Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

772.00/10–951

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper)

confidential

[Washington,] October 9–10, 1951.

Subject: Aspirations of Tunisia

Participants:	Habib Bourguiba, President, Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia
	Farhat Hached, Secretary General of the UGTT, Tunisia
	Samuel K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director of NE

As had been anticipated, I encountered Habib Bourguiba at the Saudi Arabian Embassy last night. Farhat Hached was with him. I said that I was sorry that I had not been able to attend the luncheon given in Bourguiba’s honor by the Egyptian Ambassador last week, but I had been out of town.

Without my mentioning the question, Bourguiba brought up the matter of the speech which it was reported he would give at San Francisco on September 21. He emphatically said that the speech, advance copies of which Abed Bouhafa had given me, did not represent his views. He disclaimed responsibility for the extreme pronouncements contained in the statement. He said that he had not seen the English translation and was surprised when informed of the substance. He said he was sorry that the speech had gained any circulation for he was afraid it had an effect on whether he would be able to see Assistant Secretary McGhee or not. He wished very much to see Mr. McGhee before he returned to Tunisia.

I told Mr. Bourguiba I was glad to hear that he had not given the speech at San Francisco for we in the Department did not think that it would have helped the Franco-Tunisian situation any. As long as he had mentioned it we told him quite frankly that the speech had caused considerable concern. The French had been particularly perturbed by it. I explained that Mr. McGhee had been out of town and was exceedingly busy at the present time with the Iranian question. I then asked Bourguiba and Farhat Hached to lunch with me the next day. (It had been previously arranged with EUR that if it seemed satisfactory I might invite Bourguiba to lunch privately. I had informed Jean-Pierre Benard Saturday afternoon, October 6, that this might take place. The latter conversation is the subject of a separate memorandum.¹)

At lunch today Habib Bourguiba commenced by referring to his speech again. He described Bouhafa as silly and irresponsible. He said that he and Farhat Hached had heavy responsibilities, whereas Bouhafa, although an idealist, did not understand the difficult task of those in responsible positions. He then showed me a press clipping from Le Monde of October 6,² in which he denied having given the speech attributed to him.

Bourguiba then gave me a number of press clippings which he felt demonstrated that he and Farhat Hached were moderate in their approach. He said their position was exceedingly difficult because the Communists were continually attacking them for being collaborationists with the Imperialists. He cited an article from L’Avenir de la Tunisie (organ of the Tunisian Communists) dated July 27, the headline of which was “Le Peuple Tunisian ne Veut ni Collaboration ni Marchandages Avec les Imperialistes”. This article was in response to a statement Mr. Bourguiba had made favoring cooperation between the Tunisian Nationalists and the non-Communist powers, including France, to defend the free world against the totalitarian danger.

Another clipping from L’Avenir dated September 15 accused Farhat Hached and the UGTT of being associated with the Imperialists.

Mr. Bourguiba said that the Neo Destour Party was in an increasingly difficult position. If it were not able to show that it was making progress toward bringing self-government to Tunisia, it would lose support. The people might then turn to the Communist Party. The Neo Destour Party had to have some encouragement. He hoped that he could see Mr. McGhee. If he returned to Tunisia without seeing him it would constitute a loss of face; the Communists would say that he was not a very strong figure. They would ask whether his advocacy of moderation and cooperation with the Western nations was paying off. I repeated Mr. McGhee was very busy and Bourguiba had already seen a number of American officials.³

Bourguiba also repeated that he wished to work things out in a peaceful and moderate way with France, but he must be able to show progress. He referred to the coming independence of Libya and the Gold Coast.

Referring to the Anglo-Egyptian question, he felt that the Egyptians had taken unwise and precipitate action in abrogating their treaty with Britain.

I did not make any extensive comments on what Bourguiba and his colleague said. I simply expressed the hope that they would continue to exercise moderation. I said I thought that some progress had been made over the past couple of years. He was well aware of the relation between France and the United States.

Both Bourguiba and Farhat Hached seemed pleased with the luncheon. They took the occasion to show me a number of pictures (for the second time) of their activities in Tunisia.

Mr. Bourguiba gave me a copy of the attached statement he was planning to give the press at the end of the week.⁴ The statement is certainly quite moderate compared with the speech which he did not give at San Francisco.

1. The memorandum under reference here has not been found in the Department of State flies.
2. This and other clippings mentioned in this memorandum are attached to the source text.

3. Regarding Bourguiba’s meeting with Bourgerie and other Department officers on September 14, see Richey’s memorandum of conservation, p. 1405. On October 3, Irving Brown, the European Representative of the A.F. of L., called on Daniel L. Horowitz, the Labor Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs; the operative portion of Horowitz’ memorandum of conversation reads as follows:

   “Brown said that he was concerned with the American Government’s policy toward North Africa and the reluctance to do anything other than what he described as going along with the French policy. He said that if Mr. Bourghiba did not succeed in seeing Mr. McGhee this would have undesirable repercussions. He said that Mr. McGhee had given the impression in the Middle East that the U.S. was interested in developing positive policy toward the Arab world and that failing to see Bourghiba in Washington would negate that impression. In addition, Bourghiba himself would make much of the slight and Brown said that unless there was some appearance of change in U.S. policy he himself would be impelled to criticize publicly the unwillingness of the U.S. to do other than accept the French position.” (611.515/10–351)

4. Not printed.