc by the United States.
j.
Continue efforts to improve Indo-Pakistan and Afghan-Pakistan relations.

Regional Associations

53. In anticipation of the situation in the Pacific area to be created by the resumption by Japan of a free and independent status, there arise the problems of the continuing security of Japan, the security of the Pacific area, and the acceptance of Japan’s new status by the several Asian and Pacific island nations. A restoration of Japanese defenses can be brought about much more successfully if the Japanese [Page 63]participate in collective security arrangements rather than reluctantly engage in a rearmament program at the prodding of the United States. At the same time Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines might be expected to quell their natural fears of a rearmed Japan if Pacific security arrangements were established.

54. In terms of United States military interests, none of the countries in the Pacific area can presently contribute military resources to any effective degree. Japan has considerable military potential in manpower resources, industrial capacity, shipping and ship-building capacity, and military experience. However, it will require a number of years before this potential can be realized. It will not serve to cope with any Sino-Soviet aggression in the immediate future. The Philippines cannot depend on its own resources for self-defense and requires the support of United States armed forces as well as military assistance from the United States. Australia and New Zealand have very small armed forces, lack their own logistic support, and are committed to some extent to military operations in other theaters of the world in line with plans of the Commonwealth. Indonesia’s maximum capability would be the establishment of sufficient internal forces to create and maintain internal stability.

55. The problems of participants, of the effect on the mainland of Asia, and of the nature of guarantees make it necessary that efforts to bring about Pacific security arrangements be developed cautiously and on a flexible basis.

56. Development and establishment of mutual security arrangements for the Pacific area will have profound effects on the noncommunist countries of South and Southeast Asia. At the same time that mutual security arrangements are being developed for the Pacific, the United States should seek ways to encourage both closer cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia and progress by these countries toward participation in a broadened regional arrangement.

57. With respect to regional security arrangements, the United States should:

a.
Conclude the post-treaty security arrangements with Japan as provided for in 29–b above.
b.
Maintain the security relationships with the Philippines as provided for in 40 above.
c.
Conclude a security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand.
d.
Consider the desirability of security arrangements with other countries of Asia, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
e.
Encourage and support closer economic and political cooperation with and among the countries of Asia in keeping with the objective stated in 10–d above.

  1. Master Files of National Security Council documentation, 1947–1961, retired by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
  2. NSC 48/2, a report titled “The Position of the United States With Respect to Asia,” December 30, 1949, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1215.
  3. NSC Action No. 471, taken by the National Security Council at its 91st Meeting, May 16, recorded NSC adoption of the present report. It also specified that the NSC would recommend to President Truman that should he approve the report, he should agree to its superseding certain other NSC series as indicated in the third paragraph below. (S/S Files: Lot 62D1: NSC Actions)
  4. Neither printed.
  5. NSC 13/1, a report titled “Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan,” September 24, 1948, and NSC 13/2, same title, October 7, 1948, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, pp. 853 and 857, respectively. NSC 13/3, same title, May 6, 1949, appears in ibid., 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 730.
  6. NSC 22, a report titled “Possible Courses of Action for the U.S. With Respect to the Critical Situation in China,” July 26, 1948, and NSC 22/1, August 6, 1948, same title, are printed in ibid., 1948, vol. viii, pp. 118 and 131. NSC 22/2, “Current Position of the U.S. Respecting Delivery of Aid to China,” December 15, 1948, is also included in ibid., p. 231. NSC 22/3, same title, February 2, 1949, is printed in ibid., 1949, vol. ix, p. 479.
  7. NSC 34, a draft reported titled “U.S. Policy Toward China,” October 13, 1948, is printed in ibid., 1948, vol. viii, p. 146. NSC 34/1, same title, January 11, 1949, and NSC 34/2, same title, February 28, 1949, are printed in ibid., 1949, vol. ix, pp. 474 and 491, respectively.
  8. Documents NSC 37 through 37/9, which were devoted to U.S. policy regarding Formosa, are printed in ibid., pp. 261 ff. NSC 37/10, same subject, August 3, 1950, is printed in ibid., 1950, vol. vi, p. 413.
  9. NSC 60/1, a report titled “Japanese Peace Treaty,” September 8, 1950, is printed in ibid., p. 1293.
  10. NSC 81, a report titled “U.S. Courses of Action With Respect to Korea,” September 1, 1950; NSC 81/1, same title, September 9, 1950; and NSC 81/2, same title, November 14, 1950, are printed in ibid., vii, pp. 685, 712, and 1150, respectively.
  11. NSC 101, titled “Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea,” January 12, and NSC 101/1, “U.S. Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression,” January 15, are scheduled for publication in volume vii.
  12. NSC 48/5 is a slightly revised version of NSC 48/4, same title, May 4, which is not printed.
  13. NSC 48/3, April 26, an earlier draft of NSC 48/4 and NSC 48/5, is not printed. The NSC staff study contained in NSC 48/5 is a slightly revised version of the Annex to NSC 48/3, April 26, which is not printed.
  14. NSC 84/2, a report titled “The Position of the U.S. With Respect to the Philippines,” November 9, 1950, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi. p. 1515.
  15. NSC 98/1, a report titled “The Position of the United States With Respect to South Asia,” January 22, 1951, is printed post, p. 1650.
  16. For the purposes of this report, “Asia” is defined as that part of the continent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Iran together with the major off-shore islands—Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand. [Footnote in the source text.]
  17. For documentation on the Kashmir controversy, see pp. 1699 ff.
  18. Circulated by memorandum for the NSC from the Executive Secretary, subject “United States Action To Counter Chinese Communist Aggression,” dated March 21, 1951. [Footnote in the source text.]
  19. For the text of the Cairo Declaration, released by the White House on December 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448, or Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1943, p. 393. For the text of the Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1474, or Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1945, p. 137.