772.00/12–351: Telegram
The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State 1
45. As Emb Paris was informed Dec 1,2 I do not think approach suggested Deptel 27 Nov 303 desirable. My reasons are:
- (1)
- Proffer of direct official Amer advice to Tunisians mins wld put US squarely in middle of dispute from here on out. Tunisians wld consider we had shown ourselves interested party and wld expect US continue intervene in debate on every future occasion. They wld attempt make my position here that of Amb to Neo-Destour.4
- (2)
- I do not concur that Tunisians using improper pressure tactics on Fr. In first place, if world situation were not tense and if Tunisians did not agitate, they wld have no chance of getting any concessions whatsoever. In second place, such pressure tactics as pub Chenik note and calling strike adopted only after Fr colonists in Tunisia had exerted every possible pressure prevent reforms.5 In third place, it is my understanding pub conf document is recognized right of govt which sends it and is frequently done by great powers. In fourth place, strikes and demonstrations are only means open to Tunisians to prove popular support of Natlist leaders.6
- (3)
- In any case, it wld be absolutely futile attempt to convince Tunisian leaders they are wrong in using this kind of pressure. They consider they have shown great patience and moderation.7
- (4)
- If we say we are satisfied Fr will grant maximum concessions possible, Tunisians will believe we have put real pressure on Fr and have concrete assurances of substantial concessions. When disillusionment comes, they will insist we do something to justify their having relied on our optimism.
- (5)
- If we tell Fr we disapprove Tunisians pressure tactics, they may be encouraged resist demands and may throw our words back at us in future as evidence we recognize Tunisians do not negotiate in good faith.
In sum, I believe it unwise for us to give direct formal8 advice to Tunisians unless and until we are prepared intervene fully with sides in all-out effort resolve Tunisian problem.9 McBride’s talk with Puaux (Paris tel 3218 Nov 2910) seems far as we shld go at moment unless Secy or Amb Bruce has support unity talk on same lines with Fr at higher level.
- This telegram was repeated to Paris. The source text bears a number of handwritten comments on portions of the text. These comments, apparently written by Richey (NEA/AF), are noted in footnotes 4 through 9, below.↩
-
Telegram 3274, December 1, from Paris, reported as follows:
“Jernegan phoned Emb this morning and stated he concurred recommendation Embtel 3264, November 30 [supra] that no approach be made by Emb to Tunisian del now in Paris. Jernegan asked Dept be informed he will convey his reasons for desiring no action Paris this time by tel as soon as his communications facilities permit.” (772.00/12–151)
↩ - Same as telegram 3239, November 29, to Paris, p. 1420.↩
- Handwritten marginal notation on source text opposite this paragraph reads: “Did they do this when Jernegan expressed U.S. views last year? We could hedge this point in our conversations.”↩
- Handwritten marginal notation “Did we know this?” appears in connection with phrase beginning “only after Fr colonists …” in source text.↩
- The final sentence of this paragraph is underscored in the source text and is accompanied by the following handwritten marginal notation: “Strikes and demonstrations lead to incidents which negate their purposes.”↩
- The last sentence of this paragraph is underscored in the source text and is accompanied by the following handwritten notation: “True and we want them to continue to do so also.”↩
- In the source text the word “formal” is circled, and a handwritten notation reads: “Why is it not informal advice?”↩
- In the source text this sentence is underlined in pencil and an accompanying handwritten marginal notation reads: “Maybe by talking to both sides we can avoid this very situation.”↩
- Ante, p. 1421.↩