Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

780.5/10–1651: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices ¹

top secret

Washington, October 16, 1951—7:46 p. m.

357. (1) Egypt rejection MEC proposals will raise many ques in Arab States and Israel re future course of action by four powers. Dept considers it of highest importance that four powers continue to show same solidarity as has been evidenced in approach to Egypt and that they make quite clear that Egypt action will not deflect them in any way from determination establish MEC. Consequently Embs Paris, London, Ankara, shld seek concurrence fol line of quadripartite action Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman without delay. We feel it essential that NE states receive authoritative reply to ques “What will four powers do now?” from four powers in manner best suited local circumstances. Answering ques more important than manner presenting ans but important maintain quadripartite aspect.

(2) Fol points wld be made by US, UK, Turk and Fr Reps.

(a) Founders MEC are disappointed by Egypt rejection of proposals after what quite obviously was hasty and casual consideration. We can only conclude that this precipitate action was taken in the heat of a domestic polit situation since the merits inherent in the farreaching proposals are self-evident. Founders must hope as friends of Egypt that future study of the proposals may lead to a change in the Egypt attitude fol a second and more thoughtful look.

(b) Founder members of MEC have always recognized possibility that Egypt wld not be willing to cooperate in MEC at the outset and had decided that need for such coop security enterprise of such importance to the defense of the ME area as a whole that MEC wld be established irrespective of Egypt decision.

(c) US wld say, and other founders wld bring forward their own inducements, that as evidence of US seriousness of purpose with regard to MEC that US will in near future approach Govt to which accredited in connection with possible econ and mil assistance programs under MSP legis. This will be done through Amer Chief of Mission with a view to discussing with state concerned programs of assistance in both fields. From time MSP appropriations authorized NE states will be eligible for arms procurement assistance on a cash reimbursable basis and to supplement such purchases some US grant arms assistance may be available. Supply arms in either category will be coordinated by US, with UK and Fr (principal suppliers) through machinery set up under MEC framework: it will difficult for US to justify aid to states which do not cooperate with MEC. We confid expect econ funds available shortly for firm allotment.

(d) US considers it important that NE states shld consider most seriously giving their agreement in principle to collaborate with MEC. We hope this decision will be taken on basis what MEC has to offer welfare of state concerned and without reference Egypts action. Once a state has indicated its decision in principle its views and needs can be better taken into account in formulating MEC details. FYI Cyprus is being considered for HQ MEC.

(3) If asked whether US backs UK in retaining its forces as at present in the Suez base, US Rep wld be authorized to reply that US considers Brit forces in Egypt by right conferred under the 1936 Treaty which, as the Secy said on Oct 10, the US does not consider subject to unilateral abrogation. You may also make point that purpose of MEC is to build stability and strength in an area where defense capabilities of states are dangerously limited. Consequently, until MEC has succeeded in improving the levels of area defensive capabilities, the US wld consider the evacuation of the Suez Base without adequate substitute for strength withdrawn as a retrograde step from the point of view of the MEC objective. The US does, of course, look forward to the time when the states of the ME, including Egypt, will possess indigenous mil capabilities sufficient to assure the defense of their terrs and the area as a whole. In this event the US believes the role of non-ME powers in time of peace shld be minimal.

(4) London, Paris and Ankara shld use this tel to ascertain whether these Govts still firm on decision set up MEC and whether they agree approach by Chiefs of Mission suggested above is most effective manner advising ME Govts of this intention. If so, UK, Fr and Turks may wish send comparable instrs (with counterpart considerations Para 2 (c)) to NE capitals in order arrange approaches similar those under Deptel 1976 Oct 11 to London.²

(5) As soon as agreement above approach obtained from UK, Fr and Turk missions Arab caps will be further instructed. Tel Aviv will receive special instructions.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Jones and Stabler, cleared by Perkins, Nitze, Moore, Raynor, and, in substance, by Defense. Personally approved for transmission and signed by Acheson. Sent for action, priority, to Paris, London, Ankara; sent for information, until instructed, to Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman; sent for information only to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Tehran.
2. Not printed; it requested Gifford to inform the Foreign Office urgently of the desire of the Department of State that shortly following presentation of the MEC proposals to Egypt, quadripartite approaches should be made to the other Arab states and Israel to inform them in confidence of the MEC concept as embodied in the proposals to Egypt. A united approach by all four ambassadors to the governments to which they were accredited was recommended as the best policy, but if that were impossible, separate approaches made on the same day were strongly urged “Since quadripartite approach is basic in MEC concept” and the Department of State “believes common front four powers shld be apparent all stages.” In closing, Acheson stated his particular wish “to avoid approaches giving impression traditional ‘spheres of influence’ still exist”. (780.5/10–1151)