Editorial Note
In telegram 2321, niact, from Paris of October 20, Ambassador Bruce reported that the French Government agreed to the proposed approach to the five Arab governments and Israel, outlined in circular telegrams 371 and 372, “and is tonight dispatching telegraphic instrs to its missions in countries concerned.” However, the Foreign Ministry stressed its continuing belief that such an approach had little chance of inducing Arab cooperation at the moment and therefore the representatives of the four powers should “underline” that their approach constituted no more than a notification of intent and not a further invitation (780.5/10–2051). In telegram 1949, niact, from London, October 20, Ambassador Gifford reported that the Foreign Office had discussed circular telegrams 371 and 372 and that while it was “somewhat disappointed new suggestions do not go further towards meeting Brit points” reported in telegram 1915 from London (ante, page 231), nonetheless an approach was desirable. However, the Foreign Office continued to object to the inclusion of any suggestion of a hope that at some future date the countries of the Middle East, including Egypt, would become sufficiently powerful as to assume their own defense burdens and it also expressed the hope that “Ambs can avoid giving impression we want views NE states just at this particular juncture, making it clear we wld expect receive them at later date as Command develops” (780.5/10–2051).
In telegram 357 to Ankara of October 21, Stabler, signing for Acheson, urged that Turkish agreement be immediately obtained for a quadripartite approach to the Arab states and Israel (780.5/10–2151), and Ambassador Wadsworth replied in telegram 383, niact, [Page 237] from Ankara of October 23 that he and his British and French colleagues had submitted nearly identical notes to Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü, and that after subsequent consultation with Köprülü, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had replied that a parallel rather than joint approach be made to the Arab governments preceding by approximately a week that made to Israel (780.5/10–2351). Stabler, signing for Acheson, replied in telegram 363 to Ankara of October 24, that parallel approaches were satisfactory to the United States Government but that they should be made simultaneously to Israel and the Arab states and no later than October 27 (780.5/10–2451). Ambassador Wadsworth in telegrams 389 and 390 from Ankara of October 24 and 25, respectively, reported securing Turkish agreement on these points (780.5/10–2451 and 780.5/10–2551).
Arab reactions to this fresh four-power démarche on the Middle East Command were mixed. In telegram 436, niact, from Beirut, October 26, Minister Harold B. Minor reported the Lebanese Foreign Minister as stating that the delicate situation then existing in the country forced Lebanon to assume a “somewhat ‘reserved’” attitude toward the MEC (780.5/10–2651). Minister Gerald Drew informed the Secretary of State in telegram 117 from Amman, October 27, that the Jordanian Prime Minister “was cordially uncommunicative” to the quadripartite approach, “merely expressing hope we could have further convers on MEC as plans progressed” (780.5/10–2751). Ambassador Raymond Hare reported from Jidda in telegram 219 of October 27, that Khaireddin Zerelky, the acting head of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office, had received the four-power presentation in a “friendly fashion, even including reference approach Israel which he said manifestly of serious concern to all Arab States and our examination of reasons for so doing helpful.” However, Zerelky added that it was “unfortunate presentation project coincided with Egypt crisis” as this naturally induced the Egyptian Government to “see in proposals new move by Brit to induce others to underwrite their imperialistic designs” (780.5/10–2751). In despatch 428 from Baghdad of November 1, Ambassador Edward S. Crocker reported that in conversation, Iraq’s Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations and President of the Chamber of Deputies Mohamed Fadhil al-Jamali had remarked “that Iraquis found two principal obstacles in the way of their adherence to the MEC; one concerned the French and Turkish troops and the other the undefined relation of Israel to the pact” (780.5/11–151).
Conversations between various United States diplomatic officials in the Middle East and representatives of the countries to which they were accredited concerning the Middle East Command took place throughout the remainder of 1951 and were reported in telegrams and despatches which may be found in Department of State file 780.5.