772.00/12–1951: Despatch
The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State
No. 213
Subject: The French Reply of December 151 to Tunisian Demands for Political Reforms.
Foreign Minister Schuman’s note of December 15 to Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Chenik seems to have brought to an abrupt close one stage of the Franco-Tunisian argument over political reforms. No matter how it is read, the note must be taken as a definite set-back for the moderate Tunisian nationalists. They have obtained virtually nothing from a démarche to which they had attached great [Page 1426] importance. It is true that there is a slight apparent gain, since the French Government has agreed to discuss the creation of a new legislative body, but this decision had been taken even before the Tunisian ministers went to Paris. In any case, it is a concession so negligible by comparison with what the Tunisians asked that it hardly counts in the political picture, and it is more than offset by other portions of the note.
Coupled with the replacement of Resident General Louis Perillier by M. Pierre Voizard, the French note seems to make clear that French policy toward Tunisia will be even more cautious in future than it has been during the past year and a half. France has not renounced the policy of negotiation nor the principle of reform, but it has indicated that changes must come very slowly and that there is a definite limit to their extent.
The big question which the note raises in its wake is: what policy will the nationalists now adopt?
[Here follow a detailed analysis of the French note of December 15 and the reaction in Tunisia thereto.]
Comment: It is hard to see how the French Government could have handled the situation in worse fashion. It would have been much better never to have let the Tunisian ministers go to Paris at all, and, once they had gotten there and presented their requests, it would have been better to give an immediate answer even if it said no more than that the Government was not prepared to discuss such questions at that moment.
Instead, the Tunisians were led to expect something, only to get worse than nothing. The Neo-Destour leaders, the only really influential people with whom the French can deal on a reasonable basis, have been exasperated and their prestige hurt. Any negotiations in future will certainly be more difficult.
It is easy to give explanations for the French. The Residency General says it was never expected that the Tunisians would present specific demands and attempt substantive negotiations. (I think any child would have known that Chenik and Co. could not and would not go to Paris merely to exchange polite words.) It is also obvious that the French cabinet had too many urgent things on its hands during the past two months to give proper attention to a relatively secondary problem like Tunisia. (All the more reason for not letting the Tunisians come at all.) It seems, furthermore, clear that the French cabinet was divided among itself regarding the policy to adopt and that the majority might have been split if Schuman had forced the issue. But all this merely adds up to a story of indecision and ineptitude which may be explicable and excusable but does not alter the fact that the Tunisian situation has become worse.
- See telegram 3618, December 17, from Paris, supra.↩