Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

772.00/9–1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by Earle J. Richey of the Office of African Affairs

confidential

[Washington,] September 14, 1951.

Subject: Political Situation in Tunisia

Participants:	Mr. Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisian Neo Destour Party
	AF—Mr. Elmer H. Bourgerie
	WE—Mr. J. M. Godley
	AF—Mr. E. J. Richey

Mr. Bourguiba opened the conversation by referring to his recent travels throughout the Arab world and mentioned that he had talked to Ambassador Henderson in India and to Ambassador Cochran in Indonesia.¹ He stated that he had talked to Ambassador Henderson regarding the Tunisian situation and that the Ambassador had suggested that when he came to the United States he present the position of the Tunisian Nationalists to the Department. In this connection Mr. Bourguiba mentioned a letter which he had written to Mr. McGhee requesting a meeting with him while he was in the Near East in the Spring of this year.²

Mr. Bourguiba stated that there had always been a conflict between the Tunisian Nationalists and the French in Tunisia but that this conflict had been largely resolved in August of 1950 when M.Schuman had stated publicly that Tunisia must be developed toward self-government and that direct French control in Tunisia must be tapered off. On the basis of the program proposed by Schuman through Resident General Perillier the Neo Destour had elected to collaborate with the French and was participating in the present Tunisian Government which, operating as M.Schuman had envisaged it, marked the end of direct French rule in Tunisia. However, he said, the Tunisian Resident General was being prevented from carrying out the program of reforms which had been agreed to by the Neo Destour, and which formed the basis for French-Neo Destour collaboration. Opposition to this reform program, Mr. Bourguiba said, came from French Colons in Tunisia and from irresponsible elements in France, as well as from selfish French office holders in the Protectorate. He said that these elements were sabotaging Schuman’s plan for Tunisia, and he pointed out that Resident General Perillier had admitted to a correspondent of the London Times that the reason for the present stalemate in the Tunisian reform program was opposition from the Colons and French office holders in Tunisia. He stated that the present impasse would lead to real trouble in Tunisia unless corrected. He mentioned the massacres of 1938 and stated that with conditions growing steadily worse at the present time, violence might again be the result if the situation were not remedied. He referred to the criticism which had been directed at the Neo Destour party by the Old Destour and the Communists as a result of the party’s present policy of collaboration with the French and the resulting difficult position the Neo Destour was placed in when the French failed to live up to the agreement which formed the basis for such collaboration. He stressed the fact that Schuman’s plan was being blocked, that conditions in Tunisia were growing steadily worse and that trouble was brewing. He stated that during his recent tours he had been explaining this situation trying to bring pressure on the French to continue Schuman’s program in order to avoid trouble and massacres and that if trouble did come the responsibility would rest with the French.

Mr. Bourguiba stated that the Neo Destour was truly democratic. He stressed the democratic nature of the Nationalist movement in Tunisia and pointed to the withdrawal of the UGTT from the WFTU and its recent affiliation with the ICFTU. He mentioned that the Secretary General of the UGTT was an officer in the ICFTU thus substantiating that the labor movement in Tunisia was democratic in the same way that the ICFTU is democratic. He mentioned that Tunisia had no Jewish problem and stressed that Nationalism in Tunisia was basically a national movement supported by all the Tunisians. He referred to the presence of United States troops in Tunisia during World War II at which time they were fighting for liberty—the same thing for which Tunisians were fighting today. The United States, he said, owed the Tunisians their liberty. He then stressed that Tunisians were not against France, but only against those elements within France which were blocking Schuman’s program for Tunisia. He stated that under the present French yoke, Tunisians could not make their contribution to the Western world during the present fight against the Soviet East. He recognized the interests which the U.S. and France had in common in the present world struggle and stressed that he did not ask the United States to support Tunisia as against France; that the only thing he asked was that we support Schuman’s policy for Tunisia. He emphasized that we must find the means to support this policy in order to avoid trouble in Tunisia.

Mr. Bourgerie replied by stating that the Department was grateful to have this opportunity of hearing Mr. Bourguiba’s views. He referred to Mr. McGhee’s visit to Tunisia in the fall of 1950³ and stated that at that time both he and Mr. McGhee had talked at length with Resident General Perillier about the reform program and about political conditions in Tunisia. He also referred to the meeting which Mr. McGhee had with Bey of Tunis. He said that the United States was interested in North African problems and was fairly familiar with recent developments in Tunisia. This Government, he said, hoped that the French and the Tunisians could work their problems out in a spirit of cooperation and moderation; that such a spirit was necessary and most essential at the present time.

Mr. Bourguiba replied by stating that no policy could be more moderate than the one presently being pursued by the Neo Destour. He repeated that this policy was so moderate that the Neo Destour was being severely criticised by the Old Destour for collaborating with the French and that to date such moderation had only proved that it did not bring results. It had only resulted in both the Neo Destour and M.Schuman being attacked by their own people for pursuing such a policy. He repeated that no policy could be more moderate than the one now being pursued, and that since August 1950, no progress had been made in the reform program, which was a long time.

