772.00/11–2751: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
3239. Tunis tel 39 Nov 27 rptd Paris 242 and previous tels from Tunis and Paris re Franco-Chenik negots. Present developments Tunisia wld appear clearly indicate Tunisian nationalists attempting take advantage present situation Mid East and Morocco to pressure Fr into mtg demands presented Tunisian Note Oct 31.3 While, for same reasons stated Tunis tel 33 Nov 23 (rptd Paris 21),4 we hope, and in fact believe it essential, that Fr grant Tunisians maximum concessions possible, we have little sympathy for pressure tactics now being employed by Tunisians achieve immed objectives. We think Tunisian action calling gen strike Nov 29 most untimely as was pub text Note Oct 31. However, since immed objective is keep situation in Tunisia quiet we believe US is in position help Fr (and Tunisians) at this juncture by expressing US position on present situation to appropriate Tunisian leaders. Accordingly, in your discretion, Emb shld approach FonOff along fol lines:
US believes Fr is on right track in Tunisia in pursuing policy collaboration with New Destour. We hope this policy will continue and (for reasons set forth Tunis tel 33 Nov 23) we hope Fr will make maximum possible concessions to Tunisia as result present negots. We fully appreciate Tunisians trying take advantage present Mid East-North African situation pressure France into making greater concessions than cld normally be expected. We disapprove Tunisian pressure tactics and realize these tactics may disrupt existing cordial atmosphere negots and create situation precluding any favorable action by Fr on Tunisian demands. This in turn cld lead to further unrest and trouble Tunisia which nobody wants. Therefore, in interests helping Fr, Emb authorized inform Chenik and/or Ben Youseff that (1) US firmly believes present policy moderation and collaboration with Fr being pursued by Tunisians is in their best interests and we hope see this policy continued. (2) US has no sympathy for present pressure tactics being used against Fr by Tunisians. Such tactics can only serve stiffen Fr public opinion against Tunisians and thus [Page 1421] make position Schuman and Council Ministers more difficult re granting concessions. In short, these tactics are against best interests Tunisians, France and whole Western world. (3) We are satisfied Fr will grant maximum concessions possible. (4) We strongly urge Tunisians reconsider matter and pursue course moderation and cooperation.
View rapidly changing events Tunisia Emb requested take no action until ConGen Tunis comments this proposal. If feasible Tunis requested telephone views Paris. If Jernegan concurs proposed approach he may, in his discretion, and after initial approach made to Fr in Paris, take similar action vis-à-vis any appropriate Nationalist leader still in Tunisia.5
- This telegram, which was also sent to Tunis as 27, was drafted by Richey (NEA/AF), cleared by Godley (WE), and Bourgerie approved transmission and signed for the Secretary of State.↩
- Not printed.↩
- On October 31 Prime Minister Chenik presented a note to the French Government in Paris setting forth the Tunisian case for reform. Chenik’s note included three principal demands: (1) the creation of an elected, representative Tunisian legislative assembly; (2) the formation of a completely Tunisian cabinet; (3) the gradual replacement of all French civil servants in Tunisia with Tunisian subjects. For the text of the Chenik note of October 31, see L’Année politique, 1951, pp. 587–589.↩
- Supra.↩
- Telegram 3273, November 30, to Paris, repeated to Tunis, instructed as follows: “In view contents Paris tel 3218 Nov 29 rptd 38 [printed infra] action suggested Deptel 3239 Nov 29 rptd Tunis 27 wld appear be unnecessary.” (772.00/11–2951)↩