611.72/9–1851: Despatch
The Consul General at Tunis ( Jernegan ) to the Department of State
No. 107
Subject: Comments on Policy Statement on Tunisia
I regret that, through an oversight, this office has not previously commented on the revised policy statement on Tunisia dated October 5, 1950.1 The following observations may be of some use to the Department in its consideration of the next revision.
In general, I concur fully in the statement as it stands. It is succinct yet covers all the essential elements. The one serious weakness, which probably cannot be corrected at the present time, is that it does not set forth any means of persuading the French Government to take the action we consider necessary if the Tunisian situation is to be stabilized. My specific comments are:
Page 1, Paragraph 2: I think it has become unrealistic to set as an objective the incorporation of Tunisia into the French Union as an associated state. Those terms have very definite meanings to the French and Tunisians, and the Tunisian nationalists seem bitterly opposed to the specific relationship which they imply. However, the dominant nationalist group, the Neo-Destour, does appear willing to accept a special (as yet only vaguely defined) relationship with France provided it is not accompanied by the labels “French Union” or “associated state”. Perhaps the statement could read as follows: “We believe that our objectives can be most satisfactorily achieved by agreement between the French and the Tunisian nationalists on a long-term modus vivendi which will assure the evolution of Tunisia toward selfgovernment as an autonomous state managing its internal affairs but retaining a special relationship with France in the fields of foreign relations and defense and continuing to receive French assistance in economic and technical fields.”
Page Paragraph 4: It seems highly improbable to me that the French would consider negotiating a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the United States on behalf of Tunisia unless and [Page 1412] until a similar treaty had been concluded between the United States and France. To do so would, in the French mind, be conceding to Tunisia too independent a personality. I agree, however, that efforts should be made to include Tunisia in the treaty with France or, failing that, to persuade the French to make a separate treaty after their own has been signed.
Page 3, Paragraph 2: Since the current policy statement was drafted, the French authorities have invoked the state of seige on a number of occasions to restrain what they considered improper nationalist activities. While it is true that French policy is more lenient than it was during and immediately after World War II, the change has not been sufficient to allay nationalist resentment.
Page 3, Paragraph 3: Except for municipal reforms, which are still under study, ail the specific changes mentioned in this paragraph have been put into effect. In addition, the veto power of the Secretary General has been abolished, although in practice it has simply been transferred to the Resident General. Other minor changes, of which the Department is aware, have also been made. These reforms, however, have had little effect in satisfying the nationalists, who claim with much reason that they are mostly window-dressing and do not even go so far as the French originally proposed.
Page 3, Paragraph 4: The current Tunisian communist line calls for a united front not only for the “triumph of liberty and peace” but also for the achievement of “true national independence”. The local communist party is hammering hard at the latter theme, with the double objective of causing trouble for the French Government and embarrassing the moderate nationalists who are willing to negotiate for something less than complete independence.
Page 4, Paragraph 1: I do not think it can be said that during the past year the French have “indicated increasing concern” over communist activities in Tunisia. Rather to the contrary, the Resident General and his subordinates have repeatedly asserted to me that the communist threat is negligible. This is not to say that the French ignore the communists; I am sure they maintain surveillance, but they do not appear worried and they are obviously much more interested in nationalist activities.
Page 4, Pargraph 5: The possibility of a United Nations debate on the Tunisian question remains ever with us, though it seems no more imminent today than in past years. Just why the nationalists have not made a more determined drive to bring their case before this international forum is a mystery to me. It is true that Habib Bourguiba has been touring the world for months to arouse sympathy for Tunisia, with an eventual UN debate in mind, but there are no indications of plans for concrete action. Nationalist policy seems always to be one of waiting for something to turn up, hoping that French concessions will be forthcoming or that some deus ex machina will intervene. On the other hand, it may be that the Tunisians have simply been unable to persuade any UN member to take the plunge of raising the question formally.
