Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

780.5/10–3151

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)¹

top secret

Washington, October 31, 1951.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Now that the intention to establish a Middle East Command has been made public knowledge, the Department believes it would be desirable for the founding members (US, UK, France, Turkey and the three Commonwealth nations) to state publicly at an early date the basic political philosophy of the Command and some of the principles under which it will operate with a view to developing pro-MEC sentiments in the Arab states and Israel. While MEC is, of course, a military organization created for the defense of the area, we must stimulate a favorable disposition toward the Command on the part of the nations of the area. This in turn is a pressing political problem of considerable difficulty and magnitude as indicated by the Egyptian situation.

At the present time the only knowledge which prospective associates have of MEC is what they have been able to deduce from the proposals made to the Egyptian Government and the statement of our diplomatic representatives in making these proposals known to them. These proposals were prepared specifically for Egypt. Now that Egypt has rejected them it is important for the future of MEC to restate in more general terms, for the other states of the area, the principles underlying the MEC concept. If, after having announced that we intend to proceed with the establishment of MEC, the founder members can say nothing further until January-February when the Congress will be in a position to ratify the entrance of Greece and Turkey into NATO, Egyptian and other hostile propaganda against MEC will have greatly reduced the likelihood of other Arab states being willing to associate themselves with MEC.

MEC has a number of important aspects:

a.

1. Defense of the Middle East (Defense).

2. Definition of MEC area (State–Defense).

3. MEC relationship to NATO (State–Defense).

4. Role of Turkey in MEC (State–Defense).

b. Detailed organizations of MEC, including location of MEC Headquarters (Defense).

c. Steps required to secure association of Arab states, Israel and other interested states with MEC (State–Defense).

The foregoing list emphasizes the very broad range of politicomilitary considerations involved in, MEC. The interconnection of State–Defense interests is also brought out in NSC 47/5 of March 14, 1951 and the President’s message to Congress in connection with MSP.²

This letter is devoted primarily to point c, above, which is among the most important since MEC becomes something of an anomaly if no ME state other than Turkey is willing to be associated with it. Points a and b, above, have sufficiently firm characteristics to be susceptible of solution. Point c, however, involves a complex of hatreds, neutralism, Communism, nationalism, xenophobia, and the aftermath of Western imperialism and will require a painstaking educational campaign with the states concerned.

The Department believes that in order for MEC to be accepted by the NE states it must be presented with elements which will capture the imagination of these states as a “New Deal”. The difficult point will be to persuade the leaders of the Arab states, in the face of Egyptian-generated hostility, to recognize the importance of MEC to welfare and security of their countries and to lead public opinion to desire association with MEC.

Enclosed is a set of principles largely drawn from previous documentation on MEC, including the proposals to Egypt and the US–UK politico-military talks from which the proposals emerged. These principles also contain a few additional ideas consistent with previous documentation which would enhance the “sales value” of MEC in the area. It would be extremely helpful to have the comments of the Department of Defense upon the enclosed statement in so far as it might affect the ultimate form which MEC will take. It should be emphasized that the wording of the statement is tentative and that in its present form it represents the general thoughts of the Department. It may be desirable to dress up the language from the point of view of public appeal.

When the Defense Department has commented upon the enclosure and, subject to its concurrence on the principles set forth, it is suggested the next step should be to seek the concurrence of the UK, France, Turkey, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa. It is important to the success of MEC that all of us have the same principles in mind. In seeking the concurrence of the other states, it should be made clear that these would be general principles only and that the details of the MEC structure which would be created on the framework of these principles would be worked out at a meeting in Washington as suggested in point X of the proposals to Egypt.

It is doubtful, of course, that Turkey would be willing to make any firm commitment regarding MEC until it is a full-fledged member of NATO and until its aspirations with regard to participation in NATO are satisfied. This being understood, however, we feel that there would be no harm in asking the Turks to consider and comment upon a set of “principles”.

If the principles could be agreed among the states named, this in itself would be an achievement. However, we would hope that the states concerned would concur in jointly making these principles public at an agreed time which would have the maximum impact on the Arab states and Israel.

It would be appreciated if you could have urgent attention directed to this question. It would be particularly useful if the Secretary, who is now in Paris, could discuss this matter with the UK and French Foreign Ministers at an early date.³

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

H. Freeman Matthews

[Annex]

Draft Statement of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa on the Basic Principles of the Middle East Command⁴

In establishing the Middle East Command, the seven founder countries state that they are guided by the following principles:

1. The United Nations is a world response to the principle that peace is indivisible and that the security of all states is jeopardized by breaches of the peace anywhere; at the same time it is incumbent upon the states of any area to be willing and able to undertake the initial defense of their area.