Mr. Godley stated that he knew that Mr. Bourguiba appreciated the number of problems facing Mr. Schuman both nationally and internationally and the number of other axes Mr. Schuman had to grind in addition to the problems in Tunisia. He stated that while the period from August 1950 to date seemed like a long time, it was infinitely short in relation to the history of the development of a nation. He stated that the very fact that Mr. Schuman was able to present and have approved by his Cabinet the program which he proposed for Tunisia illustrated the evolution in French political thinking. The fact that Mr. Schuman was still in office was further evidence of evolution in French political thought. Mr. Godley emphasized that the present situation required patience on both sides and an understanding of the problems and difficulties facing Mr. Schuman.

Mr. Bourguiba replied by stating that there was a distinction between what France said and what France practiced. He referred again to the selfish actions of the Colons in Tunisia in blocking the reform program and reiterated that the present problem in Tunisia could only be solved by implementation of the reform program. He pointed out that Libya and the Gold Coast were approaching self-government while Tunisia was still under direct administration by the French. He observed that Tunisians could not understand such a situation. The Tunisians, Mr. Bourguiba said, were moderate and anxious to cooperate but also determined to progress from their present status.

Mr. Bourgerie closed the conversation by informing Mr. Bourguiba that he would study the documents left with him by Mr. Bourguiba.⁴ He thanked Mr. Bourguiba again for giving the Department the opportunity to hear his views and expressed the hope that his visit in the United States would be a most pleasant one.⁵ He urged Mr. Bourguiba to use moderation in his statements to the public while in the United States, since such a course would facilitate the entry into the U.S. of other North Africans who might wish to visit this country.

Before departing Mr. Bourguiba asked if it would be possible for him to see Mr. McGhee after he (Bourguiba) returned from San Francisco.⁶ Mr. Bourgerie explained how busy Mr. McGhee is and that it was not possible to say whether Mr. McGhee would be in Washington at that time.

1. Bourguiba visited Karachi, New Delhi, and Jakarta during March 1951. Bourguiba met with Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi on March 14. According to Henderson’s memorandum of the conversations, transmitted as an enclo-sure to despatch 2183, March 15, from New Delhi, Bourguiba presented his view of the reform program in Tunisia which was not essentially dissimilar to the presentation recorded in his memorandum of conversation. Henderson spoke to Bourguiba as follows:

   “I told Mr. Bourghiba that I had received him only in a personal capacity; that as a representative of the American Government I could not receive him or his associates; that I was not qualified to discuss matters pertaining to relations between the United States and countries other than India; but that I would, nevertheless, pass along what he had to say to me to my friends in Washington.

   “I added that although I had no authorization to discuss American policies with him, I could, nevertheless, tell him personally what I understood to be the general attitude of the United States towards colonialism. I described our general attitude and then told him that in my opinion resort to violence by Tunisian Nationalists at this stage would not be likely to serve any good purpose but might well bring great harm to the people of Tunisia and might impede the development of Tunisia into a prosperous, healthy, self-respecting state. Only the Communists and those forces which thrive in chaos would benefit by civil war in Tunisia.”

   Henderson ended his memorandum of conversation as follows:

   “I asked Mr. Bourghiba if he was acquainted with Mr. Jernegan, our Consul General in Tunis, whom I knew personally as an exceptionally able diplomat. Mr. Bourghiba said that it had been his policy to hold somewhat aloof from the American Consulate General in Tunis since he was afraid that visits or gestures of friendship on his part might prove embarrassing to the consular representatives of the United States in Tunisia.” (772.00/3–1551)

2. In an undated letter addressed to McGhee from Karachi, received in the Department of State in early April 1951, Bourguiba requested a meeting with McGhee in Colombo or Washington in order to discuss the situation in Tunisia. McGhee, who had been in Ceylon in late February and early March 1951 in connection with a meeting of South Asian Chiefs of Mission, never met with Bourguiba, and in a letter of reply of April 13 McGhee did not make any effort to invite Bourguiba to Washington for a meeting. (772.00/4–551)
3. For information on McGhee’s visit to Tunisia in October 1950, see despatch 109 from Tunis, October 3, 1950, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 1786.
4. The documents referred to here cannot be further identified. No documents were found attached to the source text.
5. Bourguiba met with NEA Deputy Director Kopper on September 17 and again reviewed the situation in Tunisia. Kopper’s memorandum of that conversation concluded with the observation that Bourguiba had taken a somewhat stronger and more pessimistic line than he had in his conversation with Bourgerie and Godley. (772.00/9–1751)
6. Bourguiba was scheduled to make an address to the A.F. of L. conference in San Francisco. The address, scheduled for September 21, was not made; see Kopper’s memorandum of conversations, October 9–10, p. 1416.