Page 4, Paragraph 6: The French have not yet granted any substantial degree of greater responsibility to the Tunisians. The reforms so far enacted, since August, 1950, do not really change the power of the French authorities to control every aspect of the Tunisian administration; at the same time, they do provide a possibility of [Page 1413] considerably more operating leeway for the Tunisian ministers, provided the French follow a hands-off policy. The French claim they have prodded the Tunisians to assume greater operating responsibilities and that the latter have been uninterested, unwilling or incapable, in most instances. As exceptions, they cite two or three ministers who have shown energy and initiative but who are not nationalist leaders. On the opposite side, the nationalists assert that they are controlled and blocked at every turn by the French, given no freedom of action, and that nothing can be accomplished under such circumstances.
My present feeling is that the French have been too cautious and have not gone nearly far enough in their concessions to accomplish their avowed purpose of establishing a firm basis for friendly Franco-Tunisian cooperation. Even if we admit, as I suspect we must, that the Tunisians would not run the country as efficiently as the French, there remains the overriding political consideration that nationalism is a powerful force in the world and paternalism is largely outmoded. It is not good enough to repeat the eternal French argument that Egypt was better-off under British control, that Syria has gone to pieces since France was forced out, that the Philippines are a mess since American rule ceased, that independent India has become a liability rather than an asset to the free world. Those countries did not become independent simply because the colonial power in each case decided they had reached a state of perfection and could manage their own affairs better than anyone could do it for them. They were emancipated because it was politically and economically unfeasible to continue their dependent status. The same situation is eventually going to confront France in Tunisia unless she can first achieve a new relationship based on free Tunisian consent. Her present rate of progress is too slow, her tactics too dilatory and too exasperating to the nationalists, to accomplish this.
Page 5, Paragraphs 1 and 2: It is certainly true that if the question of French rule in North Africa is raised in the UN, the United States will be faced with a serious question of policy determination. If we support France, we shall incur the bitter resentment and distrust of the Moslem world and, probably, of all formerly dependent nations. It would be, it seems to me, practically impossible to argue convincingly that France is really pursuing the policy best suited to the interests of the Tunisian people and that Tunisia should remain indefinitely in dependent status. Whatever the hard merits of that argument, it would sound very weak in opposition to the cries of “self-determination”, “freedom for all peoples”, “down with imperialism”, which would undoubtedly be raised on every side, especially since there are a number of independent peoples no better fitted to run themselves than are the Tunisians. Furthermore, France’s record in Tunisia is weak with regard to civil and political liberties, democratic processes, etc. It is difficult to defend, before an emotional public assembly, a regime which has on occasion arbitrarily suspended opposition newspapers, prosecutes political agitators before military courts applying martial law in time of peace, and refuses to permit the establishment of elective legislative bodies.
On the other hand, the difficulties of opposing France in the UN are obvious, and the results of a French defeat before the assembled representatives of the world could not but be harmful to over-all [Page 1414] American interests. If, to take the extreme case, Tunisia should become independent overnight, we might find that a highly vulnerable and highly strategic piece of territory had slipped outside the orbit of western defense and become a potential bridgehead for the Soviet bloc. Or, as a lesser evil, the United States might be forced to assume yet another burden in supporting the Tunisian economy and endeavoring to replace French political guidance. Even if the outcome of the debate merely amounted to a moral condemnation of France, it would weaken the position of the whole western group of nations.
A French policy of really progressive political reform in Tunisia seems to me to be the only means of avoiding the dilemma. If it did not prevent the case from being raised in the UN, it would at least give France and her friends, including the United States, a plausible basis for arguing that things were going very well and there was no need to interfere. Our policy, of course, has been and is to encourage the French in this direction. Unfortunately, our representations seem to have had little effect. So far as I can judge from this restricted viewpoint, they are likely to continue without effect unless something occurs which gives the United States a clear, direct reason for intervening in what the French continue to regard as strictly an internal affair. That something might be the immediate threat of a UN debate. If we were about to be called upon by France to back her up in the General Assembly, we would have good grounds for insisting that she must do something concrete to provide us with ammunition.
- For text of the policy statement, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 1792.↩