2. The defense of the Middle East is vital to the free world and its defense against outside aggression can be secured only by the cooperation of all interested states. (Proposals I and II to Egypt.)

3. The Middle East Command is intended to be the center of cooperative efforts for the defense of the area as a whole: the achievement of peace and security in the area through MEC will permit social and economic advancement.

4. A function of the Middle East Command will be to assist and support the states associated with it in developing the capacity of each to play a role in the defense of the area as a whole against outside aggression. Problems of an intra-area nature will continue to be handled bilaterally or multilaterally in accordance with the UN Charter, the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, the Armistice Agreements, and the several Treaties of Alliance.

5. The task of the Middle East Command at the outset will consist primarily of planning, the provision of advice and training missions to the Middle East states upon request, and the coordination of arms supplies and the training programs for Middle East nationals in foreign countries.

6. Facilities to train and equip forces of participating nations will be provided by those participating members of the Middle East Command in a position to do so. (Proposal IX to Egypt.)

7. The Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, will command forces placed at his disposal and will develop plans for the operations of all forces within the area (or to be introduced into the area) in time of war or international emergency. However, the placing of forces under command of SACME in peacetime is not a prerequisite for association with the Middle East Command. Movement of those troops placed under SACME’s command within the territories of states associated with the Middle East Command will be made only with the agreement of the associated state concerned.

8. It is anticipated, although details have yet to be settled among founder members, that at the outset the Middle East Command will consist of a small headquarters staffed by officers representing the founder members and the Middle East states associated with the Command. The duty of the Middle East Command commander and his staff will be to the corporate defense enterprise represented by the Command. National interests will be represented at M.E.C. HQ. through a Liaison Organization.

9. Flags and insignia used by Middle East Command will be of special, non-national design to emphasize its cooperative area character.

10. States associated with the Middle East Command will during peacetime have final decision as to the use by Middle East Command of their national territories and resources. SACME, on behalf of states associated with MEC, will reach agreements with the states concerned regarding the rights and obligations which go with MEC association.

11. Notwithstanding the wide differences which exist among the states of the area in resources, size, and population, the Middle East Command will preserve the democratic principle of equality of the states associated with it. (Proposal IV to Egypt.)

12. The broad mission of MEC and its cooperative character make it necessary that all states, whether territorially or not part of the area, act on the basis of the best interests of the cooperative defense of the area.

13. The creation of the Middle East Command is a response to the present lack in the Middle East of organization, capacity and experience to defend the area. (SG 80/4)⁵ When the necessary indigenous organization and capacity for area defense has been created through the efforts of the Middle East Command, the peacetime role in MEC of those countries not territorially part of the Middle East should be minimal.

14. The founder members of MEC do not regard the initial form in which MEC will be organized as unchangeable; they believe MEC should evolve in the manner which will enable it most effectively to provide for the defense of the ME area as a whole.

1. Drafted by G. Lewis Jones and Stabler. Cleared by Nitze, Parsons of RA, Coe of BNA, Hoskins of NEA, and Moore of GTI.
2. Reference is to the President’s Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program, May 24, 1951; see the editorial note, p. 150.

3. Acting Secretary of Defense William C. Foster, under a covering letter of November 3 to the Secretary of State, transmitted a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated November 2, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed general concurrence in the principles of the draft statement but recommended a number of changes in the draft in the interest of accuracy and clarity. They also advised the Secretary of Defense that it had to be recognized that “the establishment of a Middle East Command as has been proposed would be most difficult under current conditions in the Middle East, and that considerable departure from original concepts may have to be made.” Acting Secretary Foster, in view of the JCS comment, informed the Secretary of State that he was forwarding the JCS memorandum with the thought that the two departments “should continue to develop new concepts which will meet the changing conditions in the Middle East as they occur.” He concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   The Department of State did not agree to all of the changes in the draft proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the draft statement was discussed informally between representatives of the two departments on November 3. A later agreed version of the draft statement was sent to Secretary Acheson in Paris in telegram Tosec 13 of November 7; see footnote 3, p. 243.

4. Drafted by G. Lewis Jones and Stabler. Cleared by Parsons, Coe, Hoskins, and Moore.
5. Regarding this NATO defense paper, see vol. iii, pt. 1, p. 573.